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GLOSSARY
Bit-stream image – an exact bit by bit copy created from a storage device such as a hard
drive.
Cloud computing – “a model for enabling ubiquitous convenient, on-demand network
access to a shared pool of confgurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and
released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction” (Mell &
Grance, 2011)
Cloud computing provider – a company that owns and maintains the cloud computing
resources rented by customers (Garcia, 2014)
Virtualization – “it is the process of hiding the underlying physical hardware so that it can
be shared and used by multiple virtual machines” (Chirammal, Mukhedkar, &
Vettathu, 2016) ; It is an abstraction layer that allows the creation of software
representations of computer physical resources (Pollitt et al., 2008)
Virtualization node – “the physical computer that runs the virtualization software”
(Chirammal et al., 2016)
Hypervisor – “a layer between the underlying physical hardware and the virtual machines
running on top of it [...] It is a piece of software that is responsible for monitoring
and controlling virtual machines” (Chirammal et al., 2016)
Virtual machine (VM) – is a software emulation of a physical computer that runs its own
operating system and applications (Pollitt et al., 2008)
Kernel-based virtual machine (KVM) – is a full virtualization solution that turns the Linux
kernel into a hypervisor by inserting a loadable kernel module (Chirammal et al.,
2016)
Virtual machine introspection (VMI) – a technique that “consists in monitoring virtual
machines from the hypervisor level in order to inspect their states and activities”
(Hebbal, Laniepce, & Menaud, 2015)
Virtual private server (VPS) – a cloud computing solution that consists of a private virtual
machine, managed exclusively by a customer (Zahedi, 2014)
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Title: Digital Forensic Acquisition of Virtual Private Servers Hosted in Cloud Providers
that Use KVM as a Hypervisor
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Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) is one of the most popular hypervisors used by
cloud providers to offer virtual private servers (VPSs) to their customers. A VPS is just a
virtual machine (VM) hired and controlled by a customer but hosted in the cloud provider
infrastructure. In spite of the fact that the usage of VPS is popular and will continue to
grow in the future, it is rare to fnd technical publications in the digital forensic feld
related to the acquisition process of a VPS involved in a crime. For this research, four
VMs were created in a KVM virtualization node, simulating four independent VPSs and
running different operating systems and applications. The utilities virsh and tcpdump
were used at the hypervisor level to collect digital data from the four VPSs. The utility
virsh was employed to take snapshots of the hard drives and to create images of the RAM
content while the utility tcpdump was employed to capture in real-time the network traffc.
The results generated by these utilities were evaluated in terms of effciency, integrity, and
completeness. The analysis of these results suggested both utilities were capable of
collecting digital data from the VPSs in an effcient manner, respecting the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired. Therefore, these tools can be used to acquire
forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS hosted in a cloud provider’s virtualization
node that uses KVM as a hypervisor.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the introduction to this research study. The general
background, scope, and signifcance of the problem that lead to the research question and
hypotheses are described next. Limitations, delimitations, and assumptions are also
introduced.

1.1 Background
Digital forensics is a science whose main objective is to gather and examine
evidence from digital devices in order to be presented in a court of law during a criminal
investigation (Holt, Bossler, & Seigfried-Spellar, 2015). It is relatively young compared
to other forensic sciences such as DNA or entomology, but its contribution is vital because
nowadays every crime involves some kind of digital information (Holt et al., 2015). A
digital device can be involved in a crime in three different ways: as a tool to commit the
crime, as a target of the criminal behavior, and as an incidental to the illegal activity (Holt
et al., 2015; Rogers, 2017). Although there is no unique standard procedure to depict the
phases of a digital investigation process in every case, there are four common phases
always present: identifcation, acquisition, examination, and presentation (Holt et al.,
2015). During identifcation, investigators survey the digital environment to detect
possible sources of data (Holt et al., 2015). Acquisition is the process of collecting data
from the sources previously identifed, while examination represents the analysis of the
data to extract meaningful evidence (Holt et al., 2015). Finally, during the presentation
phase investigators report the methods used and the results obtained in a court of law (Holt
et al., 2015).
The acquisition phase is crucial because the success of the following phases
depends on the data collected (Kolhe & Ahirao, 2017; Ligh, Case, Levy, & Walters,
2014). The investigator has to decide which data need to be collected and the proper
method to do it in order to preserve the state of the digital environment under examination
(Kolhe & Ahirao, 2017; Ligh et al., 2014). This means the acquisition has to be
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completed in a forensically-sound manner to ensure the evidence does not lose its
admissibility and evidentiary value when presented in a court of law (Lessing & von
Solms, 2008; McKemmish, 2008). To this end, the acquisition process has to be reliable
and accurate in order to guarantee two fundamental properties of the data acquired:
integrity and completeness (Beebe, 2009; Holt et al., 2015; Lessing & von Solms,
2008; McKemmish, 2008). Integrity is achieved by collecting an authentic copy of the
data from the digital environment, while at the same time preserving its original state in
order to minimize the probability of contamination (Holt et al., 2015). Completeness
signifes collecting all the available data to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the
state of the digital environment during a particular moment (Holt et al., 2015).
In investigations where traditional computers are involved, these two properties
can be achieved by powering the computer off, using a write blocker to create bit-stream
images of the hard drives, and verifying that the hash values from the hard drives and the
images created match (Holt et al., 2015). This has been considered the traditional
procedure to create authentic and complete images from hard drives and to preserve the
state of the evidence stored inside them (Lessing & von Solms, 2008; Ligh et al., 2014).
However, this procedure is not always the best option. In a time-sensitive investigation
such as a kidnapping or a child abduction the traditional procedure has to be modifed in
order to retrieve critical information in a short period of time, directly at the crime scene
(Rogers, Goldman, Mislan, Wedge, & Debrota, 2006). Information related to emails,
browser, and instant messaging artifacts should be examined frst, instead of creating a
bit-stream image of every storage device (Rogers et al., 2006). Furthermore, the
traditional forensic procedure has an important disadvantage: volatile data such as RAM
content or network traffc are lost when the device is powered off, even though this data
represent a fundamental part of the digital environment being analyzed (Lessing & von
Solms, 2008; Ligh et al., 2014).
As the digital forensic feld has evolved, the need to take into account not only
hard drives but also other sources of data (e.g., RAM and network traffc) has become vital
to achieve a deeper comprehension of the digital environment (Ligh et al., 2014). Those
other sources were omitted in the past because the environment has to be altered in order
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to collect data from them and because it is not possible to determine the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired in the same way it is for hard drives. Nonetheless, every
acquisition method introduces modifcations in the digital environment; even the
traditional procedure of powering the computer off to create bit-stream images from its
hard drives (Kolhe & Ahirao, 2017; Lessing & von Solms, 2008; Ligh et al., 2014).
The key to still achieve the integrity and completeness required depends on the
investigator’s understating on how each method impacts on the environment and how to
minimize this impact during the investigation process (Ligh et al., 2014). Detailed
documentation of the process followed and the results obtained by the investigator also
plays a fundamental role to achieve forensic soundness (Lessing & von Solms, 2008).
In a digital environment, data are available in three different states: at rest, in
motion, or in execution (Birk, 2011; Birk & Wegener, 2011). Data at rest are kept in
storage devices, data in motion are transferred over a network from one device to another,
and data in execution are loaded in the device’s RAM in order to be read, modifed, or
executed (Birk, 2011; Birk & Wegener, 2011). These three states are intimately related
to the sources from where data can be collected: hard drives (or other permanent storage
devices), RAM, and network interfaces. The procedure to collect information focused
only on hard drives and the creation of bit-stream images is referred to as dead forensic
acquisition since it is performed while the device is off (Kolhe & Ahirao, 2017). On the
contrary, live forensic acquisition includes procedures to retrieve non-persistent (volatile)
data from RAM and network interfaces before powering the device off (Kolhe & Ahirao,
2017). The course of action during an acquisition phase should be based on the
persistence of the data to be collected, prioritizing the most volatile frst (Ligh et al.,
2014). For this reason, network traffc should be collected frst since it is exchanged in
real-time between the devices. Then, the RAM content because it is lost once the device is
powered off. Finally, hard drives and other persistent storages which are more stable
sources of information.
When mobile devices such as cell phones, tablets, and watches are involved in a
investigation, most of the time it is not possible to create bit-stream images from their
permanent storages (Owen & Thomas, 2011). Even if it is possible, the devices usually
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have to be modifed in order to allow a bit-stream extraction, which means the digital
environment has been altered. Other limitations apply to cloud computing solutions. The
cloud provider’s infrastructure is usually shared among different users, and collecting data
from a server could affect the privacy of other users not related to the investigation
(Garcia, 2014). Even if the privacy issues are ignored and all the data from a shared
server is collected, the volume of the data retrieved can be a technical limitation during the
examination phase.
With the development of new technologies and the tendency to move solutions to
the cloud, the traditional forensic procedures defned for personal computers do not seem
to be appropriate enough to justify the digital evidence admissibility. Under this scenario,
it seems more appropriate to evaluate the admissibility of the evidence based on the
methods used by the investigators and their knowledge and skills to justify their actions.
For this reason, the present study evaluated possible methods to collect digital data from a
virtual private server (VPS) hosted in a cloud provider virtualization node that uses
Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) as a hypervisor.

1.2 Scope
The cloud computing paradigm enables scalable, on-demand, and affordable
computing resources through the Internet (Garcia, 2014). Virtualization is a key concept
in cloud computing (Garcia, 2014). Cloud providers make use of virtualization by
offering VPSs to their customers. A VPS is a private VM managed by the customer but
hosted in the cloud provider infrastructure. KVM is one hypervisor used by cloud
providers to deliver and host VPSs. Customers pay according to the resource usage and
they have total control over their VPS (i.e., they can modify the operating system or install
and execute any particular software).
The present study focused on the acquisition process, using two utilities to collect
digital data from a VPS hosted in a full virtualized environment that uses KVM as a
hypervisor: virsh and tcpdump. These utilities were selected with a twofold objective.
First, they allow the collection of data from the hypervisor level and without needing
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access to the VPS itself, which implies a more reliable result. Second, they are common
utilities available in the majority of the virtualization nodes based on GNU/Linux
distributions and their installation and execution do not require signifcant modifcations
to the production environment. Three different sources of digital data from a VPS were
taken into account to analyze the performance of the utilities: hard drives, RAM, and
network interfaces. These three sources were selected because they represent the most
fruitful locations of potential evidence from a digital forensic perspective.
The performance of the utilities was analyzed in terms of effciency, integrity, and
completeness because these three characteristics are critical to ensure the acquisition
process is accurate and reliable. Effciency is measured according to the time needed to
collect the data. Integrity is achieved when the data collected are an authentic copy of the
original source and the source has not been modifed during the process (Holt et al.,
2015). Completeness is accomplished when all the data from a specifc source of evidence
are acquired (Holt et al., 2015). Although this study focused exclusively on VPSs, the
results and conclusions of using these utilities for acquisition purposes are valid also for
any VM hosted in a KVM virtualization node.

1.3 Signifcance
The global cloud computing market grew 21% to achieve $110 billion in 2015
(SynergyResearchGroup, 2016). In 2016, spending on hiring public cloud computing
infrastructure reached $38 billion and it is forecast to grow to $173 billion in 2026
(Forbes, 2016). The virtualization market was valued at $10 billion in 2014 and it is
expected to reach $21.5 billion by 2019, as the virtualization market increases in response
to demands for cloud services (Technavio, 2015). In 2016, 17% of enterprises run over
1,000 VPSs in the public cloud, compared to 13% in 2015 (RightScale, 2016). The
previous indicators suggest the usage of cloud computing and virtualization solutions will
continue to grow during the next years.
Even though VMware solutions lead the general hypervisor market share, when
the focus is on cloud computing providers the results are different. Cloud providers cannot
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afford the costs associated to VMware if they want to offer a lower price to their
customers. Instead, they rely on open source virtualization projects such as Xen or KVM
because they offer an excellent performance and they do not have license costs associated.
Digital Ocean, the third largest cloud provider, uses KVM as a hypervisor (Chirammal et
al., 2016). Amazon Web Services (AWS), the largest IaaS cloud provider, has been using
Xen as principal hypervisor for several years but recently it announced a shift to KVM for
future EC2 VPSs (TheRegister, 2017). These indicators imply the usage of KVM will
continue to grow in the near future and become the most preferred hypervisor by cloud
providers.
For these reasons, it is of paramount importance to defne digital forensic
procedures to technically deal with VPSs hosted in a KVM virtualization node. Different
studies have been conducted to examine technical and legal general implications of cloud
computing, but there is no research focused particularly on KVM and the details of the
acquisition process of VPSs.
Furthermore, the cloud computing characteristics of global access, faster
provisioning, high control, and affordability pave the way for criminals to access
computing resources and perform illegal activities. They can rent their own VPSs using
stolen credit card information or they can exploit vulnerable accounts to be used as launch
points to commit offenses. In fact, the term Crime as a Service (CaaS) has been introduced
to defne this type of illegal cloud-based services offered by criminals, such as on-demand
distributed denial of service (DDos) attacks (BankInfoSecurity, 2017). The researcher has
worked with different cloud providers and is well aware of how a this problematic
negatively affects not only their business, but also the victims of these illegal activities.
It is expected that the results of this research will guide forensic practitioners and
cloud providers to collect forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS involved in a
crime and hosted in a virtualization node that uses KVM as a hypervisor. Moreover, it is
the intent of this study to contribute to enlarge the body of knowledge of digital forensics
in this particular area and to reduce the criminal cases that involve the usage of VPSs.
Similar research could be conducted on other hypervisors such as XEN, OpenVZ,
or Hyper-V. Forensic software companies could use these results to develop remote agents
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to be executed in cloud provider’s virtualization nodes in order to collect data from VPSs.
If these agents were developed as open source projects, the details of their functioning
would be known, which could potentially increase the willingness of the cloud provider to
cooperate with the investigation. The agents could collect data locally or transfer it
remotely using encryption mechanisms. The data collected from the VPSs could be
integrated into the existent forensic software suites to provide a unifed examination
interface to investigators. In addition, once the practical details of the acquisition phase in
distinct hypervisors are extensively analyzed, the global legislation on this topic could be
updated in order to deal with this problem also from a legal standpoint.

1.4 Research Question and Hypotheses
The principal objective of this research was to answer the following research
question: is it possible to acquire forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS hosted
in a cloud provider’s virtualization node that uses KVM as a hypervisor?
The hypotheses of this study were stated as follows:
H1 : images of the hard drives of a VPS can be created in an effcient manner,
respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
H2 : images of the RAM content of a VPS can be created in an effcient
manner, respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
H3 : the network traffc of a VPS can be captured in real-time, respecting the
integrity and completeness of the data acquired.

1.5 Assumptions
The assumptions of this study were:
1. The research environment simulated a VPS provider’s infrastructure, using a
physical computer as a virtualization node.
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2. The virtualization node hosted four VMs that simulated four independent VPSs.
3. A laptop simulated a system used by different participants to interact with the four
VPSs.
4. The virtualization node and the laptop were connected to an Ethernet switch in
order to allow network communication between them and with the four VPSs.
5. Administrator access to the virtualization node was granted in order to complete the
acquisition process of each VPS.
6. The processes of installing and executing the utilities virsh and tcpdump did not
require signifcant modifcations to the virtualization node and to the VPS provider’s
environment.
7. The hardware components and software used throughout the study worked
appropriately.
8. The methodology and results of this research could be applied to any virtualization
node as long as it is confgured in the same manner and using the same software
versions.

1.6 Limitations
The limitations of this study were:
1. The study was conducted using a GNU/Linux Ubuntu Server 16.04.4 64-bit system
(kernel version: 4.4.0-116.140) to simulate a virtualization node of a VPS provider.
2. The hypervisor used throughout the study was KVM.
3. The KVM module loaded into the kernel was provided by the linux-image-generic
package (version 4.4.0-116.140).
4. The KVM user-space tools were provided by the qemu-kvm package (version
2.5.0).
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5. The libvirt service was provided by the libvirt0 package (version 1.3.1-1). The
libvirt utilities, including virsh, were provided by the libvirt-bin package (version
1.3.1-1).
6. The research environment included four VPS running different operating systems:
Ubuntu Server 17.10 (32-bit), CentOS 7 (64-bit), Windows Server 2008 Standard
(32-bit), and Windows Server 2016 Standard (64-bit).
7. The study tested utilities to collect digital data from three possible sources of each
VPS: hard drives, RAM, and network interfaces.
8. The utility virsh (version 1.3.1-1) was used to create images from the virtual hard
drives and from the RAM content of each VPS.
9. The utility tcpdump (version 4.9.2-0) was used to capture in real-time the network
traffc of each VPS.
10. The data collection was performed under low load conditions on the virtualization
node.

1.7 Delimitations
The delimitations of this study were:
1. Other operating systems were not considered to simulate a virtualization node of a
VPS provider.
2. Other hypervisors, KVM (module or user-space tools) versions, and libvirt (service
or client) versions were not considered.
3. The utility virsh (version 1.3.1-1) was the only utility used to create images from the
virtual hard drives and from the RAM content of each VPS.
4. The utility tcpdump was the only utility used to capture in real-time the network
traffc of each VPS.
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5. Instead of using a public IP address, each VPS was assigned with a private IP
address.
6. The data collection was not performed under heavy load conditions on the
virtualization node.

1.8 Summary
This chapter provided the general background, scope, signifcance, research
question and hypotheses, assumptions, limitations, and delimitations for this research
study. The following chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to cloud
computing and virtualization from a digital forensic perspective.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
This chapter aims to review existent digital forensic research on cloud computing
and virtual environments. The frst section defnes the principal ideas of the cloud
computing paradigm. The second section provides the fundamental concepts of
virtualization and explores the KVM internals for the purposes of the present study. The
third section analyzes the latest and most signifcant research on cloud computing and
virtualization. The fourth section summarizes the signifcant conclusions drawn from the
research and the ffth section introduces the approach taken by this research study.

2.1 Cloud Computing

2.1.1 Defnition and Characteristics
It seems appropriate to start this review with the principal concepts related to cloud
computing. The most generally accepted defnition of cloud computing was provided by
Mell and Grance (2011):
Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient,
on-demand network access to a shared pool of confgurable computing
resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction. (p. 2)
From this defnition, it can be stated that cloud computing has fve inherent
characteristics: on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid
elasticity, and measured service (Mell & Grance, 2011). On-demand self service means
that a customer can hire computing resources from the cloud provider without human
interaction. Broad network access implies that the services can be accessed over the
Internet using different devices such as cell phones, tablets, or laptops. Resource pooling
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means the provider offers computer resources dynamically to attend the needs of each
customer. Rapid elasticity implies the resources are delivered and released simply
according to the consumer demand. Measured services means the resources are
monitored, administered, and billed based on utilization.

2.1.2 Service Models and Deployment Models
Cloud computing can be classifed into three different service models:
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Software as a Service
(SaaS) (Mell & Grance, 2011). IaaS provides processing, storage, network, and other
fundamental computing resources to the customers where they can install and execute all
their necessary software, including the operating system and applications. The customer
does not manage the infrastructure of the cloud but has total control over the operating
system and applications deployed, and over the usage of processor, storage, and network
resources (Mell & Grance, 2011). Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Rackspace are two
examples of IaaS providers. PaaS provides the cloud infrastructure where customers can
deploy their own or acquired applications. The customer does not manage the
infrastructure, the operating system, or the usage of processor, storage, and network
resources, but has full control over the applications deployed (Mell & Grance, 2011).
Google App Engine and Microsoft Azure are two examples of PaaS providers. SaaS
provides applications deployed by the provider onto its own infrastructure to be used by
the customers. The customer does not manage the infrastructure of the cloud, the
operating system, or the applications deployed, with the exception of user-side
confguration settings (Mell & Grance, 2011). Microsoft Offce 365 is an example of
SaaS.
Cloud computing can also be classifed into four different deployment models:
private, community, public, and hybrid (Mell & Grance, 2011; Reilly, Wren, & Berry,
2010). Private cloud is used exclusively by a particular organization which owns,
manages, and operates the cloud infrastructure. Community cloud is controlled
exclusively by a specifc community whose members share common concerns. Public
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cloud is open used by the general public such as business, academic, and government
organizations, or a combination of them. Hybrid cloud is a combination of two or more
different models of cloud previously described.
The present study focused particularly on the IaaS model because it uses
virtualization as the key component, it permits the highest level of customization by the
customers, and it also represents the most fruitful scenario to fnd potential evidence. The
IaaS model is also the preferred option by most cybercriminals because they can rent this
service using stolen credit card information, or they can exploit vulnerable accounts to be
used as launch points for their illegal activities. A clear example of this predicament was
the attack on Sony’s PlayStation servers, which was launched from an Amazon’s Elastic
Compute Cloud (Amazon EC2) server, and affected over 100 million customers
(ITProPortal, 2011). Furthermore, the term Crime as a Service (CaaS) has been
introduced to defne this type of illegal services offered by criminals such as on-demand
distributed denial of service (DDos) attacks (BankInfoSecurity, 2017).

2.2 Virtualization

2.2.1 Defnition and Concepts
Virtualization is the key component of the IaaS model (Garcia, 2014). It is an
abstraction layer that allows the creation of multiple virtual (software-based) resources
from physical computer resources (Pollitt et al., 2008). Once created, these virtual
resources can be allocated to a virtual machine (VM), which is an isolated process being
executed by the virtualization software on the physical computer (Pollitt et al., 2008). The
VM behaves like an independent computer, using the assigned virtual resources and
running its own operating system (OS) and applications (Bem & Huebner, 2007). The
physical computer from where the virtual resources are created is called virtualization
node or host, while the VMs are called guests or domains (Barrett & Kipper, 2010;
Pollitt et al., 2008). The virtualization software is called hypervisor (also referred to as
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virtual machine monitor or VMM) and it is responsible for controlling the interaction
between the VMs and the physical host (Barrett & Kipper, 2010; Pollitt et al., 2008).
There are two principal modes of virtualization: paravirtualization and full
virtualization. In paravirtualization, the VM OS is aware it runs in a virtual environment,
so it modifes some internal operations to communicate with the hypervisor instead of
establishing a direct communication with the different devices (Pollitt et al., 2008;
RedHat, 2017). In full virtualization, the VM OS is not aware it runs in a virtual
environment because the devices are virtualized by the hypervisor and the VM OS can
establish a direct communication with them (Pollitt et al., 2008; RedHat, 2017).
Hypervisors that run on top of the host in place of an OS, such as VMware ESX, are
called Type I hypervisors (Barrett & Kipper, 2010; Pollitt et al., 2008). On the contrary,
hypervisors that run as a process inside the host OS, such as Kernel-based Virtual
Machine (KVM), Xen, and Hyper-V, are called Type II hypervisors (Chirammal et al.,
2016; Pollitt et al., 2008).

2.2.2 KVM
KVM is an open source, hardware-assisted, full virtualization solution. It was
designed to be a modern hypervisor that takes advantage of CPU virtualization
technologies such as Intel VT-x and AMD-V (Chirammal et al., 2016). It can be installed
in most GNU/Linux distributions and it works by loading a module into the Linux kernel
to convert the system into a hypervisor (Chirammal et al., 2016). The complete KVM
virtualization solution includes the following components:
• KVM module: it is a Linux loadable kernel module, which provides
hardware-assisted full virtualization support making use of the virtualization
extensions offered by the underlying CPU (Chirammal et al., 2016).
• Quick Emulator (QEMU): it is a user-space software that provides emulation of
CPUs and peripheral devices such as hard drives, network interfaces, video cards,
and USB ports (Chirammal et al., 2016). QEMU utilizes the KVM kernel module
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to achieve real hardware-assisted full virtualization support instead of only
emulation (Chirammal et al., 2016). The properties of each VM such as number of
CPUs, RAM size, and virtual devices assigned are specifed in a XML confguration
fle located inside the directory /etc/libvirt/qemu (Chirammal et al., 2016).
• Libvirtd: it is a management layer that runs as a service and communicates with
different hypervisors, including KVM (Chirammal et al., 2016). Libvirtd provides
an application programming interface (API) to manage the VMs and the
functionalities of the hypervisor (RedHat, 2017). It spawns one QEMU process per
each VM, with the specifcations defned in its corresponding XML confguration
fle (Chirammal et al., 2016).
• Libvirt client: it is the application used to connect to the Libvirtd service
(Chirammal et al., 2016). Virsh is the principal Libvirt client and it is an advanced
command-line utility that allows to manage the VMs and control the functioning of
the hypervisor (RedHat, 2017).
Figure 2.1 illustrates all the components previously described and their
relationship in a GNU/Linux virtualization node that uses KVM as a hypervisor.

Figure 2.1. KVM virtualization node components
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2.2.2.1 Virtual storage
The frst concept to defne related to storage management in KVM is storage pool.
A storage pool represents reserved storage space on the virtualization node, that can be
used to create virtual hard drives and assign them to VMs (Libvirt, 2018). By default,
only one storage pool is defned and it is the directory /var/lib/libvirt/images. The
confguration fles corresponding to each defned pool are located inside the directory
/etc/libvirt/storage. A wide variety of pools are supported, but the more important ones for
the purpose of the present study are:
• Local directory or flesystem (including network flesystems such as NFS): if a
flesystem is confgured as a storage pool, Libvirt mounts it on a local directory to
manipulate the fles stored inside it (Libvirt, 2018). Once it is mounted, the pool is
handled in the same manner as a local directory. Using this type of pool, Libvirt
manages each virtual hard drive as a single fle (Libvirt, 2018). For example, if a
VM is created with one virtual hard drive, the corresponding fle is also created
inside the flesystem previously mounted as a storage pool. This means a separate
fle is generated per each virtual hard drive assigned to a VM.
• Physical disk pool: if a physical disk is confgured as a storage pool, Libvirt
manipulates the partition table and creates one partition per each virtual hard drive
generated (Libvirt, 2018). This means a separate partition is generated inside the
partition table of the physical disk per each virtual hard drive assigned to a VM.
• Logical volume pool: this type of pool uses the logical volume management (LVM)
support provided by the Linux kernel, which allows the creation of logical volume
groups from multiple physical partitions or entire hard drives. If a logical volume
group is confgured as a storage pool, Libvirt creates one logical volume inside the
group per each virtual hard drive generated (Libvirt, 2018). This means once a
logical volume group has been created, a separate logical volume is generated inside
the volume group per each virtual hard drive assigned to a VM.
In summary, a virtual hard drive assigned to a VM can be created as a fle in a
mounted flesystem, as a physical partition in a physical disk, or as a logical volume in a
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logical volume group. The storage pools based on physical partitions or logical volumes
are called block-based storages because they use devices without a flesystem as backend
to store virtual hard drives (RedHat, 2018). On the contrary, pools based on local
directories or flesystems are called fle-based storages and they do use a device with a
flesystem as backend to store virtual hard drives (RedHat, 2018). Block-based storage
pools offer a higher performance than fle-based since VMs using block-based devices
achieve higher throughput and lower latency (IBM, 2018).
The next concept to consider regarding storage management is the allocation
policy. There are two possible options:
• Preallocated (thick provisioned) storage: this policy allocates all the storage space
of a virtual hard drive at the moment it is generated (RedHat, 2015). This means if
a VM is created with a 50GB virtual hard drive in a flesystem pool, then the
corresponding fle is created with a size of 50GB. This policy offers a better writing
performance because no storage allocation occurs during runtime and it is
recommended for VMs that works as servers or that need high I/O performance
(RedHat, 2015). The main disadvantage is that all the storage is allocated even if
only a small part of the virtual hard drive is being used.
• Sparsely allocated (thin provisioned) storage: this policy is more fexible than
preallocated storage because the virtual hard drive grows as the VM writes data on it
(RedHat, 2015). It also offers a lower writing performance and it is recommended
for VMs that work as desktops or that do not need high I/O performance (Libvirt,
2018)
The last concept to take into account in storage management is the virtual hard
drive format. Libvirt supports several formats: raw, cow, qcow, qcow2, qed, vmdk, and
more (Chirammal et al., 2016). Even though several formats are supported (including
proprietary ones such us vmdk), the best performance in a KVM virtualization node is
achieved when the format used for the virtual hard drive is one of the following:
• raw: it supports both allocation policies (preallocated and sparsely allocated) when
using a fle-based storage pool as backend, and only preallocated policy when using
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block-based storage pool (RedHat, 2017). This format is a direct representation of
the virtual hard drive content and does not add additional metadata to it (Chirammal
et al., 2016; RedHat, 2017).
• qcow2: it supports both allocation policies but only when using a fle-based storage
pool as backend. This format adds additional metadata to the content of the virtual
hard drive and it also offers advanced features such us snapshots, compression, and
encryption (RedHat, 2017).
The raw format has a better performance because no additional formatting is
applied to virtual hard drive (RedHat, 2018). On the contrary, qcow2 offers a better
snapshot support, but a similar behavior can be achieved using raw virtual hard drives in a
logical volume pool (RedHat, 2017). In fact, the usage of logical volume pools to store
preallocated VM hard drives in raw format is a convenient strategy for cloud providers
because it combines the high performance offered by block-based storages and by the raw
format with the fexibility of logical volumes.
Table 2.1 summarizes the relationship between the KVM storage components
previously introduced and their corresponding support.
Table 2.1. Storage pool, allocation policy, and virtual hard drive format supported by
KVM
Storage pool
Block-based
(physical disk or
logical volume)
File-based (local
directory or
flesystem)

Allocation policy
Preallocated

Virtual hard drive format
raw
qcow2
raw
Sparsely allocated
qcow2
Preallocated
raw
qcow2
raw
Sparsely allocated
qcow2

Supported
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

In a KVM virtualization node, the following command can be used to determine
the format and allocation policy of an existent virtual hard drive identifed by the last
parameter: qemu-img info diskfle (Chirammal et al., 2016).
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There is another concept related to virtual storage: the type of virtual hard drive
assigned to the VM. The implementations supported by Libvirt are: IDE, SATA, SCSI, or
VirtIO (between other options). From a digital forensic standpoint, the type of hard drive
assigned to a VM is not relevant because the process to collect data from it is the same.
However, it is worth mentioning that VirtIO is a paravirtualized implementation, while the
others are just emulations. For this reason, VirtIO offers a higher performance and it is
likely to be used in production environments.
2.2.2.2 Virtual storage snapshots and images
A snapshot represents the state of a VM hard drive in a particular point in time.
Libvirt supports the creation of live snapshots that can be taken while the VM is running,
but if the VM is generating high I/O traffc it is safer to stop or suspend the VM before
taking the snapshot (Chirammal et al., 2016). The utility virsh allows the creation of
virtual hard drive snapshots, regardless of whether the VM is running, suspended, or
stopped. Two different type of snapshots can be taken:
• Internal: the snapshot is contained within the virtual hard drive of the VM. It is only
supported by qcow2 virtual hard drives and does not support logical volume storage
pools (Chirammal et al., 2016).
• External: the original virtual hard drive becomes read-only and the writing
operations are completed on a new overlay fle (Chirammal et al., 2016). It is
supported by all the virtual disk formats, including raw and qcow2 (Chirammal et
al., 2016). The new overlay fle is created with qcow2 format and it can grow to the
same size defned for the original virtual hard drive (Chirammal et al., 2016).
From a digital forensic perspective the external approach seems to be optimal
because it does not modify the original virtual hard drive. Once the snapshot is created a
bit-stream image can be created from the read-only hard drive. In addition, internal
snapshots are supported by only one virtual hard drive format: qcow2.
As it has been stated, the utility virsh can be used to create external snapshots. For
example, the next command creates an external snapshot of a VM named VM1: virsh
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snapshot-create-as VM1 --disk-only --atomic --name snapshot1 --diskspec
hda,snapshot=external,fle=/mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot.qcow2 . The parameter --diskspec
defnes three additional options: the virtual hard drive of the VM to set as read-only (hda),
the type of snapshot (external), and the new overlay fle to be created
(/mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot.qcow2). The parameter --disk-only specifes not to include the
memory content in the snapshot. The parameter --atomic assures the snapshot either
succeeds or fails with no changes on the original device. It is recommended to use
--atomic every time an external snapshot is created, specially when it is created from a live
system (Chirammal et al., 2016). Finally, the parameter --name specifes a customized
name for the snapshot generated. Once the previous command is successful, it is possible
to create a bit-stream image from original virtual hard drive, which is set as read-only after
the overlay fle was created.
Once the bit-stream image has been created and verifed, the overlay fle can be
merged into the original virtual hard drive through the command: virsh blockcommit
VM1 hda --active --pivot --verbose. In this example, the parameter hda specifes the
virtual hard drive, the fag --active initiates the merging process of the overlay fle into the
virtual hard drive, and --pivot makes the hard drive active again once the merging is
completed. At this point all the read/write operations are completed on the hard drive
again and the overlay fle is not used anymore. The fag --verbose displays detailed
information about the process on the screen.
The previous command does not remove the overlay fle nor the snapshot metadata
maintained by Libvirt. The following command should be executed to remove the
metadata: virsh snapshot-delete VM1 snapshot1 --metadata. The parameter snapshot1 is
the customized name specifed for the snapshot previously generated. At the time of this
study, Libvirt does not have support for removing external overlay fles (Chirammal et al.,
2016). For this reason, once the metadata is removed, the overlay fle has to be manually
deleted, for example in this particular case, by executing the command: rm
/mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot.qcow2.
2.2.2.3 Virtual RAM
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In a KVM environment, each VM defnes two key parameters regarding the RAM
allocation policy used:
• Maximum allocation: it represents the maximum RAM that can be allocated to the
VM when it is in execution.
• Current allocation: it represents the actual RAM allocated to the VM when it is
powered on. It can be lower or equal to the maximum allocation value.
Each VM runs like a normal GNU/Linux process inside the host OS. When a VM
is powered on, its process allocates the RAM specifed by the parameter current allocation.
If the VM needs more RAM, the allocation increases until the maximum allocation value
(Chirammal et al., 2016). This behavior is achieved through a driver named balloon that
allows each VM to notify the hypervisor how much RAM it requires (RedHat, 2017). The
hypervisor then dynamically assigns available RAM between different VMs according to
their needs (RedHat, 2017). Even though this is a fexible approach, it could lead to a
potential problem: if the sum of the maximum allocation values of all the different VMs is
greater that the physical RAM of the host and all the VMs request the maximum allocation
at the same time, the host OS will become unstable. Therefore, it is recommended that the
current allocation value equals the maximum allocation value and that the sum of these
values for all the VMs is lower than the physical RAM available in the host.
2.2.2.4 Virtual RAM images
The utility virsh can be also used to create an image of the RAM content of a VM,
but it has to be suspended in order to obtain a consistent result (Suneja, Isci, & de Lara,
2015). The command virsh suspend pauses the execution of the VM, but keeping its RAM
allocation unmodifed. Once the VM is suspended, the RAM content can be dumped to a
local fle through the command virsh dump. For example, the next command creates an
image of the RAM content of a VM named VM1: virsh dump VM1 --memory-only
/mnt/kvm/VM1.memdump . The resulting fle is /mnt/kvm/VM1.memdump and the
parameter --memory-only specifes to collect only the RAM content and CPU common
register value of the VM. After the RAM image is created, it is possible to resume the
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execution of the VM with the command virsh resume. It is important to note that the
command virsh dump automatically suspends the VM before creating the RAM image and
resumes it after the image is completed. In case the VM should not be suspended during a
particular investigation, a RAM image can still be created if the fag --live is added to the
virsh dump command. In this case the RAM image is created while the VM is running.
The command virsh dump generates a RAM image in QEMU ELF core dump
format, which is supported by the Volatility Framework (Volatility, 2018). Using this
utility, it is possible to examine the RAM image content looking for running processes,
network connections, opened fles, and other artifacts stored in RAM.
2.2.2.5 Virtual networking
In Libvirt, the key component of virtual networking is the Ethernet bridge, which
simulates a virtual network switch where different network interfaces can be attached
(Chirammal et al., 2016). By default, Libvirt defnes only one virtual network, which
creates an Ethernet bridge on the virtualization node named virbr0 and with IP address
192.168.122.1. The network interfaces of the VMs can be attached to this bridge (working
as a network switch) in order to allow inbound and outbound network traffc between the
VMs and with the virtualization node (RedHat, 2017). The confguration fle of the
default virtual network is /etc/libvirt/qemu/networks/default.xml.
Libvirt also creates one TAP interface on the virtualization node (named
vnet<number>) per each network interface added to a VM (Chirammal et al., 2016). If
an Ethernet bridge represents a network switch, these interfaces represent the ports of the
switch where other devices are connected.
Figure 2.2 illustrates a network diagram of a virtual network with a bridge and two
VMs attached to it. In this example, the virtualization node has two physical network
interfaces (eth0 and eth1) connected to different networks. It also has a bridge (virbr0)
whose main function is working as a virtual switch with two virtual ports (vnet0 and
vnet1), where the network interfaces of the VMs are connected.
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Figure 2.2. KVM virtual network diagram

Once the virtual network interfaces of each VM are connected to the bridge
through the TAP interfaces, they can be set to one of the following modes:
• Isolated mode: inbound and outbound network traffc between the VMs and the
virtualization node is allowed. However, traffc beyond the virtualization node is not
allowed.
• NATed mode: inbound and outbound network traffc between the VMs and the
virtualization node is allowed. Outbound traffc beyond the virtualization node is
also allowed by network address translation (NAT) rules.
• Routed mode: inbound and outbound network traffc between the VMs and the
virtualization node is allowed. Inbound and outbound traffc beyond the
virtualization node requires modifying the routing tables of the devices involved.
• Bridged mode: the VMs are attached to an Ethernet bridge and a physical network
interface of the virtualization node is also attached to the bridge. This confguration
makes the VMs visible on the physical network, allowing inbound and outbound
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traffc between the VMs and the devices connected to the physical network without
the need of modifying the routing table of the devices involved.
Isolated, NATed, and routed modes are common in testing environments, while the
bridged mode is common in production environments because it allows access to the VMs
directly through their assigned IP addresses (Chirammal et al., 2016). This mode is used,
for example, by cloud providers to offer VPSs with public IP addresses to host services
accessible from the Internet.
There is another concept related to virtual networking: the type of virtual network
interface connected to the VM. The implementations supported by Libvirt are: rtl3189
(Realtek chipset), e1000 (Intel chipset), or VirtIO. In a similar vein as hard drives, from a
digital forensic standpoint, the type of virtual network interface assigned to a VM is not
relevant because the process to collect data from it is the same. However, it is worth
mentioning that VirtIO is a paravirtualized implementation, while the others are just
emulations. For this reason, VirtIO offers a higher network performance and it is likely to
be used in production environments.
2.2.2.6 Virtual network traffc capturing
Tcpdump is a powerful command line utility for monitoring and capturing network
traffc in real-time. It captures the traffc bit-by-bit as it passes through any network
interface and it can also decode protocols from layer 2 (data link), layer 3 (network), and
layer 4 (transport) of the OSI model (Davidoff & Ham, 2012). The network capturing
process performed by tcpdump is highly accurate and, in consequence, it is also
considered admissible in a court of law (Davidoff & Ham, 2012). However, this accuracy
may be limited by two factors. In the frst place, capturing network traffc is a
CPU-consuming activity, which means on high traffc networks the CPU could be
overloaded and tcpdump could not be capable of capturing every packet, ignoring some of
them (Davidoff & Ham, 2012). The second factor is the hard drive available space. If the
capturing is too broad and it includes numerous devices generating high traffc operations,
the available hard drive space in the capturing station could not be enough to store all the
traffc (Davidoff & Ham, 2012). For these reasons, it is recommended to capture the
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network traffc when the CPU load is low and to plan previously the amount of hard drive
available space needed to store the data collected through this procedure (Davidoff &
Ham, 2012). It is also crucial to flter the network traffc to be captured by specifying
only particular hosts or ports related to the ongoing digital investigation. This
determination leads to a lower CPU-consuming process and to a smaller capture fle,
which is also benefcial for the subsequent analysis. In addition, the live migration support
provided by KVM could be employed to migrate a particular VM to a special
virtualization node. The network capturing process could be completed on this node
exclusively set aside and with enough resources to complete this task appropriately.
As it was previously mentioned, Libvirt leverages the bridge support provided by
the Linux kernel to set up a virtual network environment for the VMs. This means
tcpdump could be used to capture the network traffc that traverses a bridge (working as a
network switch), and therefore, to capture all the network traffc of that virtual network.
This is possible because the bridge is just a network interface created in the virtualization
node. Nevertheless, this approach has two potential weaknesses from a digital forensic
perspective. Firstly, it is not effcient and the accuracy of the process could be
compromised as it was previously stated. Secondly, it could also affect the privacy of
users, since the network traffc from all the VMs running in the virtualization node is
captured, even if only one VM is under investigation. It seems much more appropriate to
take advantage of the Libvirt virtual network management and use tcpdump to only
capture the traffc that traverses the TAP interfaces of the interested VM.
By taking the previous analysis into consideration, a possible way to capture the
network traffc of one single VM, whose TAP interface is vnet0, is through the command:
tcpdump -nn -s0 --interface=vnet0 -w /mnt/forensic-data/network-capture.pcap. The
parameter --interface specifes to capture only the traffc that traverses the listed network
interfaces (vnet0). The parameter -nn declares not to resolve IP addresses (or ports) to
host names (or services names). This option is relevant because the resolution process
executed by default generates an important delay that can be omitted. The parameter -s
indicates the snapshot length, which is the amount of bytes from each packet to be
captured. In this case, the value 0 means no limit and it was included to avoid truncating
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packets that have a longer size to the value specifed. However, depending on the
investigation and the legal constraints, this value could be reduced. For example, if the
network is based on the Ethernet standard as data link layer, a value of 1,514 bytes should
be enough because this is the maximum size of an Ethernet packet (Davidoff & Ham,
2012). Finally, the parameter -w declares the output fle where the network traffc captured
is stored. Tcpdump saves this fle using the pcap (packet capture) format, which is an API
for capturing network traffc. This format is also supported by network packet analyzers
such as Wireshark or SolarWinds.

2.2.3 VPS
IaaS providers make use of virtualization technologies such as KVM by offering
VPSs to their customers. In this context, a VPS is a synonym of a VM, with the
particularity that it is managed by the customer but hosted in the cloud provider
infrastructure (Barrett & Kipper, 2010). Figure 2.3 depicts the relationship between a
KVM virtualization node and the VPSs hosted by it.

Figure 2.3. KVM virtualization node and VPSs overview

Customers pay according to the resources used and they have total control over
their VPS (i.e., they can modify the operating system or install and manage any software
they need). One of the most popular VPS solutions is Amazon EC2, which is provided by
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Amazon Web Services (AWS), and whose cloud is formed by more than half-a-million
GNU/Linux servers with XEN as a hypervisor (ZDNet, 2012). However, AWS recently
announced a shift from Xen to KVM for future EC2 VPSs (TheRegister, 2017).

2.3 Cloud Computing and Virtualization in Digital Forensics
The research needs on cloud computing and virtual environments from a digital
forensic point of view have constantly been evolving. For this reason, it seems appropriate
to present in the frst subsection the early studies that identifed these two areas as new
challenges to be investigated further. In the second subsection, more recent studies are
analyzed from the IaaS perspective to recognize the improvements and unaddressed
topics. The third subsection introduces studies on complementary approaches to improve
the availability of digital evidence in the cloud provider environment. Finally, the fourth
section analyzes the impact of using the virtual machine introspection (VMI) approach to
acquire digital data from the hypervisor level.

2.3.1 Early Research
Pollitt et al. (2008) developed a research agenda to examine the impact of
virtualization on digital forensics. The authors recognized three principal research areas to
be developed further: analysis of virtual environments, virtualization as investigative tool,
and virtualization in education. Three main sub-areas were identifed inside analysis of
virtual environments that needed to be addressed in order to conduct valid forensic
investigations: forensic data acquisition of VMs, virtual platform forensics, and virtual
machine introspection (Pollitt et al., 2008).
The positive use of virtualization with investigative and educational purposes was
previously highlighted by Bem and Huebner (2007). They stated this technology was a
signifcant step forward to reduce the time needed to analyze digital evidence and also to
train new forensic analysts without compromising real evidence.
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Beebe (2009) conducted a review study to examine the body of knowledge in
digital forensics and to evaluate the improvements, issues, and unaddressed topics in the
feld. The most important contributions made by the forensic community were the
progress toward formalizing the discipline and the improvements related to identifying,
collecting, and examining digital data in traditional computer platforms (Beebe, 2009).
However, the study acknowledges that achieving the same positive results on non-standard
computing environments, such as cloud computing or virtualization, has not been properly
addressed (Beebe, 2009). According to the author, research efforts had been made to take
advantage of virtualization in education or investigative contexts, but there was still a lack
of research on how to conduct digital forensic investigations in virtual environments.
Another unaddressed topic mentioned was the increase of volume storage capacities and
the importance to performing selective forensic acquisitions in order to simplify the
analysis process (Beebe, 2009).
The previous studies suggest that before 2010 virtualization had been considered
only as a tool but not as an environment to be inspected from a digital forensic standpoint.
Similarly, there was no research on the impacts of cloud computing at all. These two facts
implied important gaps in the digital forensic feld that needed to be flled.

2.3.2 Cloud Computing and Virtualization
Dykstra and Sherman (2012) conducted a research study to expose technical and
legal issues related to the acquisition of digital evidence from an IaaS cloud provider, and
the strategies proposed to address these limitations. The authors identifed six abstraction
layers in the IaaS model (from lower to higher): network, physical hardware, host OS,
hypervisor, VM OS, and VM applications. Each layer determines the type of data
collected: network packets at the network layer, hard disk sectors at the physical hardware
layer, or fle system data at the host OS layer. At the same time, each layer offers a
different level of trust regarding the quality of the data acquired. The lower the layer, the
more reliable is the evidence and less level of trust is needed by judges or jury to consider
admissible the evidence in a court of law (Dykstra & Sherman, 2012). If the hypervisor is

29
type I, then the third and forth layers (host OS and hypervisor) are combined in just one,
and VMI utilities could be used to collect data directly from this layer, which is more
reliable than the higher ones (Dykstra & Sherman, 2012).
Dykstra and Sherman (2012) also evaluated the capability of different forensic
tools to collect data remotely from an Amazon EC2 server. FTK and EnCase were able to
retrieve data from the VM OS (layer 5), but they required a local client installed on the
VM and they did not provide hash values for integrity verifcation (Dykstra & Sherman,
2012). These are important limitations, because installing a local client is not a valid
option when the VM being investigated was used to commit a crime. In this case, the VM
should not be modifed to not reveal the presence of the examiner and to not affect the
integrity of the data to be collected. The authors also employed VMI techniques to inject
the local client in the memory of the VM, avoiding the need of installing the local client.
This approach allowed them to retrieve more reliable information from the hypervisor
level (layer 4), but it leaves traces that could reveal the presence of the examiner.
According to Dykstra and Sherman (2012) there are also different options about
who should perform the collection of the digital evidence: law enforcement, an employee
of the cloud provider, or an independent examiner. In the majority of legal cases in the
US, a search warrant or a subpoena is issued to the cloud provider, which executes the
collection and then provides the data to the law enforcement agency (Dykstra & Sherman,
2012). This procedure releases law enforcement from performing the acquisition, but the
process needed to justify the admissibility of the evidence becomes more complex
because it relies on the experience and integrity of the technician at the provider (Dykstra
& Sherman, 2012). This limitation could be partially addressed if a guideline or standard
procedure is developed to be followed by the technicians of the cloud providers. This
document should include the steps required not only to collect the data, but also to include
methods to verify and validate the data acquired.
Birk (2011) conducted a study to analyze the technical challenges of digital
forensic in cloud computing environments. According to the author, in case of an incident,
IaaS offers much more information to be collected and used as digital evidence than PaaS
and SaaS. One important advantage of IaaS and virtualization is the usage of snapshots,
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which is supported by all popular hypervisors and allows the creation of an exact copy of
the virtual hard drives and the RAM content of a VM (Birk, 2011). This feature also
allows digital forensic practitioners to collect information of a VM without the need of
turning it off. Another beneft mentioned of IaaS and virtualization is the capacity of using
VMI utilities to observe and collect data of the VMs from the hypervisor level (Birk,
2011).
In a similar vein, Birk and Wegener (2011) defned additional technical challenges
related to the IaaS model. They claimed that best practice guides about collection of
digital data are usually outdated and there are no guides to complete this process in a
cloud or virtual environment. If these guides were updated, it would be simpler to justify
in a court of law the integrity and authenticity of the data retrieved and the chain of
custody of the digital evidence presented (Birk & Wegener, 2011).
Zawoad and Hasan (2013) performed a meta-analysis of challenges, approaches,
and problems in cloud computing forensics. One challenge they mentioned was forensic
data acquisition, which they considered the most important step in an investigation
because it involves the collection of the potential digital evidence (Zawoad & Hasan,
2013). The authors also noticed that IaaS offers some advantages over traditional
computer forensics such as the creation of snapshots from the hypervisor level. According
to them, most of the approaches proposed to overcome limitations in cloud computing
depend on the cloud providers’ willingness to modify their environments and to improve
their readiness level (Zawoad & Hasan, 2013). Instead, other solutions proposed are
focused on the legal aspects of cloud computing by proposing an international legislation
for cloud forensic investigations (Zawoad & Hasan, 2013).
Important results can be highlighted from the studies of Birk (2011) and Zawoad
and Hasan (2013). First, the data to be collected from a cloud environment depends on the
type of cloud model. For SaaS and PaaS the possible acquisition approaches are limited
and rely on the provider’s assistance and readiness. For IaaS, the control is higher because
a VM could be accessed to collect data or even retrieve it from the hypervisor level,
although the provider’s collaboration is also needed. As it was stated before, a VPS is just
a VM hosted in a IaaS provider’s infrastructure, this means it is possible to create VM
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snapshots and to get an exact copy of its virtual hard drives and RAM content. This is a
more auspicious scenario than a traditional computer forensic investigation because it is
not possible to create such snapshots from physical computers. Second, most of the
solutions proposed for the current problems in this feld were related to modifcations to
be accomplished by law makers or cloud providers in order to make the investigation
process more viable. Third, the absence of guidelines was mentioned again which
emphasizes the signifcance of defning practical procedures to complete digital forensic
acquisitions in cloud and virtual environments.
Morioka and Sharbaf (2016) conducted a research on cloud forensic to identify
unaddressed challenges and possible solutions. The main challenges they mentioned were
the data acquisition diffculties, the privacy and confdentiality concerns when data is
collected from shared infrastructure (e.g., virtual environments), and the cloud provider’s
lack of staff and procedures to conduct forensic investigations. They also identifed three
locations where digital information could be collected: local computers, between the
cloud and local computers, and in the cloud. The frst location refers to the personal
devices used to connect to the cloud services, browser cache and history is a clear example
of possible information to be found. The second location concerns records of the Internet
service provider (ISP) which could contain traces of client-cloud communication. The
third location refers to evidence directly located at the cloud provider. The authors
mentioned different possible approaches to collect information from this latter location:
data acquisition from physical node directly at cloud provider, virtual machine
introspection (VMI) to monitor and examine VMs from the hypervisor level, and forensic
tools to acquire information directly from the VM (Morioka & Sharbaf, 2016).
The focus of this study is data acquisition of VPSs (i.e., VMs hosted in a
virtualization node owned by cloud computing provider), and for this reason the most
fertile location to retrieve evidence is the cloud provider’s infrastructure. However,
performing a full data acquisition of the virtualization node is not a valid approach for two
reasons: the volume of information to collect and analyze could be enormous and the
privacy of the customers could be compromised. Using forensic tools to collect data
directly from the VM is not a solid method either because it requires accessing the VM in
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order to install and execute the tools (i.e., modifying the state of the VM). Therefore, the
scope of the acquisition has to be reduced to include only the suspicious VPSs in order to
not infringe on privacy rights of other clients. The optimal method to do this seems to be
virtual machine introspection (VMI) which is the process of monitoring and managing
VMs externally from the hypervisor level. By using this method, the presence of the
forensic examiner is not revealed and the state of the VM is not modifed by installing
tools and executing them.

2.3.3 Complementary Approaches
Patrascu and Patriciu (2014) presented an alternative approach to monitor and log
user activity in IaaS cloud environments. They proposed the idea of implementing a cloud
forensic module to gather forensic and log data from the VMs running in a cloud provider.
The forensic module was designed to be scalable in order to avoid performance issues and
to be applied on top of new or existing cloud computing deployments (Patrascu &
Patriciu, 2014). Their study focused on KVM as an example of the integration between
the proposed module and one particular hypervisor. However, in a real case scenario, this
integration has to be developed for any other hypervisor used by the cloud provider
(Patrascu & Patriciu, 2014). They concluded the presented framework allowed digital
investigators to collect a great deal of information from any particular VM in a cloud
provider, no matter the heterogeneity of the VMs and geographical distribution of the
cloud (Patrascu & Patriciu, 2014).
A similar strategy to deal with cloud environments in a digital investigation was
proposed by Sang (2013), who recommended to build a forensic-friendly environment in
cloud providers. This model focused mainly on SaaS and PaaS solutions and it should be
implemented by the cloud providers to keep the log records of the interaction between
users and the cloud services (Sang, 2013). According to the author, the cloud provider
should implement mechanisms to make this information secure and available not only on
its side, but also on the customer’s side.
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The methods proposed by Patrascu and Patriciu (2014) and Sang (2013) provided
recommended practices to be performed on the cloud service provider’s side as a
readiness strategy to increase the amount of potential evidence available. Both methods
could be helpful in an investigation by providing additional data, but the downsize is that
their implementation depends on the cloud provider’s willingness to cooperate. From a
digital forensic perspective it is fundamental to have standard and reliable procedures to
perform a comprehensive acquisition in virtual environments, regardless of whether the
cloud provider contributes with additional information from its end.

2.3.4 Virtual Machine Introspection
Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) is a method that allows to monitor and
control the state of the VMs from the hypervisor level. Through this approach, the
hypervisor can inspect all the data processed by the VMs because it is located in the layer
between the physical hardware of the virtualization node and the VMs (Poisel, Malzer, &
Tjoa, 2013). From this layer, the hypervisor can examine the virtual resources of a VM
(i.e., hard drives, RAM content, and network traffc) without altering its state. This
method allows investigators to overcome the classical limitations presented in traditional
computer forensics such as RAM and network traffc acquisitions (Poisel et al., 2013).
VMI tools relies on the following principles: the VMs are unable to interfere with the
operations executed at the hypervisor level (i.e., tamper resistant), the hypervisor has total
control over the state of the VMs (i.e., evasion resistant), and the hypervisor has a
complete and direct access to the VM resources such as CPU registers, RAM content, and
network traffc (i.e., effciency) (Hebbal et al., 2015).
The simplest way to retrieve data from a VM using VMI utilities is in binary
format (e.g., a RAM dump or a virtual hard drive image). Other VMI tools have been
developed to provide a high-level information such as processes running in the VM
instead of just bits. The difference between bits and high-level information is called the
semantic gap (Dolan-Gavitt, Payne, & Lee, 2011; Hebbal et al., 2015; Poisel et al.,
2013). According to the method used by the VMI utilities to monitor the state of the VMs,
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they can be classifed in: in-VM (or in-brand), out-of-VM (or out-of-brand), and hybrid
(or derivation) (Hebbal et al., 2015; Poisel et al., 2013). The in-VM strategy implies
installing an agent inside the VM in order to expose its state to the hypervisor. On the
contrary, out-of-VM is considered the real VMI strategy because it does not need an agent
inside the VM, it collects the data from the hypervisor level by accessing the VM
resources directly. The hybrid strategy is a combination of in-VM and out-of-VM. There
are also VMI utilities that can be available out-of-the-box on a particular hypervisor, and
others that need to modify the default behavior of the hypervisor or install additional
libraries in order to be able to work (Suneja et al., 2015). The client virsh previously
mentioned in subsection 2.2.2 is an example of an out-of-VM and out-of-the-box VMI
utility that can be used to monitor the state of the VMs in a virtualization node that uses
KVM as a hypervisor (Suneja et al., 2015).
According to the previous observations, the VMI out-of-VM and out-of-the-box
strategy is the best option from a digital forensic perspective because it does not need to
alter in any manner the content of the VMs or the hypervisor in order to collect reliable
data. Through these specifc VMI utilities, it could be possible to create an image of the
virtual hard drive, dump the RAM content, or capture the network traffc in real time. In
addition, they use the inherent benefts of virtualization, such as creating snapshots or
suspending the VMs. The snapshot feature permits to create an instant copy of the virtual
hard drive at a particular point in time, without the need of stopping or suspending the
VM. This is also benefcial to be undetected by the user (customer) while the acquisition is
being performed. The capability of suspending the VMs allows the investigator to create
consistent RAM content images and to validate their integrity (Poisel et al., 2013). This is
conceivable because once the VM is suspended the RAM content remains unmodifed and
it can be imaged from the hypervisor level in a reliable and effcient manner. The RAM
image created can be analyzed using memory forensic utilities such as the Volatility
Framework (Volatility, 2018). The drawback of suspending the VM is that it could be
detected by the user because the VM is not accessible until it is unsuspended. Through
these VMI utilities, it could be also possible to capture all the network traffc sent and
received by a VM during a particular period of time and store it into a fle. This fle can be
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inspected to analyze the network communications established using network analysis
tools such as Wireshark (WireShark, 2018). The available space on the hard drive needed
to capture the network traffc depends on the period of time the capture is active and on
the volume of the network data sent and received by the VM during that time. In addition,
this process may require an intensive usage of CPU on the hypervisor because each single
network packet is frst written to a fle and then sent to the virtual network interface.

2.4 Summary
The following conclusions can be drawn from the previous analysis. First, the
acquisition process on cloud computing and virtual environments is mentioned as an
unaddressed topic in digital forensics (Beebe, 2009; Birk & Wegener, 2011; Morioka &
Sharbaf, 2016; Pollitt et al., 2008; Zawoad & Hasan, 2013). Second, some of the
solutions proposed to address this topic need active participation of the cloud providers in
order to apply important modifcations to their current environments (Patrascu & Patriciu,
2014; Sang, 2013). Third, VMI is introduced as a reliable approach to collect data from a
VM because it works at a hypervisor level (Birk, 2011; Dykstra & Sherman, 2012;
Morioka & Sharbaf, 2016). This method can be considered a selective acquisition
because it only collects data from a particular VM instead of from the entire physical
virtualization node. Therefore, it helps to address the issues of analyzing enormous data
storage volumes and compromising the privacy of other customers (Beebe, 2009;
Morioka & Sharbaf, 2016). In addition, the capacity to take snapshots and suspend VMs
are mentioned as signifcant and positive advantages of collecting data from a virtual
environment compared to traditional physical computers (Birk, 2011; Chirammal et al.,
2016; Poisel et al., 2013). Fourth, one limitation noticed is the lack of updated guidelines
to provide forensic investigators with reliable procedures to be followed in cloud or virtual
environments (Birk & Wegener, 2011; Dykstra & Sherman, 2012). This limitation
negatively affects the reliability of the evidence acquired from these environments. Fifth,
there are different types of VMI utilities, but the out-of-VM and out-of-the-box ones are
the more interesting from the digital forensic perspective because they do not need to alter
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in any manner the content of the VM or the hypervisor. In spite of this fact, there is no
research on the reliability of this kind of VMI utilities to collect data from a virtual
environment. Instead, most of the studies focused on possible classifcations and
applications of diverse VMI tools (Hebbal et al., 2015; Poisel et al., 2013; Suneja et al.,
2015).

2.5 This Research Study
This study took a different approach. It aimed to examine if it was possible to
acquire forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS hosted in a virtualization node
that uses KVM as a hypervisor. To this purpose, the performance of two utilities was
evaluated. The frst one was virsh, a VMI out-of-VM and out-of-the-box utility, which
was used to create images of the virtual hard drives and the RAM content of the VPSs.
The second utility was tcpdump, which was used to capture in real-time the network
traffc of the VPSs. Even though tcpdump has been studied and used in the digital
forensics feld to capture network traffc on physical network interfaces for a long time,
this study focused on using this utility to capture traffc on specifc virtual network
interfaces assigned to a VPS. The main reason for focusing on these utilities was they
could positively impact on the admissibility of the evidence in a court of law because virsh
works at the hypervisor level and tcpdump at the virtualization node OS level. This means
the results of these utilities are more reliable than other utilities that work at the VM level
(Dykstra & Sherman, 2012). Furthermore, they are available in the majority of the
virtualization nodes based on GNU/Linux distributions and their installation and
execution do not require signifcant modifcations to the production environment.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
As discussed in the previous chapters, there is a need in the digital forensics feld
to fnd an effcient and reliable procedure to acquire digital data from VPSs. This study
aimed to analyze if the utilities virsh and tcpdump can be used to accomplish this
objective in a full virtualized environment that uses KVM as a hypervisor. The principal
reasons for focusing on these tools were: they produce more reliable results than utilities
that work at the VM level (virsh works at the hypervisor level and tcpdump at the
virtualization node OS level), they are available in the majority of the virtualization nodes
based on GNU/Linux distributions, and their installation and execution do not require
signifcant modifcations to the production environment. This chapter introduces the
research question, hypotheses, participants, research design, testing conditions and
procedures, measurements for evaluation and success, and possible threats to validity.

3.1 Research Question and Hypotheses
The principal objective of this research was to answer the following research
question: is it possible to acquire forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS hosted
in a cloud provider’s virtualization node that uses KVM as a hypervisor?
The hypotheses of this study were stated as follows:
H1 : images of the hard drives of a VPS can be created in an effcient manner,
respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
H2 : images of the RAM content of a VPS can be created in an effcient
manner, respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
H3 : the network traffc of a VPS can be captured in real-time, respecting the
integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
The utility virsh was used to test H1 and H2 , while tcpdump was used to test H3 .
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3.2 Participants
Five participants cooperated to address H2 and H3 by following four different
scripts to interact with the research environment described in section 3.3. The participants
selected were students of the Computer and Information Technology department at Purdue
University because they are technically skilled and they could follow the scripts more
naturally. The participants did not provide any personal information or opinions during
the process and the purpose of this interaction is explained in subsection 3.5.2. Appendix
F includes the review exemption letter provided by Purdue’s Institutional Review Board
(IRB) for this research.

3.3 Research Design
A study was conducted to test the hypotheses and to address the research question
stated in section 3.1. The study involved the creation of a virtual environment to simulate
a VPS provider’s infrastructure. One physical computer, one Ethernet switch, and one
Ethernet patch cord were used to this purpose. The computer acted as a KVM
virtualization node and was connected to the switch (using the patch cord) to imitate the
VPS provider’s network. The computer required one network interface and enough hard
drive and RAM resources to host four VMs. It also required two hard drives: one to store
the VM hard drives and a second one to store the information collected from the VMs
through the utilities virsh and tcpdump. These VMs acted as independent VPSs hired by
different customers.
In addition, one laptop and another Ethernet patch cord were required for this
study. The laptop was also connected to the switch (using the second patch cord) to
simulate the network communication between the customers (or other external users) and
the VPSs. Figure 3.1 summarizes the research environment proposed.
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Figure 3.1. Research environment

Once the research environment was prepared, a BASH script was developed to
address H1 by testing if the utility virsh was able to take snapshots of the hard drives of
the VMs, from where bit-stream images could be created. This BASH script was executed
once per day, during 14 consecutive days, and after each execution the results were
evaluated in terms of effciency, integrity, and completeness. The source code of the
BASH script was included in Appendix E. When the previous analysis was over, fve
different participants interacted twice with the four VMs (one at a time) using the laptop
in order to address H2 and H3 . During each interaction all the network traffc was captured
with the utility tcpdump, and at the end of the interaction an image of the RAM content of
the VM was created with the utility virsh. Each RAM image creation process was
evaluated in terms of effciency, integrity, and completeness while each network traffc
capturing process only in terms of integrity and completeness. The details of these
processes are described later in this chapter.
The following two subsections describe the technical specifcations of the devices
used in the study and the installation and confguration process followed for each of them.

40
3.3.1 Hardware Specifcations
This subsection details the technical specifcations of all the devices used to
recreate the research environment previously presented.
3.3.1.1 Virtualization node
The physical computer used as virtualization node in the study was a MacPro3,1
server, model A1186, with the following hardware specifcations:
• CPU: Two 3.0GHz 45-nm Intel Xeon E5472 (Harpertown/Penryn) 64-bit
processors. Each processor has four cores and a 12MB level-2 cache. These
processors include the VT-x (virtualization technology) extension, which offers
support for hardware-assisted virtualization.
• RAM: 32GB. Eight 4GB 800MHz DDR2 FB-DIMMs connected into the slots 1 to
4 on the frst memory card and into the slots 5 to 8 on the second memory card.
• Hard Drive 1: Hitachi GST Deskstar HDT725040VLA360 3.5 inch internal hard
drive, 400GB (physical sector size 512 bytes), 7200 RPM, SATA 3.0, 16MB cache.
It was connected to the frst 3.0 Gbit/s SATA bus connector of the motherboard.
This hard drive was assigned to install the OS of the virtualization node and to store
the VM hard drives.
• Hard Drive 2: Seagate BarraCuda ST31000333AS 3.5 inch internal hard drive, 1TB
(physical sector size 512 bytes), 7200 RPM, SATA 3.0, 32MB cache. It was
connected to the second 3.0 Gbit/s SATA bus connector of the motherboard. This
additional hard drive was assigned to store the data collected from the VMs during
the testing procedures.
• Video: ATI Radeon HD4870 1GB PCI-Express video graphics card.
• Ethernet Interfaces: Two independent Intel 10/100/1000 BASE-T Gigabit Ethernet
RJ-45 interfaces.
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3.3.1.2 Laptop
The laptop selected to interact with the VMs was a Lenovo IdeaPad Yoga 13,
model 20175, Windows 8.1 Pro 64-bit, with the following hardware specifcations:
• CPU: One 2.0GHz Intel i7-3537U 64-bit dual core processor. Each core has their
own 0.25MB level-2 cache and 2MB level-3 cache.
• RAM: 8GB. One 8GB 1600MHz DDR3 SO-DIMM.
• Hard Drive: Samsung MZMTD256HAGM-000L1 internal solid state drive (SSD),
256GB (physical sector size 512 bytes), Mini-SATA (mSATA) interface.
• Video: integrated Intel HD Graphics 4000.
• Ethernet Interface: The laptop did not have an integrated Ethernet network
interface. For this reason, a FosPower USB 3.0 to Gigabit Ethernet RJ-45 adapter
was used to overcome this limitation and to connect the laptop to the switch.

3.3.1.3 Switch and Ethernet patch cords
Two category 6 Ethernet RJ-45 patch cords were used to connect the virtualization
node and the laptop to a D-Link DGS-108 8-port Gigabit switch in order to simulate the
cloud provider’s network. Since the network interfaces, patch cords, and switch were
Gigabit capable, the resulting Ethernet network supported a maximum throughput of 1
Gbit/s.

3.3.2 Virtualization Node Implementation
This subsection describes the process followed to install the OS and the KVM
components on the virtualization node.
3.3.2.1 Operating system installation
The Ubuntu Server 16.04.4 64-bit LTS (long term support) version was
downloaded from the offcial Ubuntu website. The latest LTS version was selected
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because it is designed to be stable and supported for fve years, while regular versions
(non-LTS) are supported only for nine months. LTS is the version recommended for
enterprises and for this purpose was used as OS of the virtualization node.
The downloaded fle was named ubuntu-16.04.4-server-amd64.iso, with MD5
checksum 6a7f31eb125a0b2908cf2333d7777c82. A booteable USB stick was generated
with this fle and the physical computer was booted from it. The option Install Ubuntu
Server was selected, and each step of the installation process was completed as detailed
below:
• Language: English
• Location: United States
• Keyboard layout (manually selected): English (US)
• Network confguration: Do not confgure the network at this time
• Hostname: kvm
• Full name for the new user: adolfo
• User name for your account: adolfo
• Password for the new user: m5LcbpygPRWHFa38
• Encrypt your home directory: No
• Time zone: America/Indiana/Indianapolis
• Partition disks (manually selected): In this step, only the 400GB hard drive (Hitachi
GST Deskstar HDT725040VLA360) was partitioned. This device was detected as
/dev/sda by the Ubuntu installer. A new GUID partition table (GPT) was created,
with four primary partitions. Table 3.1 shows the details of each partition defned.
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Table 3.1. Partition table of device /dev/sda
Partition
/dev/sda1
/dev/sda2
/dev/sda3
/dev/sda4

Start Sector
2,048
1,050,624
98,707,456
118,239,232

End Sector
1,050,623
98,707,455
118,239,231
781,422,591

Size
Filesystem
536.87MB
FAT32
50GB
EXT4
10GB
SWAP
339.5GB unformatted

Function
EFI system
Root partition
Swap area
Not used

Partition /dev/sda1 (EFI system) contained the UEFI fles needed to start the loading
process of the OS. Partition /dev/sda2 (root partition) contained all OS fles and its
mount point was the directory /. Partition /dev/sda3 was defned as swap space.
Partition /dev/sda4 was created but not formatted during the Ubuntu Server
installation process. This partition was used after the installation to calculate the
transfer rate for the hard drive and then to store the VM hard drives. These two
additional procedures are described later in this section.
• Updating policy: No automatic updates
• Software selection: Only the option Standard system utilities was selected to be
installed.
• Install GRUB boot loader to the master boot record of the frst hard drive: Yes (in
this case the frst hard drive was /dev/sda)
• Finish the installation: Continue (to boot into the new installed system)
Once the installation process was completed, the virtualization node booted into
Ubuntu Server 16.04.4. The 400GB hard drive (Hitachi GST Deskstar
HDT725040VLA360) was detected as device /dev/sda, while the 1TB hard drive (Seagate
BarraCuda ST31000333AS) was recognized as /dev/sdb. The two integrated Ethernet
interfaces were identifed as enp7s0f0 and enp7s0f1. The interface enp7s0f0 was
connected to a local network and confgured to get Internet access. The interface enp7s0f1
was not enabled since it was not needed throughout the study. After that, all the installed
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packages were updated to the latest version by executing as root the command: apt-get
update && apt-get upgrade && apt-get dist-upgrade.
3.3.2.2 KVM installation and confguration
The KVM module was already installed by the linux-image-generic package
(version 4.4.0-116.140). The KVM user-space tools (version 2.5.0), the libvirt service and
client packages (version 1.3.1-1), and all the required dependencies were downloaded and
installed by executing as root the command: apt-get install kvm qemu-kvm libvirt-bin.
After that, the command kvm-ok (without parameters) was executed to determine if
hardware-assisted full virtualization was supported by the CPU. The output of this
command confrmed that it was supported and enabled.
3.3.2.3 Additional confguration steps
The following steps were performed to complete the confguration process of the
virtualization node.
1. Hard drive /dev/sdb partitioning: the hard drive /dev/sdb was partitioned to replicate
the same partition table defned for /dev/sda during the Ubuntu Server installation
process. The principal objective of this replication was to defne exactly the same
fourth partition, which was used to calculate the transfer rates for both hard drives in
subsection 3.4.1. In addition, the second partition was defned to have 50GB, which
was the same size specifed for the hard drives assigned to the four VMs. This
partition was employed by a BASH script to create bit-stream images from the
snapshots taken by the utility virsh in section 3.5. The other two partitions and the
unpartitioned space available on /dev/sdb were not used during this study. Figure
3.2 illustrates (not to scale) the partition layout for both hard drives.
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Figure 3.2. Partition layout for /dev/sda and /dev/sdb

2. Testing Conditions: once the hard drive /dev/sdb was partitioned, the procedures
detailed in section 3.4 were completed. These procedures included: the examination
of both hard drives for bad sectors, the calculation of read and write transfer rate for
both hard drives, the data duplication transfer rate from /dev/sda to /dev/sdb, and the
RAM data duplication transfer rate.
3. Partition /dev/sdb4 formatting: after the procedures detailed in section 3.4 were
completed, the partition /dev/sdb4 was formatted with the EXT4 flesystem by
executing as root the command: mkfs.ext4 /dev/sdb4. After that, the partition was
mounted on the directory /mnt/forensic-data (previously created) by executing as
root: mount -t ext4 /dev/sdb4 /mnt/forensic-data. The fle /etc/fstab was also
modifed to mount this partition on boot in case the server was restarted.
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4. Logical volume group creation: as it was stated in 2.2.2.1, the usage of logical
volume pools to store preallocated VM hard drives in raw format is a convenient
strategy for cloud providers because it combines the high performance offered by
block-based storages and by the raw format with the fexibility of logical volumes.
For this reason, a logical volume group was created in the virtualization node by
executing two commands as root. The frst one was: pvcreate /dev/sda4. It
initialized the partition for use by the logical volume manager. The second
command was: vgcreate lvm-group /dev/sda4. It generated a new logical volume
group called lvm-group using the partition /dev/sda4 as physical backend. This
logical volume group was created to be used as storage pool for the VM hard drives.
5. Ethernet bridge confguration: as it was also mentioned in 2.2.2.5, the Ethernet
bridge is the key component of virtual networking in KVM. It simulates to be a
virtual network switch where different network interfaces can be attached. For this
reason, an Ethernet bridge was created in the virtualization node by editing the fle
/etc/network/interfaces. This fle was modifed in order to reconfgure the Ethernet
interface enp7s0f0 and accomplish three objectives: disabling the Internet access
previous confgured, creating an Ethernet bridge named br0 with IP address
192.168.10.1, and attaching the interface enp7s0f0 to the bridge. After the four
VMs were created, their virtual network interfaces were set to bridged mode and
attached to the bridge in order to share the same physical network with the
virtualization node. Once the bridge confguration was fnished, an Ethernet patch
cord was used to connect the interface enp7s0f0 to the physical switch to imitate the
cloud provider’s network.
Appendix A shows a complete list of all the packages installed on the
virtualization node, including their respective version. Appendix B displays the
customized content of the following confguration fles: /etc/fstab, /etc/network/interfaces,
and /etc/libvirt/storage/lvm-group.xml.
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3.3.3 Virtual Machine Deployment
Four VMs were created in the virtualization node according the specifcations
detailed in Table 3.2. Different versions of OS and architecture were used to verify if the
results were consistent across them.
Table 3.2. Virtual machine specifcations
VM ID
VM1
VM2
VM3
VM4

Operating System
Ubuntu Server 17.10
CentOS 7
Windows Server 2008
Windows Server 2016

Architecture
32-bit
64-bit
32-bit
64-bit

Hard Drive
50GB
50GB
50GB
50GB

RAM
4096MB
4096MB
4096MB
4096MB

IP address
192.168.10.11
192.168.10.12
192.168.10.13
192.168.10.14

Four logical volumes of 50GB (one per each VM) were created in the logical
volume group lvm-group previously defned in the virtualization node. The command
executed as root to create the logical volume for VM1 was: lvcreate -L 50000000000B -n
VM1 ubuntu lvm-group. The parameter -L specifes the size in bytes of the volume, the
parameter -n defnes the name of the volume, and the last parameter indicates in which
logical volume group the new volume is created. Once the previous command was
executed, the new logical volume was created as /dev/lvm-group/VM1 ubuntu. Other
three volumes were created in the same fashion: /dev/lvm-group/VM2 centos (for VM2),
/dev/lvm-group/VM3 win2008 (for VM3), and /dev/lvm-group/VM4 win2016 (for VM4).
The OS installation process in each VM was completed using the original ISO fles
provided by Ubuntu, CentOS, and Microsoft, respectively. Table 3.3 shows the fles used
in this study and their MD5 checksums. These fles were downloaded in the virtualization
node inside the directory /mnt/kvm/isos.
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Table 3.3. ISO fles used to install the OS in each VM
VM ID
VM1
VM2
VM3
VM4

File name and MD5 checksum
ubuntu-17.10.1-server-i386.iso
MD5 checksum: f713724032a1b0fdbf3ebd90d2eec8d8
CentOS-7-x86 64-Minimal-1708.iso
MD5 checksum: 5848f2fd31c7acf3811ad88eaca6f4aa
6001.18000.080118-1840 x86fre Server en-us-KRMSFRE EN DVD.iso
MD5 checksum: 89fbc4c7baafc0b0c05f0fa32c192a17
14393.0.161119-1705.RS1 REFRESH SERVER EVAL X64FRE EN-US.iso
MD5 checksum: 70721288bbcdfe3239d8f8c0fae55f1f

The OS installation process followed for each VM and their particular settings are
detailed in the next fve subsections.
3.3.3.1 VM1 - Ubuntu Server 17.10 (32-bit)
Virtual resources allocated to this VM:
• CPU: 8 cores.
• RAM: 4096MB.
• Hard drive: /dev/lvm-group/VM1 ubuntu (50GB).
• Network: virtual interface vnet0 attached to the bridge br0.
The previous resources and other information required to create the VM in the
virtualization node were included in the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM1.xml. After that, the
following command was executed to create the VM taking as input this fle: virsh defne
/mnt/kvm/xmls/VM1.xml. The content of the fle is included in Appendix C.
Once the VM was created, it was booted from the ISO fle downloaded from the
Ubuntu website to start the installation process. The hard drive of the VM was detected as
/dev/sda by the Ubuntu installer. A new MSDOS partition table was created with two
primary partitions: /dev/sda1 (46GB) and /dev/sda2 (4GB). The former partition was
formatted with EXT4 flesystem. It contained all the OS fles and its mount point was the
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directory /. The latter partition was defned as swap space. At the software selection
screen, only the option SSH server was selected to be installed. In addition, only one user
account was generated and granted with sudo privileges:
• User name: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
When the installation process was completed, the VM was booted into the new
installed Ubuntu Server 17.10. The user account was used to login into the system and
confgure the network interface with the IP address 192.168.10.11 (network mask
255.255.255.0, no default gateway, and no DNS servers). The SSH server was enabled by
default to listen for incoming SSH connections on port TCP 22. The Apache web server
(version 2.4.27-2) was installed by executing the command: apt-get install apache2. The
default confguration was used, which means the web server listened for incoming HTTP
connections on port TCP 80 and served the default HTML fle /var/www/html/index.html.
In summary, two network services were installed and confgured in this VM:
• SSH (port TCP 22): Secure Shell access allowed only for user cfstudent.
• Apache (port TCP 80): HTTP access allowed for everyone.

3.3.3.2 VM2 - CentOS 7 (64-bit)
Virtual resources allocated to this VM:
• CPU: 8 cores.
• RAM: 4096MB.
• Hard drive: /dev/lvm-group/VM2 centos (50GB).
• Network: virtual interface vnet1 attached to the bridge br0.
The previous resources and other information required to create the VM in the
virtualization node were included in the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM2.xml. After that, the
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following command was executed to create the VM taking as input this fle: virsh defne
/mnt/kvm/xmls/VM2.xml. The content of the fle is included in Appendix C.
Once the VM was created, it was booted from the ISO fle downloaded from the
Centos website to start the installation process. The hard drive of the VM was detected as
/dev/sda by the Centos installer. A new MSDOS partition table was created with two
primary partitions: /dev/sda1 (46GB) and /dev/sda2 (4GB). The former partition was
formatted with XFS flesystem. It contained all the OS fles and its mount point was the
directory /. The latter partition was defned as swap space. In addition, only one user
account was generated and granted with sudo privileges:
• User name: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
When the installation process was completed, the VM was booted into the new
installed Centos 7. The user account was used to login into the system and confgure the
network interface with the IP address 192.168.10.12 (network mask 255.255.255.0, no
default gateway, and no DNS servers). The SSH server was installed and enabled by
default by the Centos installer to listen for incoming SSH connections on port TCP 22.
The vsftpd FTP server (version 3.0.2) was installed by executing the command: yum
install vsftpd. The default confguration was used, which means vsftpd listened for
incoming FTP connections on port TCP 21 and allowed access to the user’s home
directory fles. One additional modifcation was performed in the vsftpd confguration fle
in order to support the passive data transfer mode through the TCP port range
10090-10100. Once installed and confgured, vsftpd was enabled to automatically start on
boot by executing the command: systemctl enable vsftpd. The frewall installed by Centos
was modifed to allow incoming FTP connections to the port TCP 21 by executing the
command: frewall-cmd --permanent --add-port=21/tcp. A similar modifcation was
performed to allow incoming data transfer connections to the passive port range by
executing the command: frewall-cmd --permanent --add-port=10090-10100/tcp. Finally,
the frewall rules were reloaded through the command: frewall-cmd --reload.
In summary, two network services were installed and confgured in this VM:
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• SSH (port TCP 22): Secure Shell access allowed only for user cfstudent.
• vsftpd (port TCP 21): FTP access allowed only for user cfstudent.

3.3.3.3 VM3 - Windows Server 2008 Standard (32-bit)
Virtual resources allocated to this VM:
• CPU: 8 cores.
• RAM: 4096MB.
• Hard drive: /dev/lvm-group/VM3 win2008 (50GB).
• Network: virtual interface vnet2 attached to the bridge br0.
The previous resources and other information required to create the VM in the
virtualization node were included in the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM3.xml. After that, the
following command was executed to create the VM taking as input this fle: virsh defne
/mnt/kvm/xmls/VM3.xml. The content of the fle is included in Appendix C.
Once the VM was created, it was booted from the ISO fle downloaded from the
Microsoft website to start the installation process. The product key text box was left
empty and the option Windows Server 2008 Standard (Full Installation) was selected at
the Windows edition selection screen. The type of installation chosen was Custom
(Advanced). It installed a clean copy of Windows in the hard drive of the VM, which was
detected as Disk 0 and automatically partitioned and formatted by the Windows installer.
When the installation process was completed, the VM was booted into the new
installed Windows Server 2008 system. During the frst boot, the password for the
administrator account was generated:
• User name: Administrator
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
The network interface was confgured with the IP address 192.168.10.13 (network
mask 255.255.255.0, no default gateway, and no DNS servers) and remote desktop access
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was allowed only from computers with network level authentication. The frewall was
modifed to allow remote desktop access (port TCP 3389) and ping (ICMP echo) request.
The DNS server role was also installed and a new forward lookup primary zone named
vpsnet.com was created. The frewall was automatically modifed to allow incoming DNS
queries to the port UDP 53 from the network 192.168.10.0/24. Finally, four A records
were manually created inside this zone trough the DNS manager: vm1 (with IP address
192.168.10.11), vm2 (192.168.10.12), vm3 (192.168.10.13), and vm4 (192.168.10.14).
In summary, two network services were installed and confgured in this VM:
• Remote Desktop (port TCP 3389): Remote Desktop access allowed only for user
Administrator.
• DNS (port UDP 53): DNS resolution for zone vpsnet.com allowed for everyone.

3.3.3.4 VM4 - Windows Server 2016 Standard (64-bit)
Virtual resources allocated to this VM:
• CPU: 8 cores.
• RAM: 4096MB.
• Hard drive: /dev/lvm-group/VM4 win2016 (50GB).
• Network: virtual interface vnet3 attached to the bridge br0.
The previous resources and other information required to create the VM in the
virtualization node were included in the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM4.xml. After that, the
following command was executed to create the VM taking as input this fle: virsh defne
/mnt/kvm/xmls/VM4.xml. The content of the fle is included in Appendix C.
Once the VM was created, it was booted from the ISO fle downloaded from the
Microsoft website to start the installation process.The option Microsoft Server 2016
Standard (Desktop Experience) was selected at the operating system selection screen. The
type of installation chosen was Custom: Install Windows only (advanced). It installed a
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clean copy of Windows in the hard drive of the VM, which was detected as Drive 0 and
automatically partitioned and formatted by the Windows installer.
When the installation process was completed, the VM was booted into the new
installed Windows Server 2016 system. During the frst boot, the password for the
administrator account was generated:
• User name: Administrator
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
The network interface was confgured with the IP address 192.168.10.14 (network
mask 255.255.255.0, no default gateway, and no DNS servers) and remote desktop access
was allowed only from computers with network level authentication. The frewall was
modifed to allow remote desktop access (port TCP 3389) and ping (ICMP echo) request.
The MySQL server (version 8.0.11) was also installed by downloading the 64-bit
Microsoft Installer (MSI) package from the MySQL website. This service was confgured
as a standalone server, to listen for incoming connections on port TCP 3306, and to be
automatically started at Windows startup. Only the default root user account was created,
with the same password defned for the Windows administrator user account. The
Windows frewall was automatically modifed by the installer to allow incoming MySQL
connections to the port TCP 3306, and the privileges of the MySQL server were manually
adjusted to allow root access from the network 192.168.10.0/24.
In summary, two network services were installed and confgured in this VM:
• Remote Desktop (port TCP 3389): Remote Desktop access allowed only for user
Administrator.
• MySQL (port TCP 3306): MySQL access allowed only for user root.

3.3.3.5 Additional confguration steps
During the OS installation process followed for each VM (or after the OS was
installed) the timezone selected was America/Indiana/Indianapolis (or US & Canada
Eastern time), the language chosen was English, and the location was United States.
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If a VM required Internet access to update or install any additional package or
software, its network confguration was temporally modifed to access the Internet using
the virtualization node as default gateway. The network confguration of the virtualization
node was also modifed to accomplish this objective. Once the VM was updated and no
additional software was needed, the network confguration of the VM and the
virtualization node were restored to their previous state.
A customized Volatility profle was compiled on both VMs running GNU/Linux
(VM1 and VM2) after they were successfully installed and updated. This profle was
required in order to examine the RAM images created with the utility virsh as described in
section 3.5. Volatility (the framework used in this study to examine the RAM images)
includes built-in support for the majority of the Windows systems, but for a GNU/Linux
system a customized profle has to be generated (Ligh et al., 2014). This is due to the
large number of Linux kernel versions available and to the fact that each kernel can be
compiled with a custom confguration (Ligh et al., 2014). The commands executed to
generate the profles for VM1 and VM2 were included in Appendix D.

3.3.4 Laptop Confguration
The laptop was restored to factory settings and all the available updates from
Microsoft were applied. The OS installed after the restore and update process was
Microsoft Windows 8.1 Pro, version 6.3.9600. Only one user account was generated:
• User account name: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
• Account type: Administrator
Besides the OS and the updates applied, the following software was also installed
on the laptop to interact with the four VMs as specifed in section 3.5.
• Putty SSH client (version 0.70)
• Google Chrome (version 65.0.3325.146)
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• FileZilla FTP client (version 3.32.0)
• Command Prompt interface (included in Microsoft Windows)
• Remote Desktop client (included in Microsoft Windows)
• MySQL Workbench (version 6.3.10)
The last step in the laptop confguration process was connecting the USB to
Gigabit Ethernet adapter into a USB port. The network interface integrated in the adapter
was automatically detected by the operating system and no additional drives were
installed. The network interface was listed as Realtek USB GBE Family Controller by
Windows device manager. The IP address 192.168.10.20 was assigned to this interface
and one Ethernet patch cord was used to connect the laptop to the switch. Finally, the
network communication was verifed between the laptop, the virtualization node, and the
four VMs.

3.4 Testing Conditions
Before starting the execution of the testing procedures, both hard drives of the
virtualization node were examined to determine if they had bad sectors. To this purpose,
the physical computer was booted from a Ubuntu Desktop 16.04.4 64-bit USB stick and
the option Try Ubuntu without installing was selected. Once Ubuntu booted into graphical
mode, the keys Ctrl+Alt+F1 were pressed to change from graphical to command line
mode. Using this mode, the default user ubuntu (without password) was logged into the
system. The command sudo su was executed to allow the user ubuntu to execute
commands with superuser privileges. Then, the following command was executed:
badblocks -s -v -n /dev/sda. The utility badblocks searches a device for bad blocks.
Option -s was included to show the progress of the process, option -v to report verbose
information, option -n to use non-destructive read/write mode, and the device /dev/sda
corresponded to the physical hard drive assigned to store the VM hard drives. Once the
previous process fnished, the following command was executed: badblocks -s -v -n
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/dev/sdb. The purpose of this command was to perform the same examination on the
device /dev/sdb. This device corresponded to the physical hard drive assigned to store the
data collected from the VMs in the next stage of the study. Both commands did not report
bad sectors.
The testing procedures related to the creation of virtual hard drive and RAM
content images were analyzed from an effciency standpoint. For this reason, the frst step
was to obtain a reliable and accurate baseline to compare with the results observed during
the testing procedures and to determine if they were effcient. The Ubuntu Desktop
previously booted from a USB stick was also used to calculate the transfer rates for both
physical hard drives and for the RAM. By default, Ubuntu Desktop starts several services
which may use hardware resources. The services related to the graphical mode, network
functions, and scheduled tasks were stopped to minimize the usage of resources before
executing the transfer rate tests. The services stopped were: lightdm, cron, bluetooth,
network-manager, cups-browserd, cups, and avahi-daemon. The network interfaces were
also disabled with the command ifconfg down. The principal objective of stopping these
services and disabling the network interfaces was to maximize the availability of resources
during the transfer rate tests in order to get an accurate baseline. The next subsections
introduce the steps followed to obtain these values, which were fundamental to determine
the effciency of virsh to create virtual hard drive and RAM content images during the
next sections of this study.

3.4.1 Hard drives transfer rates
This subsection describes the process followed to calculate read and write transfer
rates for both hard drives available in the virtualization node. These values were used then
to calculate the data duplication transfer rate from one hard drive to the other and to use it
as baseline for effciency.
3.4.1.1 Read transfer rate for /dev/sda
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The command executed to get the read transfer rate for the physical hard drive
selected to store the virtual hard drives was: dd if=/dev/sda4 of=/dev/null bs=512
conv=noerror. The partition /dev/sda4 was selected as input device (parameter if) because
this partition had a size of 339.5GB approximately, which was large enough to get a
reliable transfer rate average. The special fle /dev/null was selected as output device
(parameter of) because it just discards the data without performing any real writing
operation. The parameter bs=512 indicates a block size of 512 bytes was read at a time.
This option was chosen to match the physical sector size of the hard drive and to create a
sector-by-sector sequential reading process. The value noerror in the parameter conv
means the process continues after a read error from the input device.
The previous command was executed 10 times. Table 3.4 displays the results of
each execution and the average values.
Table 3.4. Read transfer rate for device /dev/sda
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

Bytes
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320

Seconds
6,317.83
6,317.98
6,318.31
6,318.07
6,318.43
6,317.71
6,318.54
6,318.40
6,317.86
6,318.30
6,318.14

Bytes/sec
53,744,700.37
53,743,424.37
53,740,617.40
53,742,658.81
53,739,596.75
53,745,721.21
53,738,661.20
53,739,851.91
53,744,445.16
53,740,702.45
53,742,037.96

MB/sec
53.74
53.74
53.74
53.74
53.74
53.75
53.74
53.74
53.74
53.74
53.74

Figure 3.3 illustrates the read transfer rate (in MB/sec) registered. As it can be
seen, the values were stable across the tests, which suggested the 53.74MB/s average
value was an accurate indicator of the read transfer rate for the device /dev/sda.
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Figure 3.3. /dev/sda read transfer rate

3.4.1.2 Write transfer rate for /dev/sda
The command executed to get the write transfer rate for the physical hard drive
selected to store the virtual hard drives was: dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/sda4 bs=512
conv=noerror,sync,fdatasync. The special fle /dev/zero was selected as input device
(parameter if) because it provides a stream of null characters and it minimizes the use of
CPU compared to other special devices such as /dev/random or /dev/urandom. The
partition /dev/sda4 was selected as output device (parameter of) because this partition was
not being used yet and it had a size of 339.5GB approximately, which was large enough to
get a reliable transfer rate average. The parameter bs=512 indicates a block size of 512
bytes was read and written at a time. This option was chosen to match the physical sector
size of the hard drive and to create a sector-by-sector sequential writing process. The
value noerror in the parameter conv means the process continues after a read error from
the input device. The value sync means to pad with null values the destination block in the
output device after a read error from the input device. The value fdatasync forces each
block to be immediately written out to the output device. The principal objective of
including this last value was to minimize the impact of the cache and to get a more
accurate write transfer rate for the hard drive.
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The previous command was executed 10 times. Table 3.5 displays the results of
each execution and the average values.
Table 3.5. Write transfer rate for device /dev/sda
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

Bytes
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320

Seconds
18,111.10
18,154.20
18,145.40
18,057.40
18,165.70
18,079.40
18,152.80
17,992.70
17,939.00
17,941.70
18,073.90

Bytes/sec
18,748,164.40
18,703,654.27
18,712,725.01
18,803,918.63
18,691,813.71
18,781,037.00
18,705,096.75
18,871,535.70
18,928,027.22
18,925,178.79
18,787,115.15

MB/sec
18.75
18.70
18.71
18.80
18.69
18.78
18.71
18.87
18.93
18.93
18.79

Figure 3.4 illustrates the write transfer rate (in MB/sec) registered. As it can be
seen, the values were also stable across the tests, which suggested the 18.79MB/s average
value was an accurate indicator of the write transfer rate for the device /dev/sda.

Figure 3.4. /dev/sda write transfer rate
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3.4.1.3 Read transfer rate for /dev/sdb
The command executed to get the read transfer rate for the physical hard drive
selected to store the information collected from the VMs was: dd if=/dev/sdb4
of=/dev/null bs=512 conv=noerror. The purpose of this command was to perform the
same previous read transfer rate test on the device /dev/sdb. It was executed 10 times and
Table 3.6 displays the results of each execution and the average values.
Table 3.6. Read transfer rate for device /dev/sdb
Test Bytes
1
339,549,880,320
2
339,549,880,320
3
339,549,880,320
4
339,549,880,320
5
339,549,880,320
6
339,549,880,320
7
339,549,880,320
8
339,549,880,320
9
339,549,880,320
10
339,549,880,320
AVG 339,549,880,320

Seconds
Bytes/sec
2,969.36 114,351,200.37
2,969.28 114,354,281.28
2,969.38 114,350,430.16
2,969.16 114,358,902.96
2,969.44 114,348,119.62
2,969.40 114,349,659.97
2,969.24 114,355,821.80
2,969.31 114,353,125.92
2,969.38 114,350,430.16
2,969.58 114,342,728.71
2,969.35 114,351,470.10

MB/sec
114.35
114.35
114.35
114.36
114.35
114.35
114.36
114.35
114.35
114.34
114.35

Figure 3.5 illustrates the read transfer rate (in MB/sec) registered. As it can be
seen, the values were stable across the tests, which suggested the 114.35MB/s average
value was an accurate indicator of the read transfer rate for the device /dev/sdb.
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Figure 3.5. /dev/sdb read transfer rate

3.4.1.4 Write transfer rate for /dev/sdb
The command executed to get the write transfer rate for the physical hard drive
selected to store the information collected from the VMs was: dd if=/dev/zero
of=/dev/sdb4 bs=512 conv=noerror,sync,fdatasync. The purpose of this command was to
perform the same write transfer rate tests on the device /dev/sdb. It was executed 10 times
and Table 3.7 displays the results of each execution and the average values.
Table 3.7. Write transfer rate for device /dev/sdb
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

Bytes
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320

Seconds
11,127.90
11,128.10
11,128.00
11,129.30
11,127.60
11,127.60
11,128.50
11,128.30
11,128.40
11,128.60
11,128.23

Bytes/sec
30,513,383.51
30,512,835.10
30,513,109.30
30,509,545.10
30,514,206.15
30,514,206.15
30,511,738.36
30,512,286.72
30,512,012.54
30,511,464.18
30,512,478.71

MB/sec
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
30.51
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Figure 3.6 illustrates the write transfer rate (in MB/sec) registered. As it can be
seen, the values were also stable across the tests, which suggested the 30.51MB/s average
value was an accurate indicator of the write transfer rate for the device /dev/sdb.

Figure 3.6. /dev/sdb write transfer rate

3.4.1.5 Data duplication transfer rate from /dev/sda to /dev/sdb
At this point, read and write transfer rate values for both hard drives were known.
The fnal step to get an accurate baseline was testing the process of duplicating data from
the hard drive /dev/sda (selected to store the VM hard drives) to the hard drive /dev/sdb
(selected to store the data collected from the VMs). The command executed to get this
transfer rate was: dd if=/dev/sda4 of=/dev/sdb4 bs=512 conv=noerror,sync,fdatasync. It
was executed 10 times and Table 3.8 displays the results of each execution and the average
values.
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Table 3.8. Data duplication transfer rate from /dev/sda to /dev/sdb
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

Bytes
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320
339,549,880,320

Seconds
11,321.50
11,323.60
11,322.20
11,322.70
11,324.30
11,322.80
11,325.70
11,321.40
11,317.30
11,325.50
11,322.70

Bytes/sec
29,991,598.31
29,986,036.27
29,989,744.07
29,988,419.75
29,984,182.72
29,988,154.90
29,980,476.29
29,991,863.23
30,002,728.59
29,981,005.72
29,988,420.99

MB/sec
29.99
29.99
29.99
29.99
29.98
29.99
29.98
29.99
30.00
29.99
29.99

Figure 3.7 illustrates the data duplication transfer rate (in MB/sec) registered. As it
can be seen, the values were stable across the tests, which suggested the 29.99MB/s
average value was an accurate indicator of the data duplication transfer rate from the
device /dev/sda to the device /dev/sdb.

Figure 3.7. Data duplication transfer rate from /dev/sda to /dev/sdb

As it was previously determined, the read transfer rate for /dev/sda was 53.74MB/s
and the write transfer rate for /dev/sdb was 30.51MB/s. The motherboard of the

64
virtualization node had an integrated SATA 3.0 Gbit/s controller, which supported a
bandwidth throughput of up to 300MB/s shared between four SATA ports. Of these ports
only two were used (one per each hard drive connected), which means if the transfer rate
for both hard drives were added, the resulting 84.25MB/s was still much lower than the
maximum bandwidth throughput supported by the controller. Therefore, the process to
measure the data duplication transfer rate was not limited by the SATA controller, it was
limited only by the write transfer rate for the hard drive /dev/sdb. This analysis is
confrmed by the previous result, since the average data duplication transfer rate
(29.99MB/s) was lower, but indeed close, to the write transfer rate for /dev/sdb
(30.51MB/s).

3.4.2 RAM data duplication transfer rate
The Ubuntu Desktop previously booted from a USB stick was also used to create
two RAM disks, to calculate the data duplication transfer rate between them, and to use
this value as baseline for effciency. This approach was employed because in section 3.5
the RAM allocated to the VMs was imaged into a fle stored in a RAM disk, which is just
a block of RAM that simulates a traditional hard drive. If the RAM content were imaged
to a fle stored in a hard drive, the process would be limited by the hard drive write
transfer rate and it would not represent an accurate value to analyze the effciency of the
imaging process. For this reason, the usage of RAM disks to calculate the RAM data
duplication transfer rate seemed to be more appropriate.
To accomplish this objective, two new directories were created by executing the
command: mkdir /mnt/ramdisk{1,2}. After that, two RAM disks were defned and
mounted on these directories by executing: mount -t tmpfs -o size=12288M tmpfs
/mnt/ramdisk{1,2}. The parameter size specifed an extension of 12GiB for each RAM
disk. A new fle called memory.img was generated to fll all the space available on the frst
RAM disk by executing: dd if=/dev/urandom of=/mnt/ramdisk1/memory.img. The device
/dev/urandom was selected as input device (parameter if) because it is an special fle that
provides a stream of random numbers. The previous command wrote 25,165,825 sectors
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of 512 bytes to generate a fle with a total size of 12,884,902,400 bytes. The fle previous
generated was then copied into the second RAM disk, by executing the command: time cp
/mnt/ramdisk1/memory.img /mnt/ramdisk2/memory.img. The program time was included
in the command to report the real time needed by the process to complete the copy. The
command was executed 10 times. Table 3.9 displays the results of each execution and the
average values.
Table 3.9. RAM data duplication transfer rate
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

Seconds
9.853
9.860
9.842
9.846
9.841
9.856
9.837
9.842
9.851
9.842
9.847

Bytes/sec
1,307,713,630.37
1,306,785,233.27
1,309,175,208.29
1,308,643,347.55
1,309,308,241.03
1,307,315,584.42
1,309,840,642.47
1,309,175,208.29
1,307,979,129.02
1,309,175,208.29
1,308,511,091.30

MB/sec
1,307.71
1,306.79
1,309.18
1,308.64
1,309.31
1,307.32
1,309.84
1,309.18
1,307.98
1,309.18
1,308.51

Figure 3.8 illustrates the data duplication transfer rate (in MB/sec) registered
between both RAM disks. As it can be seen, the values were stable across the tests, which
suggested the 1,308.51MB/s average value was an accurate indicator of the RAM data
duplication transfer rate.
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Figure 3.8. RAM data duplication transfer rate

Once this process was concluded, the virtualization node was powered off, the
Ubuntu Desktop USB stick was disconnected, and the Ubuntu Server previously installed
was booted again.

3.5 Testing Procedures
This section describes the testing procedures performed after the virtualization
node, the VMs, and the laptop were implemented (according to section 3.3) and the
transfer rates determined (section 3.4). These procedures employed the utilities virsh and
tcpdump to collect digital data from the VMs and to test the hypotheses previously defned
(section 3.1).

3.5.1 Virtual hard drive image creation
The testing procedures related to the creation of virtual hard drive images involved
an automatic component completed by a BASH script, and a manual component
completed by examining the output generated by the script.
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The BASH script was developed to test the imaging process of virtual hard drives
by employing the utility virsh to create a snapshot. This script was executed once per day,
during 14 consecutive days, in order to create two images from the hard drive of each VM.
One image was stored into a local fle in the partition /dev/sdb4, which was previously
formatted with ext4 and mounted on the directory /mnt/forensic-data. The second image
was written into the physical partition /dev/sdb2, which was created with the same size of
the four virtual hard drives. The main reason for creating two images was to examine if
different transfer rates were observed when the image was written directly to physical
sectors of a partition and when it was written to a fle in a flesystem. The source code of
the script was included in Appendix E and the steps completed by it are detailed next:
1. The utility virsh was used to create an external snapshot of the hard drive of the frst
VM. This means the virtual hard drive was set as read-only and a new overlay fle
was created to record the writing operations on it. This step was completed without
suspending the VM and the time needed to create the snapshot was registered.
2. A bit-stream image was created through the command dd from the read-only hard
drive into the physical partition /dev/sdb2. The size of this partition matched the one
of the virtual hard drive. The transfer rate of this operation was registered.
3. A second bit-stream image was created through the command dd from the read-only
hard drive into a local fle inside the directory /mnt/forensic-data. The transfer rate
of this operation was registered.
4. MD5 and SHA1 hash values were calculated for the read-only virtual hard drive, for
the physical partition /dev/sdb2, and for the fle generated in the directory
/mnt/forensic-data. The objective of this step was to verify if the hash values
matched.
5. The principal partition where the VM OS had been installed was mounted on the
local directory /mnt/temp, using one of the images previously created. A log fle
located inside this mounted partition was checked to verify if the date and time of
the last entry recorded was close to the moment when the snapshot was created.
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6. The overlay fle was merged into the original virtual hard drive to revert the changes
made in the frst step. The virtual hard drive was set again as a read-write device.
This step was completed without suspending the VM and the time needed to merge
the snapshot was registered. Finally, the overlay fle was removed.
7. The process started again from the frst step, but focusing on the next VM.
Once the script completed the previous steps for the four VMs, its output was
manually analyzed to determine the following:
1. If the MD5 and SHA1 hash values calculated for the two images and the virtual
hard drive matched.
2. If it was possible to mount, from one of the images created, the principal partition
where the VM OS had been installed.
3. If the content of a log fle located in the partition mounted reported a close date and
time to the moment the snapshot was created.

3.5.2 RAM image creation and network traffc capturing
The testing procedures related to RAM content imaging and real-time network
traffc capturing required the cooperation of fve participants in order to interact with the
four VMs. To this purpose, the participants used the laptop that was previously connected
to the emulated cloud provider’s network and they interacted with the VMs through
different network services. Figure 3.9 illustrates the network connections established from
the laptop by the participants and the network services running on each VM.
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Figure 3.9. Network connections established from the laptop by the participants

The participants followed sequentially four different scripts (one at a time) that
detailed the steps to be executed for each VM. Table 3.10 summarizes these steps.
Table 3.10. Steps followed by the participants to interact with the VMs
Step
1
2
3

4

5

VM
ALL
ALL
VM1
VM2
VM3
VM4
VM1
VM2
VM3
VM4
ALL

Description
Log in the laptop.
Send a random number of ICMP echo requests to the VM.
Use the SSH server on VM1 to execute two commands.
Use the SSH server on VM2 to execute two commands.
Use the remote desktop server on VM3 to execute two commands.
Use the remote desktop server on VM4 to execute two commands.
Use a web browser to access the web server on VM1.
Use a FTP client to access the FTP server on VM2.
Use a DNS client to query the DNS server on VM3.
Use a MySQL client to access the MySQL server on VM4.
Complete a table indicating the date and time the interaction
started, the random number of ICMP echo requests specifed at
step 2, and the two commands executed at step 3.
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The four complete scripts and the results registered by the participants are
included in Appendices G, H, I, and J. Appendix F includes the review exemption letter
provided by Purdue’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) for this research.
Each participant completed the process of interacting sequentially with the four
VMs twice, but at different dates. In addition, only one participant completed the process
per each day. The purpose of this segmentation was to allow the researcher to be present
during each interaction in case the participants had any concerns about the process to
follow and also to simplify the later analysis of the data collected.
Before each participant started the interaction with a particular VM, the utility
tcpdump was executed on the virtualization node to capture continuously all the network
traffc that traversed the TAP interface of the VM. For example, the following command
was employed to capture all the network traffc of VM1 (whose TAP interface was vnet0)
and to store the data collected into a local fle: tcpdump -nn -s0 --interface=vnet0 -w
/mnt/forensic-data/net-captures/vm1-test1.pcap. The meaning of the parameters included
in the command were explained in 2.2.2.6.
During the interaction, the participants generated network traffc from the laptop,
as specifed in table 3.10. Once the interaction was completed, the tcpdump process was
stopped and the resulting fle was examined through the application Wireshark (version
2.2.6). The objective of this examination was to retrieve:
1. The random number of ICMP echo requests sent from the laptop to the VM.
2. The SSH or remote desktop access established from the laptop to the VM.
3. The network service connection (HTTP, FTP, MySQL, or DNS) established from
the laptop to the VM.
Similarly, once the interaction with a VM was completed, its RAM content was
imaged into a fle stored in a RAM disk that was mounted on the directory /mnt/ramdisk.
The RAM disk was created by executing the command: mount -t tmpfs -o size=5000M
tmpfs /mnt/ramdisk. The parameter size specifed an extension of 5GB for the RAM disk.
This size was chosen in order to have enough space to store one RAM image created from
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any VM (all the VMs had 4GB RAM assigned). The principal and only purpose of using a
RAM disk to store the RAM image fle was to analyze the effciency of the imaging
process.
The utility virsh was executed to create a RAM image from each VM after each
participant fnished the interaction. For instance, the following command was employed to
create a RAM image of VM1 into the RAM disk, and also to report the time needed to
fnish the process: time virsh dump VM1 Ubuntu 17.10 /mnt/ramdisk/vm1-ram.dump
--memory-only. The meaning of the parameters included in the command were explained
in 2.2.2.4.
Once the previous command ended, the resulting fle was moved to the directory
/mnt/forensic-data/ram-images to be examined through the Volatility Framework (version
2.6). The objective of this examination was to retrieve:
1. The SSH or remote desktop access established from the laptop to the VM, that was
intentionally left active during the interaction.
2. The commands executed on the VM OS through the SSH or remote desktop session.
3. The network service connection (HTTP, FTP, MySQL, or DNS) established from
the laptop to the VM.

3.6 Measurements for Evaluation
This section describes the procedures followed to determine if each test described
in the previous section achieved, after being executed, the expected results for the
variables effciency, integrity, and completeness.

3.6.1 Hypothesis One
The results reported by the BASH script developed to test the creation of virtual
hard drive images were examined to verify if the process was effcient and if it respected
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the integrity and completeness of the data acquired. Table 3.11 summarizes the steps
executed by the BASH script for each image created and the expected result for each step.
Table 3.11. Steps and expected results of the virtual hard drive image creation process
Step
1

2
3
4

5

6

7

Description
Result
Create an external snapshot of the virtual hard drive.
Time
This means the virtual hard drive was set as read-only
device and a new overlay fle was created.
Create a bit-stream image from the read-only hard drive
Time
into the physical partition /dev/sdb2.
Create a bit-stream image from the read-only hard drive
Time
into a local fle inside the directory /mnt/forensic-data.
Calculate MD5 and SHA1 hash values for the read-only
Boolean
hard drive, the physical partition /dev/sdb2, and the fle
inside /mnt/forensic-data. Did they match?
Mount the principal partition where the VM OS was
Boolean
installed using one of the images previously created. Was
the partition successfully mounted?
Check date and time of the last entry recorded in a
Boolean
log fle located in the partition mounted in the previous
step. Were date and time close (less than 6 hours) to the
moment when the snapshot was created?
Merge the overlay fle into the original virtual hard
Time
drive to revert the changes made in the frst step.

The time results observed for steps 1, 2, and 7 were added together. This sum
represented the total amount of time needed to take a new snapshot from the virtual hard
drive, to use the snapshot to create a bit-stream image into a physical partition, and to
revert the changes made when the snapshot was taken. The total size of the virtual hard
drive was then divided by the total amount of time in order to get the transfer rate for the
whole operation of creating a new image from a snapshot. The ratio between this value
and 29.99MB/s (data duplication transfer rate from /dev/sda to /dev/sdb obtained in
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subsection 3.4.1) was calculated. As equation 3.1 states, if the ratio was greater than or
equal to 0.7, the process was considered effcient:
E f f iciency = 1, i f

trans f er rate f or snapshot and image creation
≥ 0.7
trans f er rate f or data duplication (Testing Conditions)
(3.1)

The 0.7 threshold value was deliberately selected because a reduction of effciency
in 0.3 could be acceptable from a digital forensic perspective, as long as the process
respected the integrity and completeness of the data acquired. For the purpose of this
study, these two variables were more signifcant than effciency to ensure the acquisition
process was reliable and accurate. Furthermore, a diminution of effciency was expected
because the images were created from a physical hard drive of the virtualization node,
which was continuously running an OS and the four VMs. The time needed to create the
snapshot and then to merge it again into the virtual hard drive was also included when
effciency was measured. For these reasons, a result in the previous equation of 0.7 or
higher signifed that effciency was fulflled.
Similarly, the process of creating two images from the snapshot was considered to
accomplish integrity and completeness if the boolean results observed for steps 4, 5, and 6
indicated a positive (true) outcome. In other words, step 4 demonstrated both bit-stream
images were exact and authentic copies of the virtual hard drive in view of the fact that
their hash values matched. While steps 5 and 6 suggested the images were also
successfully created because the partition table was recognized, the main partition was
mounted, and the entries of the log fle extracted were close enough to the moment the
snapshot was taken. As Equations 3.2 and 3.3 state, if these three steps had a positive
(true) outcome, integrity and completeness were considered satisfed:
Integrity = 1, i f Step 4 = true && Step 5 = true && Step 6 = true

(3.2)

Completeness = 1, i f Step 4 = true && Step 5 = true && Step 6 = true

(3.3)
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3.6.2 Hypothesis Two
In a similar way, the RAM image created after each participant interacted with a
particular VM was examined to verify if the process was effcient and if it respected the
integrity and completeness of the data acquired. Table 3.12 summarizes the steps
manually executed and the expected result for each step.
Table 3.12. Steps and expected results of the RAM image creation process
Step Description
Result
1
Create a RAM content image from the VM (into a RAM disk),
Time
once the participant fnished the interaction.
2
Use Volatility to recover from the RAM image the SSH or
Boolean
remote desktop connection established by the participant.
Was the information successfully retrieved?
3
Use Volatility to recover from the RAM image the commands
Boolean
executed on the VM through the SSH or remote desktop session.
Was the information successfully retrieved?
4
Use Volatility to recover from the RAM image the process name Boolean
and port used by the network services running on the VM and
accessed by the participant. Was the information successfully
retrieved?

The time result observed for step 1 represented the total amount of time needed to
create a RAM content image. The total size of fle generated in the RAM disk was then
divided by the total amount of time in order to get the transfer rate for the operation of
creating a new RAM content image. The ratio between this value and 1,308.51MB/s
(RAM data duplication transfer rate obtained in subsection 3.4.2) was calculated. As
equation 3.4 states, if the ratio was greater than or equal to 0.5, the process was considered
effcient:
E f f iciency = 1, i f

trans f er rate f or RAM content image creation
≥ 0.5
trans f er rate f or RAM data duplication (Testing Conditions)
(3.4)

The 0.5 threshold value was also deliberately selected because a reduction of
effciency in 0.5 could be acceptable from a digital forensic perspective, as long as the
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process respected the integrity and completeness of the data acquired. This value
represented a more fexible threshold than the one used to analyze effciency during the
hard drive imaging process. There were two main reasons to explain why this threshold
was set to a more fexible value: in the frst place RAM transfer rates are sensible and more
diffcult to accurately measure than hard drive transfer rates, and in the second place RAM
transfer rate is considerably faster than hard drive transfer rates. For these particularities, a
result in the previous equation of 0.5 or higher signifed that effciency was fulflled.
Similarly, the process of creating a RAM content image was considered to
accomplish integrity and completeness if the boolean results observed for steps 2, 3, and 4
indicated a positive (true) outcome. In other words, it was possible to recover from the
RAM image the SSH or remote desktop connection established to the VM, the commands
executed through this connection, and the information regarding network services running
on the VM. As Equations 3.5 and 3.6 state, if these three steps had a positive (true)
outcome, integrity and completeness were considered satisfed:
Integrity = 1, i f Step 2 = true && Step 3 = true && Step 4 = true

(3.5)

Completeness = 1, i f Step 2 = true && Step 3 = true && Step 4 = true

(3.6)

3.6.3 Hypothesis Three
The network traffc captured after each interaction with a particular VM was
analyzed to verify if the process respected the integrity and completeness of the data
acquired. Table 3.13 summarizes the steps manually executed to examine the network
traffc fle and the expected result for each step.
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Table 3.13. Steps and expected results of the network traffc capturing process
Step Description
Result
1
Use Wireshark to recover the random number of
Boolean
ICMP echo requests sent by the participant. Was
the information successfully retrieved?
2
Use Wireshark to recover the SSH or remote desktop Boolean
connection established by the participant. Was the
information successfully retrieved? Did it match
the information retrieved from the RAM image at
step 3 in the previous subsection?
3
Use Wireshark to recover the network service
Boolean
connection established by the participant. Was the
information successfully retrieved? Did it match
the information retrieved from the RAM image at
step 4 in the previous subsection?

The process of capturing network traffc in real-time was considered to accomplish
integrity and completeness if the boolean results observed for steps 1, 2, and 3 indicated a
positive (true) outcome. In other words, it was possible to recover from the network traffc
fle the random number of ICMP echo requests sent to the VM, the SSH or remote
desktop connection established to the VM, and the network connection established to the
services running on the VM. In addition, the information recovered matched the one
observed after examining the results of the RAM imaging process of the same interaction.
As Equations 3.7 and 3.8 state, if these three steps had a positive (true) outcome, integrity
and completeness were considered satisfed:
Integrity = 1, i f Step 1 = true && Step 2 = true && Step 3 = true

(3.7)

Completeness = 1, i f Step 1 = true && Step 2 = true && Step 3 = true

(3.8)
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3.7 Measurements for Success
This section describes the procedures followed to accept or reject each of the three
hypotheses stated, based on the measures observed for the variables effciency, integrity
and completeness on each of the tests performed.

3.7.1 Hypothesis One
Fourteen virtual hard drive images were created for each of the four VM, to
produce 56 different images in total. For every image creation process, the variables
effciency, integrity, and completeness were assigned a value of 1 if the process met the
conditions described in section 3.6. Otherwise, the variables were assigned a value of 0.
Based on these values, equation 3.9 states the condition to accept H1 .

H 1 : Integrity ∗ (10) +Completeness ∗ (10) + E f f iciency ∗ (5) ≥ 20

(3.9)

The previous equation conferred a weight of 10 to the variables integrity and
completeness and a weight of 5 to the variable effciency. H1 was accepted if the sum of
the three variables by their weight was greater than or equal to 20 for every image creation
process completed or otherwise it was rejected. In other words, H1 was accepted if at least
integrity and completeness were achieved for each image created. As it was mentioned
before, from a digital forensic perspective a reduction of effciency could be acceptable as
long as the process respects the integrity and completeness of the data acquired. For the
purpose of this study, these two variables were more signifcant than effciency to ensure
the acquisition process was reliable and accurate.

3.7.2 Hypothesis Two
Ten RAM images were created for each of the four VM, to produce 40 different
images in total. For every RAM image creation process, the variables effciency, integrity,
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and completeness were assigned a value of 1 if the process met the conditions described in
section 3.6. Otherwise, the variables were assigned a value of 0. Based on these values,
equation 3.10 states the condition to accept H2 .

H 2 : Integrity ∗ (10) +Completeness ∗ (10) + E f f iciency ∗ (5) ≥ 20

(3.10)

The previous equation conferred a weight of 10 to the variables integrity and
completeness and a weight of 5 to the variable effciency. H2 was accepted if the sum of
the three variables by their weight was greater than or equal to 20 for every RAM image
creation process completed or otherwise it was rejected. In other words, H2 was accepted
if at least integrity and completeness were achieved for each RAM image created. As it
was mentioned before, from a digital forensic perspective a reduction of effciency could
be acceptable as long as the process respects the integrity and completeness of the data
acquired. For the purpose of this study, these two variables were more signifcant than
effciency to ensure the acquisition process was reliable and accurate.

3.7.3 Hypothesis Three
Ten network capturing processes were executed for each of the four VM, to
produce 40 different network traffc fles. For every network capturing process, the
variables integrity and completeness were assigned a value of 1 if the process met the
conditions described in section 3.6. Otherwise, the variables were assigned a value of 0.
Based on these values, equation 3.11 states the condition to accept H3 .

H 3 : Integrity ∗ (10) +Completeness ∗ (10) ≥ 20

(3.11)

In this case, the part of the equation related to effciency was removed because this
variable was not considered for the process of capturing network traffc through the utility
tcpdump.
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3.8 Threats to Validity
The cooperation of participants in the study may introduce uncertainty. For
instance, they could omit one step in the procedures detailed by the scripts and the later
analysis of the RAM image or network traffc fles could get inaccurate results. In order to
minimize this threat, the scripts were written as detailed as possible to guide the
participants, step by step, throughout the study. The researcher was also present during
each interaction in case the participants had any concerns about the process to follow. The
objective of these decisions was to minimize the occurrence of unexpected events when
the participants interacted with the VMs that could impact on the validity of the results.
Additionally, the participants were not informed about the global scope of the
research study. They were only introduced to the scripts to follow during the interaction,
with the principal purpose of minimizing the introduction of bias in their behavior.
In terms of reliability, if the study were repeated using the same software versions
on the virtualization node, the results observed should be replicated. The following list
shows the critical software and corresponding version for the purpose of this study:
• Virtualization node OS: Ubuntu Server 16.04.4 64-bit.
• Linux kernel and KVM module (package linux-image-generic): 4.4.0-116.140.
• KVM user-space tools (package qemu-kvm): 2.5.0.
• Libvirt service (package libvirt0) and Libvirt client (package libvirt-bin): 1.3.1-1.
• Tcpdump: 4.9.2-0.
Appendix A shows a complete list of all the packages installed on the
virtualization node, including their respective version.
It is probable that the results were also replicated if different software versions
were used, specially the GNU/Linux distribution and the Linux kernel installed on the
virtualization node. However, other software versions were not analyzed in this study and
more research is needed to support this observation.
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A different physical computer could be used as virtualization node as long as the
processor includes virtualization technology support and its hardware components are
fully supported by the Linux kernel. The rest of the physical devices (Ethernet switch and
Laptop) are not relevant as long as they work appropriately and meet the minimum
requirements for the purpose of the study.

3.9 Summary
This chapter provided a detailed description of the methodology used in this
research study. It presented the research question, hypotheses, participants, research
design, testing conditions and procedures, measurements for evaluation and success, and
possible threats to validity.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
This chapter presents the results registered after completing the testing procedures
previously described for each of the hypotheses stated. The chapter also interprets the
results to determine whether or not each hypothesis was accepted.

4.1 Hypothesis One
Fourteen different images were created from the virtual hard drive assigned to
VM1. This virtual hard drive and each image generated had 97,656,832 sectors of 512
bytes and a total size of 50,000,297,984 bytes. Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the
different steps executed to analyze each image created. The column called TTR displays
the total transfer rate for each image creation process, including the steps needed to create
and merge the external snapshot. This means the values reported by this column take into
account the time results of steps 1, 2, and 7, previously described in section 3.6.1. The
column named Ratio represents the relationship between column TTR and the data
duplication transfer rate used as a baseline (29.99MB/s). The value of the variable
effciency depended on this column: each image creation process was considered effcient
if the ratio value was greater than or equal to 0.7. The possible values of columns S4, S5,
and S6 were T (true) or F (false) according to the results observed for steps 4, 5, and 6,
described in section 3.6.1. The values of the variables integrity and completeness
depended on these columns: each image creation process was considered to respect the
integrity and completeness of the data acquired if the results reported by these three
columns were T (true). In other words, the last four columns (Ratio, S4, S5, and S6)
provided the information required to assign a value of 0 or 1 to the variables effciency,
integrity, and completeness for each image creation process completed.
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Table 4.1. VM1 hard drive image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
AVG

SCT
1.77s
1.86s
1.69s
1.79s
1.78s
1.69s
1.77s
1.80s
1.77s
1.82s
1.73s
1.70s
1.64s
1.79s
1.76s

DDT
1,977.11s
2,010.38s
1,984.36s
1,945.54s
1,979.25s
1,955.87s
2,060.47s
1,966.50s
1,961.44s
1,925.99s
1,955.68s
1,962.14s
1,931.43s
2,056.23s
1,976.60s

SMT
4.20s
3.37s
3.42s
3.54s
3.45s
3.25s
3.35s
3.39s
6.75s
3.30s
3.67s
3.72s
3.17s
3.38s
3.71s

DDTR
25.29MB/s
24.87MB/s
25.20MB/s
25.70MB/s
25.26MB/s
25.56MB/s
24.27MB/s
25.43MB/s
25.49MB/s
25.96MB/s
25.57MB/s
25.48MB/s
25.89MB/s
24.32MB/s
25.31MB/s

TTR
25.21MB/s
24.81MB/s
25.13MB/s
25.63MB/s
25.20MB/s
25.50MB/s
24.21MB/s
25.36MB/s
25.38MB/s
25.89MB/s
25.50MB/s
25.41MB/s
25.82MB/s
24.26MB/s
25.24MB/s

Ratio
0.84
0.83
0.84
0.85
0.84
0.85
0.81
0.85
0.85
0.86
0.85
0.85
0.86
0.81
0.84

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S5
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S6
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. SCT represents the external snapshot creation time (step 1), DDT the bit-stream
image creation time (step 2), and SMT the external snapshot merging time (step 7). DDTR
represents the transfer rate recorded only for the bit-stream image creation process, while
TTR the total transfer rate, which includes the time needed to create and merge the external
snapshot in addition to the bit-stream image creation time. Ratio represents the relationship
between TTR and the value used as a baseline (29.99MB/s). S4, S5, and S6 represent the
results of steps 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The possible results of S4, S5, and S6 were T
(true) or F (false).

Fourteen different images were also created from the virtual hard drive assigned to
VM2. This virtual hard drive and each image generated had the same size previously
detailed for VM1. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the different steps executed to
analyze each image created.
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Table 4.2. VM2 hard drive image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
AVG

SCT
1.94s
2.02s
1.78s
1.89s
1.74s
1.88s
1.91s
1.95s
1.93s
1.88s
1.87s
1.92s
1.75s
1.96s
1.89s

DDT
1,845.62s
1,917.03s
1,898.53s
1,884.68s
1,864.89s
1,870.41s
1,905.96s
1,860.15s
1,845.36s
1,864.82s
1,866.35s
1,911.01s
1,799.27s
1,914.25s
1,874.88s

SMT
3.49s
3.07s
3.49s
3.08s
2.92s
2.82s
3.02s
3.04s
3.86s
3.48s
3.42s
3.96s
4.80s
4.90s
3.53s

DDTR
27.09MB/s
26.08MB/s
26.34MB/s
26.53MB/s
26.81MB/s
26.73MB/s
26.23MB/s
26.88MB/s
27.10MB/s
26.81MB/s
26.79MB/s
26.16MB/s
27.79MB/s
26.12MB/s
26.68MB/s

TTR
27.01MB/s
26.01MB/s
26.26MB/s
26.46MB/s
26.74MB/s
26.67MB/s
26.17MB/s
26.81MB/s
27.01MB/s
26.74MB/s
26.71MB/s
26.08MB/s
27.69MB/s
26.03MB/s
26.60MB/s

Ratio
0.90
0.87
0.88
0.88
0.89
0.89
0.87
0.89
0.90
0.89
0.89
0.87
0.92
0.87
0.89

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S5
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S6
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. SCT represents the external snapshot creation time (step 1), DDT the bit-stream
image creation time (step 2), and SMT the external snapshot merging time (step 7). DDTR
represents the transfer rate recorded only for the bit-stream image creation process, while
TTR the total transfer rate, which includes the time needed to create and merge the external
snapshot in addition to the bit-stream image creation time. Ratio represents the relationship
between TTR and the value used as a baseline (29.99MB/s). S4, S5, and S6 represent the
results of steps 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The possible results of S4, S5, and S6 were T
(true) or F (false).

Fourteen different images were also created from the virtual hard drive assigned to
VM3. This virtual hard drive and each image generated had the same size previously
detailed for VM1. Table 4.3 summarizes the results of the different steps executed to
analyze each image created.
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Table 4.3. VM3 hard drive image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
AVG

SCT
2.60s
2.14s
2.16s
2.31s
1.84s
2.19s
2.18s
1.74s
2.15s
2.03s
2.13s
2.32s
2.05s
2.43s
2.16s

DDT
1,925.07s
1,964.93s
2,032.38s
1,980.01s
2,067.05s
2,156.22s
2,178.07s
2,061.69s
1,940.10s
1,936.74s
1,921.73s
1,824.84s
1,814.18s
2,085.50s
1,992.04s

SMT
3.86s
3.89s
3.62s
3.31s
3.47s
3.29s
3.20s
3.47s
4.22s
3.33s
3.82s
3.31s
3.85s
3.78s
3.60s

DDTR
25.97MB/s
25.45MB/s
24.60MB/s
25.25MB/s
24.19MB/s
23.19MB/s
22.96MB/s
24.25MB/s
25.77MB/s
25.82MB/s
26.02MB/s
27.40MB/s
27.56MB/s
23.98MB/s
25.17MB/s

TTR
25.89MB/s
25.37MB/s
24.53MB/s
25.18MB/s
24.13MB/s
23.13MB/s
22.90MB/s
24.19MB/s
25.69MB/s
25.75MB/s
25.94MB/s
27.32MB/s
27.47MB/s
23.90MB/s
25.10MB/s

Ratio
0.86
0.85
0.82
0.84
0.80
0.77
0.76
0.81
0.86
0.86
0.86
0.91
0.92
0.80
0.84

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S5
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S6
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. SCT represents the external snapshot creation time (step 1), DDT the bit-stream
image creation time (step 2), and SMT the external snapshot merging time (step 7). DDTR
represents the transfer rate recorded only for the bit-stream image creation process, while
TTR the total transfer rate, which includes the time needed to create and merge the external
snapshot in addition to the bit-stream image creation time. Ratio represents the relationship
between TTR and the value used as a baseline (29.99MB/s). S4, S5, and S6 represent the
results of steps 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The possible results of S4, S5, and S6 were T
(true) or F (false).

Fourteen different images were also created from the virtual hard drive assigned to
VM4. This virtual hard drive and each image generated had the same size previously
detailed for VM1. Table 4.4 summarizes the results of the different steps executed to
analyze each image created.
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Table 4.4. VM4 hard drive image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
AVG

SCT
1.55s
1.93s
2.30s
2.10s
2.61s
2.49s
2.45s
2.26s
1.99s
1.77s
1.75s
1.83s
1.64s
1.69s
2.03s

DDT
1,943.80s
1,949.18s
2,032.45s
2,027.28s
2,042.94s
2,106.78s
2,051.54s
2,024.43s
1,946.88s
2,104.86s
2,099.97s
1,914.80s
2,012.17s
1,949.67s
2,014.77s

SMT
7.26s
5.77s
7.77s
8.72s
6.06s
6.22s
5.54s
6.45s
4.72s
4.66s
4.44s
4.82s
4.91s
6.14s
5.96s

DDTR
25.72MB/s
25.65MB/s
24.60MB/s
24.66MB/s
24.47MB/s
23.73MB/s
24.37MB/s
24.70MB/s
25.68MB/s
23.75MB/s
23.81MB/s
26.11MB/s
24.85MB/s
25.65MB/s
24.84MB/s

TTR
25.61MB/s
25.55MB/s
24.48MB/s
24.53MB/s
24.37MB/s
23.64MB/s
24.28MB/s
24.59MB/s
25.59MB/s
23.68MB/s
23.74MB/s
26.02MB/s
24.77MB/s
25.54MB/s
24.74MB/s

Ratio
0.85
0.85
0.82
0.82
0.81
0.79
0.81
0.82
0.85
0.79
0.79
0.87
0.83
0.85
0.83

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S5
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S6
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. SCT represents the external snapshot creation time (step 1), DDT the bit-stream
image creation time (step 2), and SMT the external snapshot merging time (step 7). DDTR
represents the transfer rate recorded only for the bit-stream image creation process, while
TTR the total transfer rate, which includes the time needed to create and merge the external
snapshot in addition to the bit-stream image creation time. Ratio represents the relationship
between TTR and the value used as a baseline (29.99MB/s). S4, S5, and S6 represent the
results of steps 4, 5, and 6, respectively. The possible results of S4, S5, and S6 were T
(true) or F (false).

The values presented in the previous four tables suggested the utility virsh is able
to take snapshots of virtual hard drives, from where bit-stream images can be created in an
effcient manner. The ratio value for each of the 56 different images generated was never
lower than the 0.7 threshold value. The lowest ratio value registered was 0.76 while the
average ratio value for all the 56 imaging processes was 0.85. In other words, the average
transfer rate achieved by the imaging processes was 25.42MB/s while the data duplication
transfer rate from /dev/sda to /dev/sdb used as a baseline was 29.99MB/s. This baseline
represented the transfer rate in optimal conditions because it was calculated when the
availability of hardware resources on the virtualization node was maximized. Conversely,
all the virtual hard drive images were created while the virtualization node was using
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resources to execute different OS tasks and running the four VMs. For instance, the
logging service of the virtualization node was writing to the physical hard drive /dev/sda
and the four VMs were reading and writing their virtual hard drives stored in the same
physical hard drive. This means the hardware resources were shared between the imaging
processes and other tasks in execution at the virtualization node. If all these facts are
considered, the average value of 0.85 observed for all the imaging processes seems to be
notably effcient.
Similarly, the values in the tables suggested the images generated respected the
integrity and completeness of the data acquired. Columns S4, S5, and S6 reported always
T (true) results for the different verifcations after each of the 56 imaging processes
fnished. Firstly, the MD5 and SHA1 hash values calculated for the virtual hard drive and
for the two bit-stream images matched every time, which means the images were exact
and authentic copies of the virtual hard drive (S4). Secondly, the main partition of each
image created into the physical partition /dev/sdb2 was successfully mounted on the
virtualization node (S5). This step implies two facts: the partition table of the image
created was correctly recognized and the flesystem of the main partition of the image was
detected and mounted by the virtualization node. Thirdly, the content of a fle located
inside the mounted partition was successfully accessed and the last entry recorded in this
fle was always close (less than 6 hours) to the moment when the snapshot was created
(S6). These results evidence that all the images created respected the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired.
For the previous reasons, H1 was accepted, which means virsh is able to take
snapshots of the virtual hard drives of a VPS from where bit-stream images can be created
in an effcient manner, respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.

4.2 Hypothesis Two
Ten different RAM images were created from VM1 and each of them had a total
size of 4,429,395,320 bytes (approximately 4GiB). Table 4.5 summarizes the results of the
different steps executed to analyze each RAM image created. The column called RITR

87
displays the total transfer rate for each RAM image creation process based on the time
needed to generate the image and its size. This means the values reported by this column
take into account the time results of step 1 previously described in section 3.6.2. The
column named Ratio represents the relationship between column RITR and the RAM data
duplication transfer rate used as a baseline (1,308.51MB/s). The value of the variable
effciency depended on this column: each RAM image creation process was considered
effcient if the ratio value was greater than or equal to 0.5. The possible values of columns
S2, S3, and S4 were T (true) or F (false) according to the results observed for steps 2, 3,
and 4, also described in section 3.6.2. The values of the variables integrity and
completeness depended on these columns: each RAM image creation process was
considered to respect the integrity and completeness of the data acquired if the results
reported by these three columns were T (true). In other words, the last four columns
(Ratio, S2, S3, and S4) provided the information required to assign a value of 0 or 1 to the
variables effciency, integrity, and completeness for each RAM image creation process
completed.
Table 4.5. VM1 RAM image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

RICT
5.378s
5.333s
5.843s
5.501s
6.142s
5.423s
5.666s
5.407s
5.910s
5.718s
5.632s

RITR
823.61MB/s
830.56MB/s
758.07MB/s
805.20MB/s
721.16MB/s
816.77MB/s
781.75MB/s
819.20MB/s
749.47MB/s
774.64MB/s
788.04MB/s

Ratio
0.63
0.63
0.58
0.62
0.55
0.62
0.60
0.63
0.57
0.59
0.60

S2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. RICT represents the RAM image creation time (step 1) and RITR the RAM image
creation transfer rate. Ratio represents the relationship between RITR and the value used
as a baseline (1,308.51MB/s). S2, S3, and S4 represent the results of steps 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The possible results of S2, S3, and S4 were T (true) or F (false).
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Ten different RAM images were also created from VM2 and each of them had a
total size of 4,429,331,264 bytes. Table 4.6 summarizes the results of the different steps
executed to analyze each RAM image created.
Table 4.6. VM2 RAM image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

RICT
5.463s
5.592s
5.625s
5.701s
5.542s
5.670s
5.576s
5.432s
5.592s
5.676s
5.587s

RITR
810.79MB/s
792.08MB/s
787.44MB/s
776.94MB/s
799.23MB/s
781.20MB/s
794.36MB/s
815.41MB/s
792.08MB/s
780.36MB/s
792.99MB/s

Ratio
0.62
0.61
0.60
0.59
0.61
0.60
0.61
0.62
0.61
0.60
0.61

S2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. RICT represents the RAM image creation time (step 1) and RITR the RAM image
creation transfer rate. Ratio represents the relationship between RITR and the value used
as a baseline (1,308.51MB/s). S2, S3, and S4 represent the results of steps 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The possible results of S2, S3, and S4 were T (true) or F (false).
Ten different RAM images were also created from VM3 and each of them had a
total size of 4,429,395,320 bytes. Table 4.7 summarizes the results of the different steps
executed to analyze each RAM image created.
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Table 4.7. VM3 RAM image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

RICT
5.344s
5.859s
5.975s
5.974s
5.530s
5.990s
5.770s
6.077s
6.041s
5.516s
5.808s

RITR
828.85MB/s
756.00MB/s
741.32MB/s
741.45MB/s
800.98MB/s
739.46MB/s
767.66MB/s
728.88MB/s
733.22MB/s
803.01MB/s
764.08MB/s

Ratio
0.63
0.58
0.57
0.57
0.61
0.57
0.59
0.56
0.56
0.61
0.58

S2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. RICT represents the RAM image creation time (step 1) and RITR the RAM image
creation transfer rate. Ratio represents the relationship between RITR and the value used
as a baseline (1,308.51MB/s). S2, S3, and S4 represent the results of steps 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The possible results of S2, S3, and S4 were T (true) or F (false).

Ten different RAM images were also created from VM4 and each of them had a
total size of 4,429,396,856 bytes. Table 4.8 summarizes the results of the different steps
executed to analyze each RAM image created.
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Table 4.8. VM4 RAM image creation process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
AVG

RICT
5.900s
5.550s
5.941s
5.943s
5.355s
5.921s
5.711s
6.081s
5.977s
5.145s
5.752s

RITR
750.75MB/s
798.09MB/s
745.56MB/s
745.31MB/s
827.15MB/s
748.08MB/s
775.59MB/s
728.40MB/s
741.07MB/s
860.91MB/s
772.09MB/s

Ratio
0.57
0.61
0.57
0.57
0.63
0.57
0.59
0.56
0.57
0.66
0.59

S2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

S4
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
-

Note. RICT represents the RAM image creation time (step 1) and RITR the RAM image
creation transfer rate. Ratio represents the relationship between RITR and the value used
as a baseline (1,308.51MB/s). S2, S3, and S4 represent the results of steps 2, 3, and 4,
respectively. The possible results of S2, S3, and S4 were T (true) or F (false).

The values presented in the previous four tables suggested the utility virsh is able
to create images of the RAM content in an effcient manner. The ratio value for each of
the 40 different RAM images generated was never lower than the 0.5 threshold value. The
lowest ratio value registered was 0.55 while the average ratio value for all the 40 RAM
imaging processes was 0.6. In other words, the average transfer rate achieved by the
imaging processes was 779.30MB/s while the average RAM data duplication transfer rate
used as a baseline was 1,308.51MB/s. This baseline represented the transfer rate in
optimal conditions because it was calculated when the availability of hardware resources
on the virtualization node was maximized. Conversely, all the RAM images were created
while the virtualization node was using resources to execute different OS tasks and
running the four VMs. This means the hardware resources were shared between the
imaging processes and other tasks in execution at the virtualization node. If all these facts
are considered, the average value of 0.60 observed for all the RAM imaging processes
seems to be effcient.
Similarly, the values in the tables suggested the RAM images generated respected
the integrity and completeness of the data acquired. Columns S2, S3, and S4 reported
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always T (true) results for the different verifcations after each of the 40 RAM images
were created. In the frst place, it was possible to recover from every RAM image the SSH
or remote desktop session left intentionally active by the participants during their
interactions (S2). In the second place, the commands executed by the participants through
a SSH session (for GNU/Linux VMs) or through a command prompt window (for
Windows VMs) were also recovered from every RAM image (S3). In the third place, it
was also possible to retrieve the process name and port used by the network services
running in each VM and accessed by the participants (S4). These results evidence that all
the RAM images created respected the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
For the previous reasons, H2 was accepted, which means virsh is able to create
images of the RAM content of a VPS in an effcient manner, respecting the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired.

4.3 Hypothesis Three
Ten network traffc capture fles were generated from VM1, once per each
interaction. Table 4.9 summarizes the results of the three different steps executed to
analyze each fle. The possible values of columns Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3, were T (true)
or F (false) according to the results observed for each step, previously described in section
3.6.3. The values of the variables integrity and completeness depended on these results:
each network traffc capturing process was considered to respect the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired if the results reported by these columns were T (true).
In other words, these three columns provided the information required to assign a value of
0 or 1 to the variables integrity and completeness for each network traffc capturing
process completed.
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Table 4.9. VM1 network traffc capturing process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Step 1
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Note. The possible results of Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3 were T (true) or F (false).

Ten network traffc capture fles were also generated from VM2. Table 4.10
summarizes the results of the three different steps executed to analyze each fle.
Table 4.10. VM2 network traffc capturing process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Step 1
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Note. The possible results of Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3 were T (true) or F (false).
Ten network traffc capture fles were also generated from VM3. Table 4.11
summarizes the results of the three different steps executed to analyze each fle.
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Table 4.11. VM3 network traffc capturing process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Step 1
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Note. The possible results of Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3 were T (true) or F (false).

Ten network traffc capture fles were also generated from VM4. Table 4.12
summarizes the results of the three different steps executed to analyze each fle.
Table 4.12. VM4 network traffc capturing process
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Step 1
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 2
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Step 3
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T
T

Note. The possible results of Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3 were T (true) or F (false).
The values presented in the previous four tables suggested the utility tcpdump is
able to capture in real-time the network traffc of a VPS, respecting the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired. Columns Step 1, Step 2, and Step 3 reported always T
(true) results for the different verifcations after each of the 40 interactions were
completed. In the frst place, it was possible to recover from every network traffc fle the
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random number of ICMP echo requests sent by the participants during their interactions
(Step 1). In the second place, the details of the SSH or remote desktop session established
by the participants were also recovered (Step 2). In the third place, it was also possible to
retrieve the details of the network connection established to the services running on each
VM and accessed by the participants (Step 3).
In addition, not only the ICMP echo requests were retrieved from the fles, but also
every single reply associated to each request. The three-way handshake (SYN, SYN-ACK,
ACK) defned by the TCP protocol to set up a new connection was also recovered for each
SSH and remote desktop session established by the participants. Moreover, the same
three-way handshake was retrieved for each TCP connection established to the services
running on VM1, VM2, and VM4 (HTTP, FTP, and MySQL, respectively). Similarly,
once each of these connections was closed, the termination four-way handshake (FIN,
ACK, FIN, ACK) defned by the TCP protocol was also recovered. Even more specifc
details were found: all the FTP commands sent to and received from the FTP server on
VM2 were recovered, including user names, passwords, and content of the fles transfered.
It was also possible to determine when the browser used to access the web server on VM1
actually requested the default index.html fle or when the browser provided it from its own
cache. Likewise, precise details of each DNS query sent to the DNS server on VM3, and
its corresponding responses, were retrieved. These results evidence that all the network
traffc fles generated respected the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
For the previous, reasons H3 was accepted, which means tcpdump is able to
capture in real-time the network traffc of a VPS, respecting the integrity and
completeness of the data acquired.

4.4 Summary
This chapter presented the results registered after completing the testing
procedures described for each of the hypotheses stated. The chapter also interpreted the
results to determine whether or not each hypothesis was accepted.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to answer the following research question: is it
possible to acquire forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS hosted in a cloud
provider’s virtualization node that uses KVM as a hypervisor?
To address this question, three different hypotheses were stated:
H1 : images of the hard drives of a VPS can be created in an effcient manner,
respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
H2 : images of the RAM content of a VPS can be created in an effcient manner,
respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
H3 : the network traffc of a VPS can be captured in real-time, respecting the
integrity and completeness of the data acquired.
In order to test the different hypotheses and to address the research question, a
research environment was created to simulate a VPS provider’s infrastructure. This
environment consisted of a KVM virtualization node, which hosted four VMs acting as
four independent VPSs.
The performance of two utilities to collect digital data from the VPSs was
evaluated. The frst one was virsh, a VMI out-of-VM and out-of-the-box utility, which
was used to take snapshots of the virtual hard drives and to create RAM images of the
VPSs. The second utility was tcpdump, which was used to capture in real-time the
network traffc of the VPSs. In other words, the utility virsh was used to test H1 and H2
while tcpdump was used to test H3 .
The main reason for focusing on these utilities was they could positively impact on
the admissibility of the evidence in a court of law because virsh works at the hypervisor
level and tcpdump at the virtualization node OS level. This means the results of these
utilities are more reliable than other utilities that work at the VM level (Dykstra &
Sherman, 2012). Furthermore, they are available in the majority of the virtualization
nodes based on GNU/Linux and their installation and execution do not require signifcant
modifcations to the production environment.
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Once the research environment was prepared, a BASH script was developed to
address H1 by testing if the utility virsh was able to take external snapshots of the hard
drives of the VPSs, from where bit-stream images could be created. After each image was
successfully created, the snapshot was merged back into the original virtual hard drive. As
it was mentioned in chapter four, the different tests executed showed effciency, integrity,
and completeness were achieved for each of the 56 different images generated. Therefore,
H1 was accepted.
Five different participants cooperated to address H2 and H3 by following four
different scripts to interact with the four VPSs. During each interaction all the network
traffc was captured with the utility tcpdump, and at the end of the interaction an image of
the RAM content of the VPS was created with the utility virsh.
The examination of RAM images was performed using the Volatility framework
and the results suggested integrity and completeness were achieved for each of the 40
RAM images generated. This means it was possible to recover from the RAM images
specifc actions performed by each participant. Effciency was also achieved by every
RAM imaging process executed. Therefore, H2 was accepted.
Likewise, the examination of the network traffc captured was performed using
Wireshark and the results suggested integrity and completeness were achieved for each of
the 40 network traffc fles generated. This entails it was possible to recover from the
network traffc fles specifc actions performed by the participants. Therefore, H3 was
accepted.
The preceding results suggested that it is possible to acquire forensically-sound
evidence from a VPS hosted in a cloud provider’s virtualization node that uses KVM as a
hypervisor because H1 , H2 , and H3 were accepted. This means the utilities virsh and
tcpdump are capable of collecting digital data from four VPSs in an effcient manner,
respecting the integrity and completeness of the data acquired.

5.1 Procedure to acquire digital evidence from a VPS hosted in KVM
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As it was mentioned, the results presented suggested it is possible to acquire
forensically-sound digital evidence from a VPS hosted in a virtualization node that uses
KVM as a hypervisor. These fndings could be used to defne a procedure to guide
forensic practitioners in acquiring evidence in this environment. For instance, if a VPS
named VM1 is suspected of being involved in a crime, the following processes could be
executed in the KVM virtualization node to collect digital data from it:
• Create an image of each virtual hard drive assigned to VM1:
1. Take an external snapshot of each virtual hard drive:
# virsh snapshot-create-as VM1 --disk-only --atomic --name
snapshot1 --diskspec hda,snapshot=external,
file=/mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot1.qcow2
When an external snapshot is created, the original virtual hard drive is set as
read-only and a new overlay fle is created to record the writing operations.
This step is completed without suspending the VPS. The parameter --diskspec
defnes three options: the name of the virtual hard drive of the VPS to set as
read-only (hda), the type of snapshot (external), and the new overlay fle to be
created (/mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot1.qcow2). The parameter --disk-only
specifes not to include the memory content in the snapshot. The parameter
--atomic assures the snapshot either succeeds or fails with no changes on the
original device. It is recommended to use --atomic every time an external
snapshot is created, specially when it is created from a live system (Chirammal
et al., 2016). Finally, the parameter --name specifes a customized name for
the snapshot generated.
2. Create a bit-stream image from the original virtual hard drive, which is set as
read-only after the external snapshot is created:
# dd if=/dev/lvm-group/VM1 of=/mnt/forensic-disk/VM1.dd
bs=512 conv=noerror,sync,fdatasync
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3. Verify the bit-stream image is an exact and authentic copy of the original
virtual hard drive by calculating MD5 and SHA1 hash values:
# md5sum /dev/lvm-group/VM1
# md5sum /mnt/forensic-disk/VM1.dd
# sha1sum /dev/lvm-group/VM1
# sha1sum /mnt/forensic-disk/VM1.dd
4. Merge the overlay fle into the original virtual hard drive:
# virsh blockcommit VM1 hda --active --pivot --verbose
The parameter hda specifes the name of the virtual hard drive, the fag --active
initiates the merging process of the overlay fle into the virtual hard drive, and
--pivot makes the hard drive active again once the merging is completed. At
this point all the read/write operations are completed on the hard drive again
and the overlay fle is not used anymore. The fag --verbose displays detailed
information about the process on the screen.
5. Remove the snapshot metadata and the overlay fle:
# virsh snapshot-delete VM1 snapshot1 --metadata
# rm /mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot1.qcow2
• Create an image of the RAM assigned to VM1:
1. Create a RAM image:
# virsh dump VM1 /mnt/forensic-disk/VM1.memdump --memory-only
The fag --memory-only specifes to collect only the RAM content and CPU
common register value of the VPS. This command automatically suspends the
VPS before creating the RAM image and resumes it after the image is
completed. In case the VPS should not be suspended during the investigation,
a RAM image can still be created if the fag --live is added to the command.
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2. Verify if the RAM image generated can be examined using a memory forensic
utility such as the Volatility Framework, specially if the image was generated
with the fag --live.
• Capture in real-time the network traffc:
1. Start the network capturing process:
# tcpdump -nn -s0 --interface=vnet0 -w
/mnt/forensic-disk/VM1-vnet0.pcap
The parameter --interface specifes to capture only the traffc that traverses the
listed network interfaces (vnet0). The parameter -nn declares not to resolve IP
addresses (or ports) to host names (or services names). This option is relevant
because the resolution process executed by default generates an important
delay that can be omitted. The parameter -s indicates the snapshot length,
which is the amount of bytes from each packet to be captured. The value 0
means no limit and it could be used to avoid truncating packets that have a
longer size to the value specifed. However, depending on the investigation and
the legal constraints, this value could be reduced. For example, if the network
is based on the Ethernet standard as data link layer, a value of 1,514 bytes
should be enough because this is the maximum size of an Ethernet packet
(Davidoff & Ham, 2012). Finally, the parameter -w declares the output fle
where the network traffc captured is stored.
2. Once the network capturing process is stopped, verify if the fle generated can
be examined using a network analysis utility such as Wireshark.
The previous procedure considers the utilities virsh and tcpdump are already
installed on the virtualization node. The meaning of the arguments included in the
example are described next:
• VM1: name of the VPS suspected of being involved in a crime. The names of all the
VPSs hosted in a KVM virtualization node can be listed by executing the command:
virsh list --all.
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• snapshot1: customized name of the snapshot generated for VM1. The list of all the
snapshots generated for this VPS can be displayed by executing the command: virsh
snapshot-list VM1.
• hda: name of the virtual hard drive assigned to VM1. The name of all the virtual
hard drives assigned to this VPS can be reported by executing the command: virsh
domblklist VM1.
• vnet0: name of the TAP network interface assigned to VM1. The list of all the TAP
interfaces assigned to this VPS can be displayed by executing the command: virsh
domifist VM1.
• /dev/lvm-group/VM1: the device of the virtual hard drive assigned to VM1. The
devices of all the virtual hard drives assigned to this VPS can by reported by
executing the command: virsh domblklist VM1.
• /mnt/kvm/VM1-snapshot1.qcow2: the name of the overlay fle created when the
external snapshot was taken, using the utility virsh.
• /mnt/forensic-disk/VM1.dd: destination fle of the bit-stream copy generated from
the external snapshot, using the command dd.
• /mnt/forensic-disk/VM1.memdump: destination fle of the RAM image generated
from VM1, using the utility virsh.
• /mnt/forensic-disk/VM1-vnet0.pcap: destination fle of the network traffc captured
from VM1, using the utility tcpdump.

5.2 Signifcance
The fndings of this study are important for the digital forensics feld for several
reasons. Firstly, Amazon Web Services (AWS), the largest IaaS cloud provider, recently
announced a shift from Xen to KVM for future EC2 VPSs (TheRegister, 2017). Digital
Ocean, the third largest cloud provider, uses KVM as a hypervisor (Chirammal et al.,
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2016). These facts imply the usage of KVM will continue to grow in the near future and
become the most preferred hypervisor by cloud providers. Furthermore, this research
focused on different versions of Windows and GNU/Linux as OS for the VPSs. These two
platforms represent the vast majority of the OS in the VPSs population and the utilities
virsh and tcpdump were capable of successfully acquiring forensically-sound digital
evidence from them. Even though tcpdump has been studied and used for a long time in
the digital forensics feld to capture network traffc on physical network interfaces, this
study took a different approach and focused on using this utility to capture traffc on
specifc virtual network interfaces assigned to a VPS.
Secondly, the procedure defned in the section 5.1 could guide forensic
practitioners and cloud providers to acquire forensically-sound digital evidence from a
VPS (or any VM) involved in a crime and hosted in a virtualization node that uses KVM
as a hypervisor. This procedure could be used as a base to develop a more detailed
guideline and help forensic practitioners in acquiring evidence in this environment. In
addition, the same methodology presented in this study could be used to analyze other
utilities or hypervisors to verify if the results could be extended to include them. This
research on cloud computing and virtual environments could contribute to enlarge the
body of knowledge of digital forensics in this particular area and to reduce the criminal
cases that involve the usage of VPSs.
Thirdly, forensic software companies could employ the fndings of this research to
develop remote agents to be executed in virtualization nodes that use KVM as a
hypervisor in order to collect digital data from VPSs. If these agents were developed as
open source projects, the details of their functioning would be known, which could
potentially increase the willingness of the cloud providers to cooperate with the
investigation and allow the execution of these agents inside their infrastructure. The
agents could collect data locally or transfer it remotely using encryption mechanisms. The
data collected could be imported into the existent forensic softwares suites to provide a
unifed examination interface to investigators. If similar research is conducted on other
hypervisors, the remote agents could be improved to incorporate the new fndings and
collect digital data from VPSs hosted in these hypervisors.
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Lastly, once the practical implications of the acquisition phase in distinct
hypervisors are extensively analyzed, the global legislation on this area could be updated
in order to deal with this problem also from a legal standpoint.

5.3 Limitations
This research was limited by time. The results and conclusions of this study were
valid for a virtualization node based on a GNU/Linux Ubuntu Server 16.04.4 system
(kernel version: 4.4.0-116.140). Ubuntu Server 18.04 (current LTS version) was released
after this research began and for that reason the virtualization node was not based on it.
Other operating systems or Linux kernel versions were not analyzed due to time
constraints.
The KVM module used to convert the Linux kernel into a hypervisor was provided
by the linux-image-kernel package (version 4.4.0-116.140) and the KVM user-space tools
were provided by the qemu-kvm package (version 2.5.0). The libvirt (service and client)
version used throughout the study was 1.3.1-1. Other versions of any of these packages
were not analyzed in this study due to time constraints.
The utility virsh (version 1.3.1-1) was used to test H1 and H2 , while tcpdump
(version 4.9.2-0) was used to test H3 . No other utilities were employed to test the
hypotheses also due to time constraints.

5.4 Recommendations for Future Studies
Future work on cloud computing and virtualization from a digital forensic
perspective may consider extending this research to include the delimitations mentioned in
chapter one. For instance, the testing procedures in this study were completed under low
load conditions on the virtualization node. This means the four VMs and the virtualization
node did not execute heavy processes during the creation of virtual hard drive and RAM
content images and during the network traffc capturing processes. It would be interesting
to analyze how the effciency of these procedures is affected under heavy load conditions
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on the virtualization node. If effciency is notably affected, the live migration support
provided by KVM could be studied to determine if a VM can be migrated to a special
virtualization node (with more resources and low load) in oder to complete the acquisition
process in that node. This approach may be also benefcial from a privacy point of view,
since the virtualization node could host only the VM under examination.
Even though this study was focused on VPSs, the methodology and techniques
presented could be employed to acquire digital data from any VM hosted in a
virtualization node that uses KVM as a hypervisor. This methodology could also be used
to defne best practice guidelines to help digital investigators to perform acquisitions on
this environment. Future work could take into account other OS to install on the
virtualization node, other utilities instead of virsh and tcpdump, or different versions of
KVM (kernel module or user-space tools) or libvirt (service or client) to verify if the
results could be extended to include them.
The methodology presented could also be used to create a virtual environment
with KVM in order to analyze the behavior of a piece of malware (or other type software)
after it is executed in a VM. The usage of virsh to create RAM content images and
tcpdump to capture all the network traffc in real-time could be valuable resources for
digital investigators to inspect the behavior of a particular piece of software.
Finally, it is worth mentioning briefy two points about the procedure employed to
test the creation of virtual hard drive images. First, a block size of 512 bytes was defned
every time the command dd was executed in this study. The objective of defning this
value was to match the physical sector size of both hard drives, which was also 512 bytes.
It would be valuable to analyze the impact defning a longer sector size could have on
effciency when the command dd is executed. Second, the BASH script developed to
generate automatically bit-stream images from the virtual hard drives created two
independent images: the frst one was stored into a local fle in a partition formatted with
ext4, and the second one was written directly to physical sectors of a different partition.
This study only included the time results observed for the second image created because
the frst image always reported transfer rates higher than the baseline. This difference was
generated because the flesystem (ext4) noticed when a segment of consecutive sectors
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was full of zeros and it used this knowledge to omit writing these sectors. This feature
provided by the flesystem increased notably the performance of the imaging process.
Even though this fnding could be interesting and benefcial in other circumstances, it was
not a precise value to measure effciency for the purpose of this research and it was not
taken into account.

5.5 Summary
This chapter drew conclusions from the results reported in chapter four in order to
address the research question. It also presented a procedure to acquire forensically-sound
digital evidence from a VPS hosted in a KVM virtualization node. Finally, the chapter
analyzed the signifcance of the fndings for the digital forensics feld and stated
limitations and recommendations for future related studies.
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APPENDIX A. PACKAGES INSTALLED ON THE
VIRTUALIZATION NODE

Packages installed on the virtualization node and their respective version.
Package name
Version
=======================================================================
0.6.40-2ubuntu11.3
accountsservice
2.2.52-3
acl
1:2.0.26-1ubuntu2
acpid
3.113+nmu3ubuntu4
adduser
2.10.95-0ubuntu2.8
apparmor
2.20.1-0ubuntu2.15
apport
0.20
apport-symptoms
1.2.25
apt
1.2.25
apt-transport-https
1.2.25
apt-utils
3.1.18-2ubuntu1
at
1.4.0-0ubuntu1.1
augeas-lenses
9.4ubuntu4.6
base-files
3.5.39
base-passwd
4.3-14ubuntu1.2
bash
1:2.1-4.2ubuntu1.1
bash-completion
1.0.8-2
bcache-tools
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
bind9-host
2.26.1-1ubuntu1~16.04.6
binutils
1.5-9ubuntu1
bridge-utils
9.0.6ubuntu3
bsdmainutils
1:2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
bsdutils
4.4-1ubuntu1
btrfs-tools
1:1.22.0-15ubuntu1
busybox-initramfs
1:1.22.0-15ubuntu1
busybox-static
5.106-0ubuntu1
byobu
1.0.6-8
bzip2
20170717~16.04.1
ca-certificates
0.39-2ubuntu5
cgmanager
0.27-0ubuntu25
cloud-guest-utils
0.27ubuntu1.5
cloud-initramfs-copymods
0.27ubuntu1.5
cloud-initramfs-dyn-netconf
0.3ubuntu16.04.2
command-not-found
0.3ubuntu16.04.2
command-not-found-data
1.108ubuntu15.3
console-setup
1.108ubuntu15.3
console-setup-linux
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coreutils
cpio
cpu-checker
crda
cron
cryptsetup
cryptsetup-bin
curl
dash
dbus
debconf
debconf-i18n
debianutils
dh-python
diffutils
distro-info-data
dmeventd
dmidecode
dmsetup
dns-root-data
dnsmasq-base
dnsutils
dosfstools
dpkg
e2fslibs:amd64
e2fsprogs
ebtables
ed
efibootmgr
eject
ethtool
exfat-fuse
exfat-utils
file
findutils
fonts-ubuntu-font-family-console
friendly-recovery
ftp
fuse
gawk
gcc-5-base:amd64
gcc-6-base:amd64
gdisk
geoip-database
gettext-base

8.25-2ubuntu3~16.04
2.11+dfsg-5ubuntu1
0.7-0ubuntu7
3.13-1
3.0pl1-128ubuntu2
2:1.6.6-5ubuntu2.1
2:1.6.6-5ubuntu2.1
7.47.0-1ubuntu2.6
0.5.8-2.1ubuntu2
1.10.6-1ubuntu3.3
1.5.58ubuntu1
1.5.58ubuntu1
4.7
2.20151103ubuntu1.1
1:3.3-3
0.28ubuntu0.7
2:1.02.110-1ubuntu10
3.0-2ubuntu0.1
2:1.02.110-1ubuntu10
2015052300+h+1
2.75-1ubuntu0.16.04.4
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
3.0.28-2ubuntu0.1
1.18.4ubuntu1.3
1.42.13-1ubuntu1
1.42.13-1ubuntu1
2.0.10.4-3.4ubuntu2
1.10-2
0.12-4
2.1.5+deb1+cvs20081104-13.1ubuntu0.16.04.1
1:4.5-1
1.2.3-1
1.2.3-1
1:5.25-2ubuntu1
4.6.0+git+20160126-2
1:0.83-0ubuntu2
0.2.31ubuntu1
0.17-33
2.9.4-1ubuntu3.1
1:4.1.3+dfsg-0.1
5.4.0-6ubuntu1~16.04.9
6.0.1-0ubuntu1
1.0.1-1build1
20160408-1
0.19.7-2ubuntu3
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gir1.2-glib-2.0:amd64
git
git-man
gnupg
gpgv
grep
groff-base
grub-common
grub-efi-amd64
grub-efi-amd64-bin
grub-efi-amd64-signed
grub-legacy-ec2
grub2-common
gzip
hdparm
hostname
ifenslave
ifupdown
info
init
init-system-helpers
initramfs-tools
initramfs-tools-bin
initramfs-tools-core
initscripts
insserv
install-info
installation-report
iproute2
iptables
iputils-ping
iputils-tracepath
ipxe-qemu
irqbalance
isc-dhcp-client
isc-dhcp-common
iso-codes
iw
kbd
keyboard-configuration
klibc-utils
kmod
kpartx
krb5-locales
language-selector-common

1.46.0-3ubuntu1
1:2.7.4-0ubuntu1.3
1:2.7.4-0ubuntu1.3
1.4.20-1ubuntu3.1
1.4.20-1ubuntu3.1
2.25-1~16.04.1
1.22.3-7
2.02~beta2-36ubuntu3.17
2.02~beta2-36ubuntu3.17
2.02~beta2-36ubuntu3.17
1.66.17+2.02~beta2-36ubuntu3.17
17.2-35-gf576b2a2-0ubuntu1~16.04.2
2.02~beta2-36ubuntu3.17
1.6-4ubuntu1
9.48+ds-1
3.16ubuntu2
2.7ubuntu1
0.8.10ubuntu1.2
6.1.0.dfsg.1-5
1.29ubuntu4
1.29ubuntu4
0.122ubuntu8.10
0.122ubuntu8.10
0.122ubuntu8.10
2.88dsf-59.3ubuntu2
1.14.0-5ubuntu3
6.1.0.dfsg.1-5
2.60ubuntu1
4.3.0-1ubuntu3.16.04.3
1.6.0-2ubuntu3
3:20121221-5ubuntu2
3:20121221-5ubuntu2
1.0.0+git-20150424.a25a16d-1ubuntu1.2
1.1.0-2ubuntu1
4.3.3-5ubuntu12.9
4.3.3-5ubuntu12.9
3.65-1
3.17-1
1.15.5-1ubuntu5
1.108ubuntu15.3
2.0.4-8ubuntu1.16.04.4
22-1ubuntu5
0.5.0+git1.656f8865-5ubuntu2.5
1.13.2+dfsg-5ubuntu2
0.165.4
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laptop-detect
less
libaccountsservice0:amd64
libacl1:amd64
libaio1:amd64
libapparmor-perl
libapparmor1:amd64
libapt-inst2.0:amd64
libapt-pkg5.0:amd64
libasn1-8-heimdal:amd64
libasound2:amd64
libasound2-data
libasprintf0v5:amd64
libasyncns0:amd64
libatm1:amd64
libattr1:amd64
libaudit-common
libaudit1:amd64
libaugeas0
libavahi-client3:amd64
libavahi-common-data:amd64
libavahi-common3:amd64
libbind9-140:amd64
libblkid1:amd64
libbluetooth3:amd64
libboost-iostreams1.58.0:amd64
libboost-random1.58.0:amd64
libboost-system1.58.0:amd64
libboost-thread1.58.0:amd64
libbrlapi0.6:amd64
libbsd0:amd64
libbz2-1.0:amd64
libc-bin
libc6:amd64
libcaca0:amd64
libcacard0:amd64
libcap-ng0:amd64
libcap2:amd64
libcap2-bin
libcgmanager0:amd64
libcomerr2:amd64
libcryptsetup4:amd64
libcurl3-gnutls:amd64
libdb5.3:amd64
libdbus-1-3:amd64

0.13.7ubuntu2
481-2.1ubuntu0.2
0.6.40-2ubuntu11.3
2.2.52-3
0.3.110-2
2.10.95-0ubuntu2.8
2.10.95-0ubuntu2.8
1.2.25
1.2.25
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
1.1.0-0ubuntu1
1.1.0-0ubuntu1
0.19.7-2ubuntu3
0.8-5build1
1:2.5.1-1.5
1:2.4.47-2
1:2.4.5-1ubuntu2.1
1:2.4.5-1ubuntu2.1
1.4.0-0ubuntu1.1
0.6.32~rc+dfsg-1ubuntu2
0.6.32~rc+dfsg-1ubuntu2
0.6.32~rc+dfsg-1ubuntu2
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
5.37-0ubuntu5.1
1.58.0+dfsg-5ubuntu3.1
1.58.0+dfsg-5ubuntu3.1
1.58.0+dfsg-5ubuntu3.1
1.58.0+dfsg-5ubuntu3.1
5.3.1-2ubuntu2.1
0.8.2-1
1.0.6-8
2.23-0ubuntu10
2.23-0ubuntu10
0.99.beta19-2build2~gcc5.2
1:2.5.0-2
0.7.7-1
1:2.24-12
1:2.24-12
0.39-2ubuntu5
1.42.13-1ubuntu1
2:1.6.6-5ubuntu2.1
7.47.0-1ubuntu2.6
5.3.28-11ubuntu0.1
1.10.6-1ubuntu3.3
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libdbus-glib-1-2:amd64
libdebconfclient0:amd64
libdevmapper-event1.02.1:amd64
libdevmapper1.02.1:amd64
libdistorm3-3
libdns-export162
libdns162:amd64
libdrm-common
libdrm2:amd64
libdumbnet1:amd64
libedit2:amd64
libefivar0:amd64
libelf1:amd64
liberror-perl
libestr0
libevent-2.0-5:amd64
libexpat1:amd64
libfdisk1:amd64
libfdt1:amd64
libffi6:amd64
libflac8:amd64
libfreetype6:amd64
libfribidi0:amd64
libfuse2:amd64
libgcc1:amd64
libgcrypt20:amd64
libgdbm3:amd64
libgeoip1:amd64
libgirepository-1.0-1:amd64
libglib2.0-0:amd64
libglib2.0-data
libgmp10:amd64
libgnutls-openssl27:amd64
libgnutls30:amd64
libgpg-error0:amd64
libgpm2:amd64
libgssapi-krb5-2:amd64
libgssapi3-heimdal:amd64
libhcrypto4-heimdal:amd64
libheimbase1-heimdal:amd64
libheimntlm0-heimdal:amd64
libhogweed4:amd64
libhx509-5-heimdal:amd64
libicu55:amd64
libidn11:amd64

0.106-1
0.198ubuntu1
2:1.02.110-1ubuntu10
2:1.02.110-1ubuntu10
3.3.0-3
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
2.4.83-1~16.04.1
2.4.83-1~16.04.1
1.12-7
3.1-20150325-1ubuntu2
0.23-2
0.165-3ubuntu1
0.17-1.2
0.1.10-1
2.0.21-stable-2ubuntu0.16.04.1
2.1.0-7ubuntu0.16.04.3
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
1.4.0+dfsg-2
3.2.1-4
1.3.1-4
2.6.1-0.1ubuntu2.3
0.19.7-1
2.9.4-1ubuntu3.1
1:6.0.1-0ubuntu1
1.6.5-2ubuntu0.3
1.8.3-13.1
1.6.9-1
1.46.0-3ubuntu1
2.48.2-0ubuntu1
2.48.2-0ubuntu1
2:6.1.0+dfsg-2
3.4.10-4ubuntu1.4
3.4.10-4ubuntu1.4
1.21-2ubuntu1
1.20.4-6.1
1.13.2+dfsg-5ubuntu2
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
3.2-1ubuntu0.16.04.1
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
55.1-7ubuntu0.3
1.32-3ubuntu1.2
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libisc-export160
libisc160:amd64
libisccc140:amd64
libisccfg140:amd64
libiscsi2:amd64
libjpeg-turbo8:amd64
libjpeg8:amd64
libjson-c2:amd64
libk5crypto3:amd64
libkeyutils1:amd64
libklibc
libkmod2:amd64
libkrb5-26-heimdal:amd64
libkrb5-3:amd64
libkrb5support0:amd64
libldap-2.4-2:amd64
liblocale-gettext-perl
liblvm2app2.2:amd64
liblvm2cmd2.02:amd64
liblwres141:amd64
liblxc1
liblz4-1:amd64
liblzma5:amd64
liblzo2-2:amd64
libmagic1:amd64
libmnl0:amd64
libmount1:amd64
libmpdec2:amd64
libmpfr4:amd64
libmspack0:amd64
libncurses5:amd64
libncursesw5:amd64
libnetcf1:amd64
libnetfilter-conntrack3:amd64
libnettle6:amd64
libnewt0.52:amd64
libnfnetlink0:amd64
libnih-dbus1:amd64
libnih1:amd64
libnl-3-200:amd64
libnl-genl-3-200:amd64
libnl-route-3-200:amd64
libnspr4:amd64
libnss3:amd64
libnss3-nssdb

1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
1.12.0-2
1.4.2-0ubuntu3
8c-2ubuntu8
0.11-4ubuntu2
1.13.2+dfsg-5ubuntu2
1.5.9-8ubuntu1
2.0.4-8ubuntu1.16.04.4
22-1ubuntu5
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
1.13.2+dfsg-5ubuntu2
1.13.2+dfsg-5ubuntu2
2.4.42+dfsg-2ubuntu3.2
1.07-1build1
2.02.133-1ubuntu10
2.02.133-1ubuntu10
1:9.10.3.dfsg.P4-8ubuntu1.10
2.0.8-0ubuntu1~16.04.2
0.0~r131-2ubuntu2
5.1.1alpha+20120614-2ubuntu2
2.08-1.2
1:5.25-2ubuntu1
1.0.3-5
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
2.4.2-1
3.1.4-1
0.5-1ubuntu0.16.04.1
6.0+20160213-1ubuntu1
6.0+20160213-1ubuntu1
1:0.2.8-1ubuntu1
1.0.5-1
3.2-1ubuntu0.16.04.1
0.52.18-1ubuntu2
1.0.1-3
1.0.3-4.3ubuntu1
1.0.3-4.3ubuntu1
3.2.27-1ubuntu0.16.04.1
3.2.27-1ubuntu0.16.04.1
3.2.27-1ubuntu0.16.04.1
2:4.13.1-0ubuntu0.16.04.1
2:3.28.4-0ubuntu0.16.04.3
2:3.28.4-0ubuntu0.16.04.3
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libnuma1:amd64
libogg0:amd64
libopts25:amd64
libopus0:amd64
libp11-kit0:amd64
libpam-modules:amd64
libpam-modules-bin
libpam-runtime
libpam-systemd:amd64
libpam0g:amd64
libparted2:amd64
libpcap0.8:amd64
libpci3:amd64
libpciaccess0:amd64
libpcre3:amd64
libperl5.22:amd64
libpipeline1:amd64
libpixman-1-0:amd64
libplymouth4:amd64
libpng12-0:amd64
libpolkit-agent-1-0:amd64
libpolkit-backend-1-0:amd64
libpolkit-gobject-1-0:amd64
libpopt0:amd64
libprocps4:amd64
libpulse0:amd64
libpython-stdlib:amd64
libpython2.7-minimal:amd64
libpython2.7-stdlib:amd64
libpython3-stdlib:amd64
libpython3.5:amd64
libpython3.5-minimal:amd64
libpython3.5-stdlib:amd64
librados2
librbd1
libreadline5:amd64
libreadline6:amd64
libroken18-heimdal:amd64
librtmp1:amd64
libsasl2-2:amd64
libsasl2-modules:amd64
libsasl2-modules-db:amd64
libsdl1.2debian:amd64
libseccomp2:amd64
libselinux1:amd64

2.0.11-1ubuntu1.1
1.3.2-1
1:5.18.7-3
1.1.2-1ubuntu1
0.23.2-5~ubuntu16.04.1
1.1.8-3.2ubuntu2
1.1.8-3.2ubuntu2
1.1.8-3.2ubuntu2
229-4ubuntu21.1
1.1.8-3.2ubuntu2
3.2-15ubuntu0.1
1.7.4-2
1:3.3.1-1.1ubuntu1.1
0.13.4-1
2:8.38-3.1
5.22.1-9ubuntu0.2
1.4.1-2
0.33.6-1
0.9.2-3ubuntu13.2
1.2.54-1ubuntu1
0.105-14.1
0.105-14.1
0.105-14.1
1.16-10
2:3.3.10-4ubuntu2.3
1:8.0-0ubuntu3.8
2.7.12-1~16.04
2.7.12-1ubuntu0~16.04.3
2.7.12-1ubuntu0~16.04.3
3.5.1-3
3.5.2-2ubuntu0~16.04.4
3.5.2-2ubuntu0~16.04.4
3.5.2-2ubuntu0~16.04.4
10.2.9-0ubuntu0.16.04.1
10.2.9-0ubuntu0.16.04.1
5.2+dfsg-3build1
6.3-8ubuntu2
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
2.4+20151223.gitfa8646d-1ubuntu0.1
2.1.26.dfsg1-14build1
2.1.26.dfsg1-14build1
2.1.26.dfsg1-14build1
1.2.15+dfsg1-3
2.3.1-2.1ubuntu2~16.04.1
2.4-3build2
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libsemanage-common
libsemanage1:amd64
libsepol1:amd64
libsigsegv2:amd64
libslang2:amd64
libsmartcols1:amd64
libsndfile1:amd64
libspice-server1:amd64
libsqlite3-0:amd64
libss2:amd64
libssh2-1:amd64
libssl1.0.0:amd64
libstdc++6:amd64
libsystemd0:amd64
libtasn1-6:amd64
libtext-charwidth-perl
libtext-iconv-perl
libtext-wrapi18n-perl
libtinfo5:amd64
libudev1:amd64
libusb-0.1-4:amd64
libusb-1.0-0:amd64
libusbredirparser1:amd64
libustr-1.0-1:amd64
libutempter0:amd64
libuuid1:amd64
libvirt-bin
libvirt0:amd64
libvorbis0a:amd64
libvorbisenc2:amd64
libwind0-heimdal:amd64
libwrap0:amd64
libx11-6:amd64
libx11-data
libx86-1:amd64
libxau6:amd64
libxcb1:amd64
libxdmcp6:amd64
libxen-4.6:amd64
libxenstore3.0:amd64
libxext6:amd64
libxml2:amd64
libxml2-utils
libxmuu1:amd64
libxslt1.1:amd64

2.3-1build3
2.3-1build3
2.4-2
2.10-4
2.3.0-2ubuntu1
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
1.0.25-10ubuntu0.16.04.1
0.12.6-4ubuntu0.3
3.11.0-1ubuntu1
1.42.13-1ubuntu1
1.5.0-2ubuntu0.1
1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.10
5.4.0-6ubuntu1~16.04.9
229-4ubuntu21.1
4.7-3ubuntu0.16.04.3
0.04-7build5
1.7-5build4
0.06-7.1
6.0+20160213-1ubuntu1
229-4ubuntu21.1
2:0.1.12-28
2:1.0.20-1
0.7.1-1
1.0.4-5
1.1.6-3
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
1.3.1-1ubuntu10.19
1.3.1-1ubuntu10.19
1.3.5-3ubuntu0.1
1.3.5-3ubuntu0.1
1.7~git20150920+dfsg-4ubuntu1.16.04.1
7.6.q-25
2:1.6.3-1ubuntu2
2:1.6.3-1ubuntu2
1.1+ds1-10
1:1.0.8-1
1.11.1-1ubuntu1
1:1.1.2-1.1
4.6.5-0ubuntu1.4
4.6.5-0ubuntu1.4
2:1.3.3-1
2.9.3+dfsg1-1ubuntu0.5
2.9.3+dfsg1-1ubuntu0.5
2:1.1.2-2
1.1.28-2.1ubuntu0.1
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libxtables11:amd64
libyajl2:amd64
linux-base
linux-firmware
linux-headers-4.4.0-112
linux-headers-4.4.0-112-generic
linux-headers-4.4.0-116
linux-headers-4.4.0-116-generic
linux-headers-4.4.0-62
linux-headers-4.4.0-62-generic
linux-headers-generic
linux-image-4.4.0-112-generic
linux-image-4.4.0-116-generic
linux-image-4.4.0-62-generic
linux-image-extra-4.4.0-112-generic
linux-image-extra-4.4.0-116-generic
linux-image-extra-4.4.0-62-generic
linux-signed-generic
linux-signed-image-4.4.0-112-generic
linux-signed-image-4.4.0-116-generic
linux-signed-image-4.4.0-62-generic
linux-signed-image-generic
locales
login
logrotate
lsb-base
lsb-release
lshw
lsof
ltrace
lvm2
lxc-common
lxcfs
lxd
lxd-client
makedev
man-db
manpages
mawk
mc
mc-data
mdadm
memtest86+
mime-support
mlocate

1.6.0-2ubuntu3
2.1.0-2
4.0ubuntu1
1.157.17
4.4.0-112.135
4.4.0-112.135
4.4.0-116.140
4.4.0-116.140
4.4.0-62.83
4.4.0-62.83
4.4.0.116.122
4.4.0-112.135
4.4.0-116.140
4.4.0-62.83
4.4.0-112.135
4.4.0-116.140
4.4.0-62.83
4.4.0.116.122
4.4.0-112.135
4.4.0-116.140
4.4.0-62.83
4.4.0.116.122
2.23-0ubuntu10
1:4.2-3.1ubuntu5.3
3.8.7-2ubuntu2.16.04.2
9.20160110ubuntu0.2
9.20160110ubuntu0.2
02.17-1.1ubuntu3.4
4.89+dfsg-0.1
0.7.3-5.1ubuntu4
2.02.133-1ubuntu10
2.0.8-0ubuntu1~16.04.2
2.0.8-0ubuntu1~16.04.2
2.0.11-0ubuntu1~16.04.4
2.0.11-0ubuntu1~16.04.4
2.3.1-93ubuntu2~ubuntu16.04.1
2.7.5-1
4.04-2
1.3.3-17ubuntu2
3:4.8.15-2
3:4.8.15-2
3.3-2ubuntu7.6
5.01-3ubuntu2
3.59ubuntu1
0.26-1ubuntu2
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mokutil
mount
msr-tools
mtr-tiny
multiarch-support
nano
ncurses-base
ncurses-bin
ncurses-term
net-tools
netbase
netcat-openbsd
ntfs-3g
ntp
open-iscsi
open-vm-tools
openssh-client
openssh-server
openssh-sftp-server
openssl
os-prober
overlayroot
parted
passwd
pastebinit
patch
pciutils
perl
perl-base
perl-modules-5.22
plymouth
plymouth-theme-ubuntu-text
pm-utils
policykit-1
popularity-contest
powermgmt-base
procps
psmisc
python
python-apt-common
python-crypto
python-distorm3
python-minimal
python2.7
python2.7-minimal

0.3.0-0ubuntu3
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
1.3-2
0.86-1ubuntu0.1
2.23-0ubuntu10
2.5.3-2ubuntu2
6.0+20160213-1ubuntu1
6.0+20160213-1ubuntu1
6.0+20160213-1ubuntu1
1.60-26ubuntu1
5.3
1.105-7ubuntu1
1:2015.3.14AR.1-1ubuntu0.1
1:4.2.8p4+dfsg-3ubuntu5.8
2.0.873+git0.3b4b4500-14ubuntu3.4
2:10.0.7-3227872-5ubuntu1~16.04.2
1:7.2p2-4ubuntu2.4
1:7.2p2-4ubuntu2.4
1:7.2p2-4ubuntu2.4
1.0.2g-1ubuntu4.10
1.70ubuntu3.3
0.27ubuntu1.5
3.2-15ubuntu0.1
1:4.2-3.1ubuntu5.3
1.5-1
2.7.5-1
1:3.3.1-1.1ubuntu1.1
5.22.1-9ubuntu0.2
5.22.1-9ubuntu0.2
5.22.1-9ubuntu0.2
0.9.2-3ubuntu13.2
0.9.2-3ubuntu13.2
1.4.1-16
0.105-14.1
1.64ubuntu2
1.31+nmu1
2:3.3.10-4ubuntu2.3
22.21-2.1build1
2.7.12-1~16.04
1.1.0~beta1ubuntu0.16.04.1
2.6.1-6ubuntu0.16.04.2
3.3.0-3
2.7.12-1~16.04
2.7.12-1ubuntu0~16.04.3
2.7.12-1ubuntu0~16.04.3
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python3
python3-apport
python3-apt
python3-chardet
python3-commandnotfound
python3-dbus
python3-debian
python3-distupgrade
python3-gdbm:amd64
python3-gi
python3-minimal
python3-newt
python3-pkg-resources
python3-problem-report
python3-pycurl
python3-requests
python3-six
python3-software-properties
python3-systemd
python3-update-manager
python3-urllib3
python3.5
python3.5-minimal
qemu-block-extra:amd64
qemu-kvm
qemu-system-common
qemu-system-x86
qemu-utils
readline-common
rename
resolvconf
rsync
rsyslog
run-one
sbsigntool
screen
seabios
secureboot-db
sed
sensible-utils
sgml-base
shared-mime-info
sharutils
shim
shim-signed

3.5.1-3
2.20.1-0ubuntu2.15
1.1.0~beta1ubuntu0.16.04.1
2.3.0-2
0.3ubuntu16.04.2
1.2.0-3
0.1.27ubuntu2
1:16.04.24
3.5.1-1
3.20.0-0ubuntu1
3.5.1-3
0.52.18-1ubuntu2
20.7.0-1
2.20.1-0ubuntu2.15
7.43.0-1ubuntu1
2.9.1-3
1.10.0-3
0.96.20.7
231-2build1
1:16.04.12
1.13.1-2ubuntu0.16.04.1
3.5.2-2ubuntu0~16.04.4
3.5.2-2ubuntu0~16.04.4
1:2.5+dfsg-5ubuntu10.24
1:2.5+dfsg-5ubuntu10.24
1:2.5+dfsg-5ubuntu10.24
1:2.5+dfsg-5ubuntu10.24
1:2.5+dfsg-5ubuntu10.24
6.3-8ubuntu2
0.20-4
1.78ubuntu6
3.1.1-3ubuntu1.2
8.16.0-1ubuntu3
1.17-0ubuntu1
0.6-0ubuntu10.1
4.3.1-2build1
1.8.2-1ubuntu1
1.1
4.2.2-7
0.0.9ubuntu0.16.04.1
1.26+nmu4ubuntu1
1.5-2ubuntu0.1
1:4.15.2-1
13-0ubuntu2
1.33.1~16.04.1+13-0ubuntu2
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snap-confine
snapd
software-properties-common
sosreport
squashfs-tools
ssh-import-id
strace
sudo
systemd
systemd-sysv
sysv-rc
sysvinit-utils
tar
tasksel
tasksel-data
tcpd
tcpdump
telnet
time
tmux
tzdata
ubuntu-cloudimage-keyring
ubuntu-core-launcher
ubuntu-keyring
ubuntu-minimal
ubuntu-release-upgrader-core
ubuntu-server
ubuntu-standard
ucf
udev
ufw
uidmap
unattended-upgrades
unzip
update-manager-core
update-notifier-common
ureadahead
usbutils
util-linux
uuid-runtime
vbetool
vim
vim-common
vim-runtime
vim-tiny

2.29.4.2
2.29.4.2
0.96.20.7
3.5-1~ubuntu16.04.2
1:4.3-3ubuntu2.16.04.1
5.5-0ubuntu1
4.11-1ubuntu3
1.8.16-0ubuntu1.5
229-4ubuntu21.1
229-4ubuntu21.1
2.88dsf-59.3ubuntu2
2.88dsf-59.3ubuntu2
1.28-2.1ubuntu0.1
3.34ubuntu3
3.34ubuntu3
7.6.q-25
4.9.2-0ubuntu0.16.04.1
0.17-40
1.7-25.1
2.1-3build1
2017c-0ubuntu0.16.04
2013.11.11
2.29.4.2
2012.05.19
1.361.1
1:16.04.24
1.361.1
1.361.1
3.0036
229-4ubuntu21.1
0.35-0ubuntu2
1:4.2-3.1ubuntu5.3
0.90ubuntu0.9
6.0-20ubuntu1
1:16.04.12
3.168.7
0.100.0-19
1:007-4
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
2.27.1-6ubuntu3.4
1.1-3
2:7.4.1689-3ubuntu1.2
2:7.4.1689-3ubuntu1.2
2:7.4.1689-3ubuntu1.2
2:7.4.1689-3ubuntu1.2
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vlan
wget
whiptail
wireless-regdb
xauth
xdg-user-dirs
xfsprogs
xkb-data
xml-core
xz-utils
zerofree
zlib1g:amd64

1.9-3.2ubuntu1.16.04.4
1.17.1-1ubuntu1.3
0.52.18-1ubuntu2
2015.07.20-1ubuntu1
1:1.0.9-1ubuntu2
0.15-2ubuntu6
4.3.0+nmu1ubuntu1.1
2.16-1ubuntu1
0.13+nmu2
5.1.1alpha+20120614-2ubuntu2
1.0.3-1
1:1.2.8.dfsg-2ubuntu4.1
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APPENDIX B. CONFIGURATION FILES OF THE
VIRTUALIZATION NODE

Content of the fle /etc/fstab
# /etc/fstab: static file system information.
#
# Use ’blkid’ to print the universally unique identifier for a
# device; this may be used with UUID= as a more robust way to name devices
# that works even if disks are added and removed. See fstab(5).
#
# <file system> <mount point>
<type> <options>
<dump> <pass>
/dev/sda2
/
ext4
errors=remount-ro 0
1
/dev/sda1
/boot/efi
vfat
umask=0077
0
1
/dev/sda3
none
swap
sw
0
0
/dev/sdb4
/mnt/forensic-data ext4
errors=remount-ro 0
2
Content of the fle /etc/network/interfaces
# This file describes the network interfaces available on your system
# and how to activate them. For more information, see interfaces(5).
source /etc/network/interfaces.d/*
# The loopback network interface
auto lo
iface lo inet loopback
auto enp7s0f0
iface enp7s0f0 inet manual
auto br0
iface br0 inet static
address 192.168.10.1
netmask 255.255.255.0
network 192.168.10.0
broadcast 192.168.10.255
bridge_ports enp7s0f0
bridge_stp off
bridge_fd 0
bridge_maxwait 0
Content of the fle /etc/libvirt/storage/lvm-group.xml
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<!-WARNING: THIS IS AN AUTO-GENERATED FILE. CHANGES TO IT ARE LIKELY TO BE
OVERWRITTEN AND LOST. Changes to this xml configuration should be made
using: virsh pool-edit lvm-group or other application using the libvirt
API.
-->
<pool type=’logical’>
<name>lvm-group</name>
<uuid>fb1197d6-d126-4ce9-a2ef-daf818092031</uuid>
<capacity unit=’bytes’>0</capacity>
<allocation unit=’bytes’>0</allocation>
<available unit=’bytes’>0</available>
<source>
<name>lvm-group</name>
<format type=’lvm2’/>
</source>
<target>
<path>/dev/lvm-group</path>
</target>
</pool>

125

APPENDIX C. VIRTUAL MACHINES CONFIGURATION FILES

Content of the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM1.xml.
<domain type=’kvm’>
<name>VM1_Ubuntu_17.10</name>
<uuid>be0c72a2-c9d7-4dd5-83e3-b2084387be81</uuid>
<memory unit=’KiB’>4194304</memory>
<currentMemory unit=’KiB’>4194304</currentMemory>
<vcpu placement=’static’>8</vcpu>
<resource>
<partition>/machine</partition>
</resource>
<os>
<type arch=’x86_64’ machine=’pc-i440fx-xenial’>hvm</type>
<boot dev=’hd’/>
</os>
<features>
<acpi/>
<apic/>
</features>
<cpu mode=’custom’ match=’exact’>
<model fallback=’allow’>Penryn</model>
</cpu>
<clock offset=’utc’>
<timer name=’rtc’ tickpolicy=’catchup’/>
<timer name=’pit’ tickpolicy=’delay’/>
<timer name=’hpet’ present=’no’/>
</clock>
<on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff>
<on_reboot>restart</on_reboot>
<on_crash>restart</on_crash>
<pm>
<suspend-to-mem enabled=’no’/>
<suspend-to-disk enabled=’no’/>
</pm>
<devices>
<emulator>/usr/bin/kvm-spice</emulator>
<disk type=’block’ device=’disk’>
<driver name=’qemu’ type=’raw’ cache=’none’ io=’native’/>
<source dev=’/dev/lvm-group/VM1_ubuntu’/>
<backingStore/>
<target dev=’hda’ bus=’ide’/>
<alias name=’ide0-0-0’/>
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<address type=’drive’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ target=’0’ unit=’0’/>
</disk>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-ehci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x7’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x0’ multifunction=’on’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci2’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’2’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci3’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’4’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x2’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’pci’ index=’0’ model=’pci-root’>
<alias name=’pci.0’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’ide’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’ide’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x01’ \
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’virtio-serial’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’virtio-serial0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</controller>
<interface type=’network’>
<mac address=’52:54:00:9e:d3:6c’/>
<source bridge=’br0’/>
<target dev=’vnet0’/>
<model type=’rtl8139’/>
<alias name=’net0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x03’ \
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function=’0x0’/>
</interface>
<serial type=’pty’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/1’/>
<target port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</serial>
<console type=’pty’ tty=’/dev/pts/1’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/1’/>
<target type=’serial’ port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</console>
<channel type=’spicevmc’>
<target type=’virtio’ name=’com.redhat.spice.0’ state=’disconnected’/>
<alias name=’channel0’/>
<address type=’virtio-serial’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ port=’1’/>
</channel>
<input type=’mouse’ bus=’ps2’/>
<input type=’keyboard’ bus=’ps2’/>
<graphics type=’spice’ port=’5900’ autoport=’yes’ listen=’127.0.0.1’>
<listen type=’address’ address=’127.0.0.1’/>
</graphics>
<video>
<model type=’qxl’ ram=’65536’ vram=’65536’ vgamem=’16384’ heads=’1’/>
<alias name=’video0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x02’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</video>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir0’/>
</redirdev>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir1’/>
</redirdev>
<memballoon model=’virtio’>
<alias name=’balloon0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x07’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</memballoon>
</devices>
<seclabel type=’dynamic’ model=’apparmor’ relabel=’yes’>
<label>libvirt-be0c72a2-c9d7-4dd5-83e3-b2084387be81</label>
<imagelabel>libvirt-be0c72a2-c9d7-4dd5-83e3-b2084387be81</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
</domain>
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Content of the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM2.xml.
<domain type=’kvm’>
<name>VM2_CentOS_7</name>
<uuid>999170f4-75c1-4d45-b875-fb77cc2a00ea</uuid>
<memory unit=’KiB’>4194304</memory>
<currentMemory unit=’KiB’>4194304</currentMemory>
<vcpu placement=’static’>8</vcpu>
<resource>
<partition>/machine</partition>
</resource>
<os>
<type arch=’x86_64’ machine=’pc-i440fx-xenial’>hvm</type>
<boot dev=’hd’/>
</os>
<features>
<acpi/>
<apic/>
</features>
<cpu mode=’custom’ match=’exact’>
<model fallback=’allow’>Penryn</model>
</cpu>
<clock offset=’utc’>
<timer name=’rtc’ tickpolicy=’catchup’/>
<timer name=’pit’ tickpolicy=’delay’/>
<timer name=’hpet’ present=’no’/>
</clock>
<on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff>
<on_reboot>restart</on_reboot>
<on_crash>restart</on_crash>
<pm>
<suspend-to-mem enabled=’no’/>
<suspend-to-disk enabled=’no’/>
</pm>
<devices>
<emulator>/usr/bin/kvm-spice</emulator>
<disk type=’block’ device=’disk’>
<driver name=’qemu’ type=’raw’ cache=’none’ io=’native’/>
<source dev=’/dev/lvm-group/VM2_centos’/>
<backingStore/>
<target dev=’hda’ bus=’ide’/>
<alias name=’ide0-0-0’/>
<address type=’drive’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ target=’0’ unit=’0’/>
</disk>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-ehci1’>
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<alias name=’usb’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’
function=’0x7’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’
function=’0x0’ multifunction=’on’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci2’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’2’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci3’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’4’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’
function=’0x2’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’pci’ index=’0’ model=’pci-root’>
<alias name=’pci.0’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’ide’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’ide’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x01’
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’virtio-serial’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’virtio-serial0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x04’
function=’0x0’/>
</controller>
<interface type=’bridge’>
<mac address=’52:54:00:f6:eb:05’/>
<source bridge=’br0’/>
<target dev=’vnet1’/>
<model type=’rtl8139’/>
<alias name=’net0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x03’
function=’0x0’/>
</interface>
<serial type=’pty’>

\

\

\

\

\

\

\
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<source path=’/dev/pts/5’/>
<target port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</serial>
<console type=’pty’ tty=’/dev/pts/5’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/5’/>
<target type=’serial’ port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</console>
<channel type=’spicevmc’>
<target type=’virtio’ name=’com.redhat.spice.0’ state=’disconnected’/>
<alias name=’channel0’/>
<address type=’virtio-serial’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ port=’1’/>
</channel>
<input type=’mouse’ bus=’ps2’/>
<input type=’keyboard’ bus=’ps2’/>
<graphics type=’spice’ port=’5901’ autoport=’yes’ listen=’127.0.0.1’>
<listen type=’address’ address=’127.0.0.1’/>
</graphics>
<video>
<model type=’qxl’ ram=’65536’ vram=’65536’ vgamem=’16384’ heads=’1’/>
<alias name=’video0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x02’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</video>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir0’/>
</redirdev>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir1’/>
</redirdev>
<memballoon model=’virtio’>
<alias name=’balloon0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</memballoon>
</devices>
<seclabel type=’dynamic’ model=’apparmor’ relabel=’yes’>
<label>libvirt-999170f4-75c1-4d45-b875-fb77cc2a00ea</label>
<imagelabel>libvirt-999170f4-75c1-4d45-b875-fb77cc2a00ea</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
</domain>
Content of the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM3.xml.
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<domain type=’kvm’>
<name>VM3_Windows_2008</name>
<uuid>9f44405d-2df8-483d-92f8-2050756235fd</uuid>
<memory unit=’KiB’>4194304</memory>
<currentMemory unit=’KiB’>4194304</currentMemory>
<vcpu placement=’static’>8</vcpu>
<resource>
<partition>/machine</partition>
</resource>
<os>
<type arch=’x86_64’ machine=’pc-i440fx-xenial’>hvm</type>
<boot dev=’hd’/>
</os>
<features>
<acpi/>
<apic/>
<hyperv>
<relaxed state=’on’/>
<vapic state=’on’/>
<spinlocks state=’on’ retries=’8191’/>
</hyperv>
</features>
<cpu mode=’custom’ match=’exact’>
<model fallback=’allow’>Penryn</model>
</cpu>
<clock offset=’localtime’>
<timer name=’rtc’ tickpolicy=’catchup’/>
<timer name=’pit’ tickpolicy=’delay’/>
<timer name=’hpet’ present=’no’/>
<timer name=’hypervclock’ present=’yes’/>
</clock>
<on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff>
<on_reboot>restart</on_reboot>
<on_crash>restart</on_crash>
<pm>
<suspend-to-mem enabled=’no’/>
<suspend-to-disk enabled=’no’/>
</pm>
<devices>
<emulator>/usr/bin/kvm-spice</emulator>
<disk type=’block’ device=’disk’>
<driver name=’qemu’ type=’raw’ cache=’none’ io=’native’/>
<source dev=’/dev/lvm-group/VM3_win2008’/>
<backingStore/>
<target dev=’hda’ bus=’ide’/>
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<alias name=’ide0-0-0’/>
<address type=’drive’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ target=’0’ unit=’0’/>
</disk>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-ehci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x7’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x0’ multifunction=’on’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci2’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’2’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci3’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’4’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x2’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’pci’ index=’0’ model=’pci-root’>
<alias name=’pci.0’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’ide’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’ide’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x01’ \
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’virtio-serial’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’virtio-serial0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x04’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</controller>
<interface type=’network’>
<mac address=’52:54:00:70:30:7f’/>
<source bridge=’br0’/>
<target dev=’vnet2’/>
<model type=’rtl8139’/>
<alias name=’net0’/>
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<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x03’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</interface>
<serial type=’pty’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/6’/>
<target port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</serial>
<console type=’pty’ tty=’/dev/pts/6’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/6’/>
<target type=’serial’ port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</console>
<channel type=’spicevmc’>
<target type=’virtio’ name=’com.redhat.spice.0’ state=’disconnected’/>
<alias name=’channel0’/>
<address type=’virtio-serial’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ port=’1’/>
</channel>
<input type=’tablet’ bus=’usb’>
<alias name=’input0’/>
</input>
<input type=’mouse’ bus=’ps2’/>
<input type=’keyboard’ bus=’ps2’/>
<graphics type=’spice’ port=’5902’ autoport=’yes’ listen=’127.0.0.1’>
<listen type=’address’ address=’127.0.0.1’/>
</graphics>
<video>
<model type=’qxl’ ram=’65536’ vram=’65536’ vgamem=’16384’ heads=’1’/>
<alias name=’video0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x02’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</video>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir0’/>
</redirdev>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir1’/>
</redirdev>
<memballoon model=’virtio’>
<alias name=’balloon0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</memballoon>
</devices>
<seclabel type=’dynamic’ model=’apparmor’ relabel=’yes’>
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<label>libvirt-9f44405d-2df8-483d-92f8-2050756235fd</label>
<imagelabel>libvirt-9f44405d-2df8-483d-92f8-2050756235fd</imagelabel>
</seclabel>
</domain>
Content of the fle /mnt/kvm/xmls/VM4.xml.
<domain type=’kvm’>
<name>VM4_Windows_2016</name>
<uuid>5463353b-7bf4-49f0-b48f-1ff20d9c499a</uuid>
<memory unit=’KiB’>4194304</memory>
<currentMemory unit=’KiB’>4194304</currentMemory>
<vcpu placement=’static’>8</vcpu>
<resource>
<partition>/machine</partition>
</resource>
<os>
<type arch=’x86_64’ machine=’pc-i440fx-xenial’>hvm</type>
</os>
<features>
<acpi/>
<apic/>
</features>
<cpu mode=’custom’ match=’exact’>
<model fallback=’allow’>Penryn</model>
</cpu>
<clock offset=’utc’>
<timer name=’rtc’ tickpolicy=’catchup’/>
<timer name=’pit’ tickpolicy=’delay’/>
<timer name=’hpet’ present=’no’/>
</clock>
<on_poweroff>destroy</on_poweroff>
<on_reboot>restart</on_reboot>
<on_crash>restart</on_crash>
<pm>
<suspend-to-mem enabled=’no’/>
<suspend-to-disk enabled=’no’/>
</pm>
<devices>
<emulator>/usr/bin/kvm-spice</emulator>
<disk type=’block’ device=’disk’>
<driver name=’qemu’ type=’raw’ cache=’none’ io=’native’/>
<source dev=’/dev/lvm-group/VM4_win2016’/>
<backingStore/>
<target dev=’hda’ bus=’ide’/>
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<boot order=’2’/>
<alias name=’ide0-0-0’/>
<address type=’drive’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ target=’0’ unit=’0’/>
</disk>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-ehci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x7’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci1’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x0’ multifunction=’on’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci2’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’2’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’usb’ index=’0’ model=’ich9-uhci3’>
<alias name=’usb’/>
<master startport=’4’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x05’ \
function=’0x2’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’pci’ index=’0’ model=’pci-root’>
<alias name=’pci.0’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’ide’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’ide’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x01’ \
function=’0x1’/>
</controller>
<controller type=’virtio-serial’ index=’0’>
<alias name=’virtio-serial0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x04’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</controller>
<interface type=’network’>
<mac address=’52:54:00:24:13:f5’/>
<source bridge=’br0’/>
<target dev=’vnet3’/>
<model type=’rtl8139’/>
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<alias name=’net0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x03’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</interface>
<serial type=’pty’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/2’/>
<target port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</serial>
<console type=’pty’ tty=’/dev/pts/2’>
<source path=’/dev/pts/2’/>
<target type=’serial’ port=’0’/>
<alias name=’serial0’/>
</console>
<channel type=’spicevmc’>
<target type=’virtio’ name=’com.redhat.spice.0’ state=’disconnected’/>
<alias name=’channel0’/>
<address type=’virtio-serial’ controller=’0’ bus=’0’ port=’1’/>
</channel>
<input type=’mouse’ bus=’ps2’/>
<input type=’keyboard’ bus=’ps2’/>
<graphics type=’spice’ port=’5903’ autoport=’yes’ listen=’127.0.0.1’>
<listen type=’address’ address=’127.0.0.1’/>
</graphics>
<video>
<model type=’qxl’ ram=’65536’ vram=’65536’ vgamem=’16384’ heads=’1’/>
<alias name=’video0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x02’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</video>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir0’/>
</redirdev>
<redirdev bus=’usb’ type=’spicevmc’>
<alias name=’redir1’/>
</redirdev>
<memballoon model=’virtio’>
<alias name=’balloon0’/>
<address type=’pci’ domain=’0x0000’ bus=’0x00’ slot=’0x06’ \
function=’0x0’/>
</memballoon>
</devices>
<seclabel type=’dynamic’ model=’apparmor’ relabel=’yes’>
<label>libvirt-5463353b-7bf4-49f0-b48f-1ff20d9c499a</label>
<imagelabel>libvirt-5463353b-7bf4-49f0-b48f-1ff20d9c499a</imagelabel>
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</seclabel>
</domain>
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APPENDIX D. GENERATION OF VOLATILITY PROFILES

Profle generation steps for VM1 (Ubuntu Server 17.10 32-bit):
# apt-get install vim mc zip unzip linux-headers-generic libelf-dev
build-essential
# cd /root
# wget http://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/releases/2.6/
volatility-2.6.zip
# unzip volatility-2.6.zip
# git clone https://github.com/tomhughes/libdwarf.git
# cd libdwarf/
# ./configure
# make dd
# cp dwarfdump/dwarfdump /usr/local/bin/
# cp dwarfdump/dwarfdump.conf /usr/local/lib/
# cp libdwarf/libdwarf.a /usr/local/lib
# cd /root/volatility-master/tools/linux/
# make
# zip /root/Ubuntu1710.zip /root/volatility-master/tools/linux/module.dwarf
/boot/System.map-4.13.0-36-generic
The fle /root/Ubuntu1710.zip generated in the last step is the Volatility profle
which was used to examine the RAM images created for VM1.
Profle generation steps for VM2 (CentOS 7 64-bit):
# yum install vim mc telnet net-tools mlocate wget git gcc zip
unzip elfutils libdwarf libdwarf-devel elfutils-libelf-devel
kernel-devel kernel-headers
# cd /root
# wget http://downloads.volatilityfoundation.org/releases/2.6/
volatility-2.6.zip
# unzip volatility-2.6.zip
# git clone https://github.com/tomhughes/libdwarf.git
# cd libdwarf/
# ./configure
# make dd
# cp dwarfdump/dwarfdump /usr/local/bin/
# cp dwarfdump/dwarfdump.conf /usr/local/lib/
# cp libdwarf/libdwarf.a /usr/local/lib
# cd /root/volatility-master/tools/linux/
# make
# zip /root/Centos7.zip /root/volatility-master/tools/linux/module.dwarf
/boot/System.map-3.10.0-693.21.1.el7.x86_64
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The fle /root/Centos7.zip generated in the last step is the Volatility profle which was used
to examine the RAM images created for VM2.
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APPENDIX E. BASH SCRIPT TO TEST THE IMAGING PROCESS

BASH script developed to test the imaging process of virtual hard drives by
employing the utility virsh to create a snapshot.
#!/bin/bash
VM_NAME=(’VM1_Ubuntu_17.10’ ’VM2_CentOS_7’ ’VM3_Windows_2008’
’VM4_Windows_2016’)
VM_LVM=(’/dev/lvm-group/VM1_ubuntu’ ’/dev/lvm-group/VM2_centos’
’/dev/lvm-group/VM3_win2008’ ’/dev/lvm-group/VM4_win2016’)
VM_MAPPER=(’/dev/mapper/loop0p1’ ’/dev/mapper/loop0p1’
’/dev/mapper/loop0p1’ ’/dev/mapper/loop0p2’)
VM_FILE=(’/var/log/syslog’ ’/var/log/messages’
’/Windows/Logs/ServerManager.log’ ’/Windows/debug/wlms.log’)
VM_DISK_DEV=(’hda’ ’hda’ ’hda’ ’hda’)
VM_FS=(’ext4’ ’xfs’ ’ntfs’ ’ntfs’)
RM=$(which rm)
DD=$(which dd)
MD5=$(which md5sum)
SHA1=$(which sha1sum)
TAIL=$(which tail)
VIRSH=$(which virsh)
MOUNT=$(which mount)
UMOUNT=$(which umount)
KPARTX=$(which kpartx)
SNAP_DIR="/var/lib/libvirt/images"
SNAP_NAME="snapshot-script"
IMAGE_DIR="/mnt/forensic-data/disk-images"
IMAGE_DEV="/dev/sdb2"
MOUNT_TMPDIR="/mnt/temp"
for i in {0..3}; do
echo -------------------------- ${VM_NAME[i]} -------------------------# Step 1: Create the external snapshot
echo -n "STEP 1: CREATING EXTERNAL SNAPSHOT. Date: "
date +"%m-%d-%y %I:%M:%S %p"
/usr/bin/time -f "Time: %E" $VIRSH snapshot-create-as ${VM_NAME[i]} \
--disk-only --atomic --name $SNAP_NAME --diskspec ${VM_DISK_DEV[i]},\
snapshot=external,file=$SNAP_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}-snapshot.qcow2
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Result: Snapshot successfully created."
else
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echo "Result: ERROR! Snapshot could not be created."
exit
fi
echo
# Step 2: Create bit-stream image and calculate hash values
echo -n "STEP 2: CREATING IMAGE AND CALCULATING HASH VALUES. Date: "
date +"%m-%d-%y %I:%M:%S %p"
echo " * Creating bit-stream image into /mnt/forensic-data:"
$DD if=${VM_LVM[i]} of=$IMAGE_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}.dd bs=512 \
conv=noerror,sync,fdatasync
sleep 5m
echo " * Creating bit-stream image into /dev/sdb2:"
$DD if=${VM_LVM[i]} of=$IMAGE_DEV bs=512 conv=noerror,sync,fdatasync
echo " * Calculating MD5 values:"
$MD5 ${VM_LVM[i]}
$MD5 $IMAGE_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}.dd
$MD5 $IMAGE_DEV
echo " * Calculating SHA1 values:"
$SHA1 ${VM_LVM[i]}
$SHA1 $IMAGE_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}.dd
$SHA1 $IMAGE_DEV
echo "Result: TBD (Check MD5 and SHA1 values)."
echo
# Step 3: Mounting bit-stream image
echo -n "STEP 3: VERIFYING IMAGE. Date: "
date +"%m-%d-%y %I:%M:%S %p"
echo " * Mounting image:"
$KPARTX -av $IMAGE_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}.dd ; sleep 3s
$MOUNT -t ${VM_FS[i]} -o ro ${VM_MAPPER[i]} $MOUNT_TMPDIR
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo " * Retrieving file:"
$TAIL -n2 $MOUNT_TMPDIR${VM_FILE[i]}
$UMOUNT $MOUNT_TMPDIR ; sleep 3s
$KPARTX -dv $IMAGE_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}.dd
echo "Result: TBD (Check date and time)."
else
echo "Result: ERROR! Image could not be mounted."
exit
fi
echo
# Step 4: Merge the snapshot into and remove files:
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echo -n "STEP 4: MERGING SNAPSHOT AND REMOVING FILES. Date: "
date +"%m-%d-%y %I:%M:%S %p"
/usr/bin/time -f "Time: %E" $VIRSH blockcommit ${VM_NAME[i]} \
${VM_DISK_DEV[i]} --verbose --pivot --active
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
echo "Result: Snapshot successfully merged."
$VIRSH snapshot-delete ${VM_NAME[i]} $SNAP_NAME --metadata
$RM $SNAP_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}-snapshot.qcow2
$RM $IMAGE_DIR/${VM_NAME[i]}.dd
else
echo "Result: ERROR! Snapshot could not be merged."
fi
echo
echo "PROCESS COMPLETE. Date: "
date +"%m-%d-%y %I:%M:%S %p"
echo
sleep 15m
done
exit 0
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APPENDIX F. PURDUE’S IRB EXEMPTION LETTER

Figure F.1 shows the review exemption letter provided by Purdue’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for the research conducted in this study.

Figure F.1. Purdue’s Institutional Review Board exemption letter

144

APPENDIX G. USER INTERACTION SCRIPT FOR VM1
(UBUNTU 17.10)

This document describes the steps the user must follow in order to interact with the
VM Ubuntu 17.10 (IP address: 192.168.10.11):
1. Log in the laptop with the following credentials:
• User: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
2. Send an ICMP echo request to the VM:
2.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon “Command
Prompt”, located at the Desktop.
2.2. Execute the command ping -n X 192.168.10.11, replacing X by a number
between 1 and 10. Figure G.1 displays an example of this step using a value of 5
for X.

Figure G.1. Ping command screen

2.3. Close the command prompt window.
3. Connect to the SSH server running on the VM:
3.1. Open the SSH client by double-clicking on the icon “PuTTY (64 bits)”, located
at the Desktop.
3.2. Double-click on the session “VM1: Ubuntu 17.10” that was previously created
to connect to the IP address 192.168.10.11 and port TCP 22. Figure G.2
displays the Putty screen and the saved session list.
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Figure G.2. Putty screen

3.3. Log in the Ubuntu system with the following credentials:
• User: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
3.4. Select two commands from the next list and execute them, once at a time:
date
ls
last

ifconfg
ip ro
cd

ps
who
hostname

clear
w
blkid

df
whoami
uname

3.5. Leave the SSH session open (do not close the terminal).
4. Connect to the webserver running on the VM:
4.1. Open the Google Chrome browser by double-clicking on the icon “Google
Chrome”, located at the Desktop.
4.2. In the address bar enter the following URL: http://192.168.10.11
4.3. You should see a web page with the title “Apache2 Ubuntu Default Page”.
Figure G.3 shows and example of the web page retrieved after entering the
mentioned URL.
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Figure G.3. Chrome screen

4.4. Close the Google Chrome browser.
5. Complete the frst available row in the next table, detailing the date and time the
interaction was performed, the X value selected at step 2.2 and the commands
executed at step 3.4.
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Date
05/18
05/20
05/21
05/22
05/23
05/25
05/30
06/01
06/05
06/08

Time
5:40pm
6:55pm
6:25pm
5:50pm
5:40pm
4:10pm
6:05pm
7:15pm
11:10am
10:45am

X value
5
7
1
3
10
8
3
5
8
9

Commands executed
ip ro — uname
hostname — df
ps — clear
w — last
date — cd
df — hostname
date — ifconfg
clear — cd
last — df
whoami — blkid
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APPENDIX H. USER INTERACTION SCRIPT FOR VM2
(CENTOS7)

This document describes the steps the user must follow in order to interact with the
VM Centos 7 (IP address: 192.168.10.12):
1. Log in the laptop with the following credentials:
• User: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
2. Send an ICMP echo request to the VM:
2.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon “Command
Prompt”, located at the Desktop.
2.2. Execute the command ping -n X 192.168.10.12, replacing X by a number
between 1 and 10. Figure H.1 displays an example of this step using a value of 5
for X.

Figure H.1. Ping command screen

2.3. Close the command prompt window.
3. Connect to the SSH server running on the VM:
3.1. Open the SSH client by double-clicking on the icon “PuTTY (64 bits)”, located
at the Desktop.
3.2. Double-click on the session “VM2: Centos 7” that was previously created to
connect to the IP address 192.168.10.12 and port TCP 22. Figure H.2 displays
the Putty screen and the saved session list.
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Figure H.2. Putty screen

3.3. Log in the Centos system with the following credentials:
• User: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
3.4. Select two commands from the next list and execute them, once at a time:
date
ls
last

ifconfg
ip ro
cd

ps
who
hostname

clear
w
blkid

df
whoami
uname

3.5. Leave the SSH session open (do not close the terminal).
4. Connect to the FTP server running on the VM:
4.1. Open the FileZilla FTP Client by double-clicking on the icon “FileZilla Client”,
located at the Desktop.
4.2. Go to menu “File” and then select “Site Manager...”.
4.3. Double-click on the entry “Centos 7” that was previously created to connect to
the IP address 192.168.10.12 and port TCP 21, using the same credentials
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mentioned in the previous step. Figure H.3 displays the FileZilla Site Manager
screen and the aforementioned entry.

Figure H.3. FileZilla Site Manager screen

4.4. Wait until the FTP connection is established. Figure H.4 illustrates the FileZilla
screen at this point, after the content of the directory /home/cfstudent is listed.

150

Figure H.4. FileZilla screen once the FTP connection is established

4.5. Close the FileZilla FTP Client.
5. Complete the frst available row in the next table, detailing the date and time the
interaction was performed, the X value selected at step 2.2 and the commands
executed at step 3.4.
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Date
05/18
05/20
05/21
05/22
05/24
05/25
05/30
06/01
06/05
06/08

Time
5:50pm
7:10pm
6:30pm
6:00pm
7:00pm
4:20pm
6:20pm
7:20pm
11:15am
10:50am

X value
10
9
4
7
1
4
5
10
2
9

Commands executed
blkid — whoami
ifconfg — date
ip ro — who
ifconfg — uname
last — whoami
ip ro — blkid
ps — uname
ifconfg — last
hostname — w
ip ro — last
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APPENDIX I. USER INTERACTION SCRIPT FOR VM3
(WINDOWS 2008)

This document describes the steps the user must follow in order to interact with the
VM Windows 2008 (IP address: 192.168.10.13):
1. Log in the laptop with the following credentials:
• User: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
2. Send an ICMP echo request to the VM:
2.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon “Command
Prompt”, located at the Desktop.
2.2. Execute the command ping -n X 192.168.10.13, replacing X by a number
between 1 and 10. Figure I.1 displays an example of this step using a value of 5
for X.

Figure I.1. Ping command screen

2.3. Close the command prompt window.
3. Connect to the Remote Desktop service running on the VM:
3.1. Open the remote desktop client by double-clicking on the icon “Remote
Desktop”, located at the Desktop.
3.2. In the Computer text-box write the IP address 192.168.10.13 and then click on
the button “Connect”. Figure I.2 displays the remote desktop client screen.

152

Figure I.2. Remote desktop client screen

3.3. Log in the Windows 2008 system with the following credentials:
• User: Administrator
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
3.4. After log in the Windows 2008, complete the next actions inside this system:
3.4.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon
“Command Prompt”, located at the Windows 2008 Desktop.
3.4.2. Select two commands from the next list and execute them, inside the
command prompt window, once at a time:
cls
date /t
time /t

ipconfg
hostname
vol

route print
netstat
whoami

dir
tree
arp -a

cd
ver
dispdiag

3.4.3. Minimize the command prompt window. Do not close it. If it was closed by
mistake start again from step 3.4.1.
3.5. Once the previous actions are completed, leave the remote desktop connection
open (do not close the session, just minimize it to continue with the next step).
4. Query the DNS server running on the VM:
4.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon “Command
Prompt”, located at the Desktop.
4.2. Execute the command nslookup.exe XXX.vpsnet.com 192.168.10.13, replacing
XXX by one of the following options: vm1, vm2, vm3, or vm4. Depending on
the option selected, the IP address reported by the DNS server could be:
192.168.10.11 (for vm1), 192.168.10.12 (for vm2), 192.168.10.13 (for vm3), or
192.168.10.14 (for vm4). Figure I.3 displays an example of this step using the
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value “vm1” for XXX. In this example, the IP address reported by the DNS
server was 192.168.10.11.

Figure I.3. Nslookup command screen

4.3. Close the command prompt window.
5. Complete the frst available row in the next table, detailing the date and time the
interaction was performed, the X value selected at step 2.2 and the commands
executed at step 3.4.2.
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Date
05/18
05/20
05/21
05/22
05/23
05/25
05/30
06/01
06/05
06/08

Time
5:55pm
7:20pm
6:40pm
6:30pm
6:10pm
4:25pm
6:25pm
7:25pm
11:25am
10:54am

X value
8
3
2
5
6
1
4
8
9
9

Commands executed
route print — dispdiag
vol — ver
cls — netstat
time /t — date /t
tree — vol
cls — vol
ver — vol
ipconfg — arp -a
date /t — netstat
cls — date /t
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APPENDIX J. USER INTERACTION SCRIPT FOR VM4
(WINDOWS 2016)

This document describes the steps the user must follow in order to interact with the
VM Windows 2016 (IP address: 192.168.10.14):
1. Log in the laptop with the following credentials:
• User: cfstudent
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
2. Send an ICMP echo request to the VM:
2.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon “Command
Prompt”, located at the Desktop.
2.2. Execute the command ping -n X 192.168.10.14, replacing X by a number
between 1 and 10. Figure J.1 displays an example of this step using a value of 5
for X.

Figure J.1. Ping command screen

2.3. Close the command prompt window.
3. Connect to the Remote Desktop service running on the VM:
3.1. Open the remote desktop client by double-clicking on the icon “Remote
Desktop”, located at the Desktop.
3.2. In the Computer text-box write the IP address 192.168.10.14 and then click on
the button “Connect”. Figure J.2 displays the remote desktop client screen.
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Figure J.2. Remote desktop client screen

3.3. Log in the Windows 2016 system with the following credentials:
• User: Administrator
• Password: 2hLMmVGt
3.4. After log in the Windows 2016, complete the next actions inside this system:
3.4.1. Open a command prompt window by double-clicking on the icon
“Command Prompt”, located at the Windows 2016 Desktop.
3.4.2. Select two commands from the next list and execute them, inside the
command prompt window, once at a time:
cls
date /t
time /t

ipconfg
hostname
vol

route print
netstat
whoami

dir
tree
arp -a

cd
ver
dispdiag

3.4.3. Minimize the command prompt window. Do not close it. If it was closed by
mistake start again from step 3.4.1.
3.5. Once the previous actions are completed, leave the remote desktop connection
open (do not close the session, just minimize it to continue with the next step).
4. Connect to the MySQL server running on the VM:
4.1. Open the application MySQL Workbench by double-clicking on the icon
“MySQL Workbench”, located at the Desktop.
4.2. Go to menu “Database” and then select “Connect to Database...”.
4.3. Select the stored connection “VM4: Windows 2016” that was previously created
to connect to the IP address 192.168.10.14, port TCP 3306, and using the root
account. Then click on the button “OK”. Figure J.3 displays the MySQL
Workbench screen and the aforementioned stored connection.
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Figure J.3. MySQL Workbench screen

4.4. Wait until the MySQL connection is established. Figure J.4 illustrates the
MySQL Workbench screen at this point, after the MySQL connection is
established and ready to accept SQL statements.

Figure J.4. MySQL Workbench screen once the MySQL connection is established
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4.5. Close the application MySQL Workbench.
5. Complete the frst available row in the next table, detailing the date and time the
interaction was performed, the X value selected at step 2.2 and the commands
executed at step 3.4.2.
Test
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Date
05/18
05/20
05/21
05/22
05/23
05/25
05/30
06/01
06/05
06/08

Time
6:10pm
7:30pm
6:50pm
6:35pm
6:30pm
4:30pm
6:20pm
7:30pm
11:30am
10:55am

X value
9
8
8
9
8
7
2
3
5
9

Commands executed
tree – arp -a
whoami – tree
route print – dispdiag
ver – netstat
hostname – ipconfg
netstat – tree
dir – whoami
date /t – ver
cls – dispdiag
ipconfg – hostname

